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ARTICLE
REFORMING REIT TAXATION (OR NOT)
Bradley T. Borden*
ABSTRACT

Tax law treats the income of real estate investment trusts
(REITs) differently from the income of regular corporations.
Income distributed by regular corporations is subject to an
entity-level tax and a shareholder-level tax, while taxable income
distributed by REITs is subject to tax only at the shareholder level.
To qualify for that single level of tax, REITs must hold primarily
real estate assets, and their income must be primarily from such
assets. After being a relatively insignificant part of the economy
for the first three decades of their existence, REITs have become
relevant over the last twenty years, with the market capitalization

of publicly traded REITs eclipsing 5% of U.S. GDP at the end of
2014. Reports about REITs appear frequently in major media
outlets, and many emphasize corporate-tax-base erosion that
results from REIT spinoffs and conversions. Calls for REIT reform
have been answered with proposed legislation that would change
various aspects of REIT taxation. Recent work in this area shows
that even though REIT spinoffs and conversions do erode the
corporate tax base, the requirement that they distribute income
and the higher tax rates of REIT shareholders offset
corporate-tax-base erosion and minimize the tax-revenue effects of
REIT taxation. This Article examines the history of REIT taxation
and identifies Congress's purposes for enacting REIT legislation
and amending it over the years. The Article examines some
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criticisms of REIT taxation and analyzes REIT taxation based
upon how well it accomplishes Congress's purposes and satisfies
traditional tax-policy objectives. Based on that analysis, the
Article finds that REIT taxation is benign, and it benefits the
economy by helping to stabilize real estate markets. The Article
then compares the REIT regime with various reform alternatives.
Not surprisingly, after finding that REIT taxation is benign and
beneficent, the Article concludes that maintaining the status quo
is more attractive than any of the reform alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION

Before announcing his retirement from Congress,'
Representative David Camp, the then-chair of the tax-writing
House Ways and Means Committee, proposed reforming aspects
of real estate investment trust (REIT) taxation. 2 Over the past
several years, REITs have also made headlines (many of which are
critical of REITs) in major news outlets, and the frequency of REIT
stories appears to be increasing. 3 The Camp Proposal and media

&

1.
Ed O'Keefe & Paul Kane, House Ways and Means Chair Dave Camp to Retire,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2014, at A3.
2.
See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (proposing several modifications
to REIT taxation, including § 3631 (proposing prohibiting tax-free spinoffs to REITs and
preventing a corporation from making a REIT election if the corporation was part of a
tax-free spinoff within the ten years preceding the date of election), §§ 3633-3634
(proposing modifications of the definition of REIT real property), § 3644 (proposing a
modification of the rules governing taxable REIT subsidiary), and § 3647 (proposing
denying tax-free corporate conversions to REITs)).
3.
See, e.g., Alison Gregor, Specialty REITs, Exploiting Niche Categories,
Outperform the Mainstream Players, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at B6; Thomas Gryta
Ryan Knutson, IRS Blesses Telecom's Turn to REIT, Windstream Cleared to Cut Taxes by
Forming a REIT: IRS Allows Firm to Classify Its Phone Lines as Real Estate, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 2014, at Bi (exploring the explosion of REITs, which has "stretched the definition
of real estate into new territory, giving American companies another means of minimizing
their taxes at a time when corporate tax avoidance has sparked fierce debate in
Washington"); Gretchen Morgenson, A Corporate Tax Break That's Closer to Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at BUl; Cecile Daurat & Caitlin McCabe, Windstream to Spin Off
Networks
into
Publicly
Traded REIT,
BLOOMBERG
(July
29,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/windstream-to-spin-off-telecom-assets-into-p
ublicly-traded-reit.html; Howard Gleckman, How REIT Spinoffs Will Further Erode the
Corporate Tax Base, FORBES (July 31, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014
(identifying REITs as
/07/31/how-reit-spinoffs-will-further-erode-the-corporate-tax-base
"1an unmistakable opportunity" to minimize taxes); David M. Levitt, Empire State Realty
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coverage of REIT taxation express concern that REITs erode the
corporate tax base and therefore are bad. 4 Unfortunately, these
reports lack critical insight into the history and policy of REIT
taxation and the effect it has on tax revenue and the broader
economy. This Article provides a critical analysis of REIT taxation
and reaches conclusions that are at odds with the popular press's
take on REIT taxation.
REITs come in three varieties: (1) equity REITs (own tangible
real estate), (2) mortgage REITs (lend money to other real estate
owners or operators or hold pools of mortgages or mortgage-backed
securities), and (3) hybrid REITs (own real estate and mortgages). 5
The comparative market size of each type of REIT has fluctuated
over time, but equity REITs have gained prominence over the last
three decades. 6 Despite those fluctuations and market cycles, the
growth of REITs has been significant, especially over the last
twenty years (see Figure 1).7 Important developments in REIT law
appear to affect the growth of REITs in varying degrees, so the law
deserves careful scrutiny. Some important legal developments
include legislation and IRS rulings that liberalized the type of
services REITs can perform directly and indirectly through
taxable REIT subsidiaries; 8 opened REIT investment to

Trust Gains After $929.5 Million IPO, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2013-10-02/empire-state-realty-trust-gains-after-929-5-million-ipo;
Aaron
Levitt, Why Weird REITs Are Wonderful for Investors, Investor Place (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://investorplace.com/2013/02/why-weird-reits-are-wonderful-for-investors/#.VCNBmk1
OxbU (identifying cold storage warehouses, cell phone towers, and salt caverns as types of
property owned by some specialty REITs); Brian Louis, Paramount Said to Plan Biggest
REIT IPO at $2.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2014-08-27/paramount-group-files-for-ipo-of-u-s-office-landlord.html; Brad Thomas,
Empire State Realty Trust: This Proposed New REIT Makes Cents, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bradthomas/2013/02/15/empire-state-realty-trust-this-propos
ed-new-reit-makes-cents/2/.
4.
See H.R. 1; sources cited supra note 3.
5.
See PETER M. FASS, MICHAEL E. SHAFF & DONALD B. ZIEF, Real Estate
Investment Trust Terminology-Types of REITs, in REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
HANDBOOK § 1:3 (2014); Joel Simpson Marcus, An Analysis of Qualified Income Interest
Problems of Mortgage REITs, 37 J. TAX'N 348, 348-49 (1972); Manishi Pathak, India
and Real Estate Investment Trusts-A New Movement, 1 REAL EST. L. 45, 45 (2008);
Larry Witner, Tax Ideas: REITs: The Revolution in Real Estate Financing, 22 REAL
EST. L.J. 248, 249 (1994).
6.
See infra Appendix A. Information about the size of the REIT market is based on
publicly-traded REITs, but REITs can also be held privately. Information about
privately-held REITs is not publicly available, but the size of the REIT market is
undoubtedly larger than depicted in Figure 1 because of privately-held REITs.
7.
The data used to construct the chart in Figure 1 is presented in Appendix A.
8.
See infra Part II.C.2; see also David M. Einhorn, Unintended Advantage: Equity
REITs vs. Taxable Real Estate Companies, 51 TAx LAW. 203, 209-18 (1998) (attributing the
success of REITs to their success evolving beyond passive investment vehicles).
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institutional investors, namely mutual funds, tax-exempt pension
funds, and endowments; 9 and continually updated the definition
of real estate assets to include more and more nontraditional real
estate.10

Figure 1: Growth of REIT Industry
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The greatest change in market capitalization as measured
by year-over-year growth occurred in 1993.11 That was the year
Congress enacted legislation that made REIT stock ownership
easier for pension funds, 12 and brought more institutional
investment to the REIT market. 13 The decrease in the number of

9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See

infra Parts II.C.4, IV.B.1-2.
infra Part II.C.8.
infra Appendix A.
infra Part II.C.4.

13.
SU HAN CHAN, JOHN ERICKSON & KO WANG, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS:
STRUCTURE, PERFORMANCE, AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 106-08 (2003) (concluding

that equity REITs provide more information, which attracts more institutional investors,
which causes market capitalization to grow); Su Han Chan, Wai Kin Leung & Ko Wang,
InstitutionalInvestment in REITs: Evidence and Implications, 16 J. REAL EST. RES. 357,
363-72 (1998) (showing that institutional investment in REIT stock increased
significantly after 1993); John L. Crain, Mike Cudd & Christopher L. Brown, The Impact
of the Revenue ReconciliationAct of 1993 on the PricingStructure of Equity REITs, 19 J.
REAL EST. RES. 275, 277-78 (2000) (analyzing the effect of the enactment of the pension
look-through rules).
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REITs following 1993 resulted from consolidations.1 4 The surge
in the number of REITs and market capitalization in 2003 would
appear to reflect the reaction to a favorable ruling from the IRS
sanctioning tax-free REIT spinoffs,15 but the number of REIT
spinoffs has been limited.16 The dip from 2007 through 2011
mirrors the Great Recession and events leading up to the 2008
financial crisis.17 The fluctuations in the number of REITs and
REIT market capitalization indicate that changes in the tax law
appear to affect investments in REITs, but other forces also play
a role in investor decision-making.
The growth rate of REITs is impressive when compared to
general economic performance (see Figure 2).18 For instance, the
U.S. gross domestic product grew from under $1.2 trillion at the
end of 1971 to more than $17.5 trillion at the end of 2014.19 That
1392% increase is dwarfed by the 60,625% increase of REIT
market capitalization (almost $1.5 billion in 1971 to more than
$907 billion in 2014) over the same period. 20

14.
See Zhilan Feng, S. McKay Price & C.F. Sirmans, An Overview of Equity Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs): 1993-2009, 19 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 307, 310 (2011).
15.
See infra Part II.C.7 (discussing REIT spinoffs).
16.
See Martin A. Sullivan, The Revenue Cost of NontraditionalREITs, 144 TAX
NOTES 1103, 1103-04, 1107-11 (2014) (identifying the handful of REIT spinoffs and
conversions that have occurred since 2001).
17.
See infra Appendix A.
18.
The data used to construct Figure 2 is reproduced in Appendix A.
19.
See National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic
Product,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE:

BUREAU

OF

ECON.

ANALYSIS,

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=5
(last updated July 30, 2015).
20.
See infra Appendix A.
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Figure 2: GDP and REIT Growth
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This growth demonstrates that over the last forty years,
REITs have become an important part of the economy. In 1971,
REIT market capitalization equaled just 0.13% of U.S. GDP, but
that number has grown to more than 5% in 2014 (see Figure 3).21
Thus, the absolute size of REIT market capitalization is growing,
and REITs are becoming an ever-increasing portion of the U.S.
economy. The attention that REIT taxation is attracting is
warranted.

21.

The data used to construct Figure 3 is reproduced in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: REIT Market Capitalization as a
Percentage of GDP
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The cause of the exceptional growth of REIT market
capitalization appears to be at least somewhat attributable to the
growth in the number of publicly traded REITs. 22 The change in
average market capitalization of publicly traded REITs tracks
very closely to the change in overall market capitalization of
REITs (see Figure 4).23 Consequently, the growth appears to be
primarily attributable to the size of REITs increasing.

22.
23.

See supra Figure 1.
The data used to construct Figure 4 is reproduced in Appendix A.
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Figure 4: Average Market Capitalization
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REITs have drawn significant attention from the media, the
tax bar, nonlegal academics, and lawmakers. For instance,
other academic disciplines recognize that "[r]egulatory changes
and the sheer growth of the industry render REITs an
interesting forum for academic inquiry." 2 4 In fact, hundreds of
articles about REITs are published in accounting, finance, and
economics journals, including articles in the leading journals of
each of those disciplines, with evidence that the interest in those
disciplines is increasing. 25 Academic articles in those other
disciplines cover a very wide range of topics. 26 By contrast the

24.
See Feng, Price & Sirmans, supranote 14, at 308.
25.
See, e.g., J.B. Corgel, W. McIntosh & S.H. Ott, Real Estate Trusts: A Review of the
FinancialEconomics Literature, 3 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 13 (1995) (citing 115 published
and unpublished REIT papers written between 1980 and the publication of their 1995
paper); Feng, Price & Sirmans, supra note 14 (reporting that 400 published and
unpublished REIT papers were written during the fifteen years prior to mid-2009, including
175 written between 2005 and mid-2009).
26.
See, e.g., Paul R. Allen & C.F. Sirmans, An Analysis of Gains to AcquiringFirm's
Shareholders: The Special Case of REITs, 18 J. FIN. EcoN. 175 (1987) (examining REIT
mergers and acquisitions); Bok Baik, Bruce K. Billings & Richard M. Morton, Reliability
and Transparency of Non-GAAP Disclosures by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), 83
ACCT. REV. 271 (2008) (analyzing REIT disclosure); David T. Brown, Liquidity and
Liquidation:Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 55 J. FIN. 469 (2000) (studying
REIT liquidity); William M. Gentry, Deen Kemsley & Christopher J. Mayer, Dividend Taxes
and Share Prices: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 58 J. FIN. 261 (2003)
(examining REIT dividends); Jay C. Hartzell, Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu, The Role
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legal academy has contributed very little to the discussion of
REIT taxation. 27 Most legal commentary in this area comes from

of Corporate Governance in InitialPublic Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment
Trusts, 51 J.L. & EcON. 539 (2008) (examining corporate governance and REIT IPOs); John
S. Howe & James D. Shilling, CapitalStructure Theory and REIT Security Offerings, 43 J.
FIN. 983 (1988) (studying the capital structure and security offerings of REITs); Jeffrey F.
Jaffe, Taxes and the CapitalStructure of Partnerships,REITs, and Related Entities, 46 J.
FIN. 401 (1991) (analyzing tax and capital structure of REITs and other entities); Jarl G.
Kallberg, Crocker L. Liu & Charles Trzcinka, The Value Added from Investment Managers:
An Examination of Funds of REITs, 35 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387 (2000)
(analyzing investment-manager effect); David C. Ling & Michael Ryngaert, Valuation
Uncertainty, InstitutionalInvolvement, and the Underpricingof IPOs: The Case of REITs,
43 J. FIN. ECON. 433 (1997) (examining institutional involvement in REIT IPOs); Frank
Packer, Timothy Riddiough & Jimmy Shek, Securitizationand the Supply Cycle: Evidence
from the REIT Market, 39 J. PORTFOLIO MTG. 134 (2013) (examining the effect publicly
traded REITs have on the stability of commercial real estate markets).
27.
The relatively few articles (many of which are excellent student notes or
comments) that appear in legal journals focus on relatively narrow issues and are almost
exclusively written by authors who are not full-time academics. See, e.g., Sarah G. Austrian
& Willys H. Schneider, Tax Aspects of ForeignInvestment in U.S. Real Estate, 45 TAX LAW.
385 (1992) (discussing the tax consequences to foreign investors of investing in U.S. real
estate and withholding obligations of U.S. persons related to foreign investments); Bradley
T. Borden,* Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 527
(2015) [hereinafter Borden, Rethinking the Effect] (using a dynamic analysis to show that
the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation is nominal with counterintuitive results relating to
REIT spinoffs and partnership-to-REIT formations); John P. Carroll, Jr., Tax Policy for the
Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REV. 299 (1973) (discussing policy aspects of
several of the REIT requirements); Emily Cauble,* Taxing Publicly Traded Entities, 6
COLUM. J. TAX L. 147 (arguing that only income from publicly-traded property should
qualify for conduit and pass-through treatment for publicly traded entities like REITs and
publicly traded partnerships); William J. Daly, A Comparative Analysis of the New Real
Estate Investment Trust Legislation in Germany and the United Kingdom: Will Those
Markets Experience the Same Success as the United States?, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 839 (2008) (comparing the REIT regimes of the United States, Germany, and the
United Kingdom); David M. Einhorn, Adam 0. Emmerich & Robin Panovka, REIT M&A
Transactions-Peculiaritiesand Complications, 55 Bus. LAW. 693 (2000) (discussing
mergers and acquisitions of REITs); Einhorn, supra note 8 (discussing the then-current
practices of REITs); Dudley J. Godfrey, Jr. & Joseph H. Bernstein, The Real Estate
Investment Trust-Past, Present and Future, 1962 WIs. L. REV. 637 (providing a
contemporary account of the original REIT legislation); James S. Halpern,* Real Estate
Investment Trusts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 31 TAX LAW. 329 (1978) (reviewing the
changes brought about by the 1976 REIT legislation); Simon Johnson, Has the Time for
Large GamingPropertyInvolved REITs FinallyArrived?:A Review of the Potentialfor REIT
Investment in Destination Gaming Resort Properties, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 47 (2011)
(focusing on REITs in the gaming industry); Simon Johnson, Reinvigorating the REIT's
Neutrality and CapitalFormation Purposes Through a Modernized Tax IntegrationModel,
7 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 63 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Reinvigorating the
REIT's Neutrality] (arguing that Congress should reform REIT taxation to improve the
capitalization rules that currently require REITs to distribute almost all of their taxable
income); Marvin S. Kahn, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48 VA. L. REV. 1011
(1962) (discussing the effect REIT taxation had on the use of business trusts); William A.
Kelley, Jr., Real Estate Investment Trusts After Seven Years, 23 BUS. LAW. 1001 (1968)
(revisiting REIT taxation shortly after the enactment of the REIT regime); Theodore Lynn,
Real Estate Investment Trusts: Problems and Prospects, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1962)
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the tax bar. 28 The oversight by the legal academy of such a
(discussing the then-newly-enacted REIT tax regime); John K. MacDonald, Real Estate
Investment Trusts under the InternalRevenue Code of 1954: Proposalsfor Revision, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 808 (1964) (discussing the then-recently-enacted REIT regime); William L.
Martin, II, FederalRegulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 316 (1978) (proposing legislation for REITs that would put REITs and RICs
on similar ground); J. B. Riggs Parker, REIT Trustees and the "Independent Contractor",
48 VA. L. REV. 1048 (1962) (describing how the federal tax restriction on services that a
REIT may provide could be contrary to the state fiduciary duties imposed on trustees of
real estate trusts); Carson Siemann, PromotingEquity for REIT Investors, 36 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 271 (2012) (recounting the history of REIT taxation and arguing that lawmakers
should modify REIT taxation to incorporate aspects of partnership taxation); Julius L.
Sokol, The Proliferationof Global REITs and the Cross-Borderizationof the Asian Market,
9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 481 (2008) (focusing on the Asian REIT market); Robert J.
Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511 (2003) (discussing the
tax aspects of RICs and REITs and the tax consequences of foreign investment in such
arrangements); Alessandra Suuberg, REIT Conversions in Context: A Case Study for the
Tax Planning Initiate, 44 REAL EST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2545368 (discussing REIT conversions and spinoffs); Louis J.
Zivot, The Evolution of a REIT Rule: Impermissible Tenant Service Income, 33 REAL EST.
L.J. 54 (2004) (discussing changes to the restrictions on services that a REIT can provide
tenants); Mitchell N. Baron, Comment, Tax Status of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A
Reassessment, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 166 (1973) (arguing that the REIT
requirements should be relaxed to help additional capital flow to low-income housing);
Nathan C. Brown, Comment, Real EstateInvestment Trusts and Subpart F: Characterizing
Subpart F Inclusions for Purposes of the REIT Income Tests, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 833
(2006) (considering whether earnings of a foreign corporation should be treated as
dividends for the REIT income tests, if the REIT is a shareholder of the foreign corporation);
Chadwick M. Cornell, Comment, REITs and UPREITs: Pushing the Corporate Law
Envelope, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1997) (describing UPREIT structures and the benefits
that investors derive from using them); Note, Managingthe Real-Estate Investment Trust:
An Alternative to the Independent ContractorRequirement, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1117 (1994)
[hereinafter Harvard Note] (discussing the rules governing the types of services that REITs
can provide directly or through contractors); Russell J. Singer, Note, UnderstandingREITs,
UpREITs, and DownREITs, and the Tax and Business Decisions Surrounding Them, 16
VA. TAX REV. 329 (1996) (focusing on particular REIT structures); Jennifer Stonecipher,
Note, From One Pocket to the Other: The Abuse ofReal EstateInvestment Trusts Deductions,
72 Mo. L. REV. 1455 (2007) (addressing a then-loophole in state tax rules that allow
operating companies to generate deductions by circulating money through a REIT and
holding company); Joseph Taubman, Note, The Land Trust Taxable as Association, 8 TAX
L. REV. 103 (1952) (discussing the tax status and treatment of land trusts prior to
enactment of the REIT legislation); Charles E. Wern, III, Comment, The Stapled REIT on
Ice: Congress' 1998 Freeze of the GrandfatherException for Stapled REITs, 28 CAP. U. L.
REV. 717 (2000) (examining legislation that curtailed the use of stapled and paired-share
REITs). * The asterisk identifies the only authors who appear to have been members of a
law school faculty at the time of article publication.
28.
A small sampling of REIT articles appearing in professional tax journals
illustrates the topics that the tax bar covers. See, e.g., Peter E. Boos, Runaway REIT Train?
Impact of Recent IRS Rulings, 144 TAX NOTES 1289 (2014) (arguing that recent trends in
REIT rulings diverge from Congress's original intent, and recommending a narrower
definition of real property, restrictions on the types of services REITs can perform, and
curtailment of REIT conversions); Roger Brown, John Staples & Jeremy Huish, Internal
Controls for Withholding Agents on Income From REITs, 111 TAX NOTES 1115 (2006)
(discussing foreign investments in U.S. REITs); Paul W. Decker, David H. Kaplan & Ameek
Ashok Ponda, Original Intent: Revenues for Noncustomary Services Furnished by REIT
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significant area of the law is surprising. Perhaps that oversight
is partly responsible for reports that do not fully appreciate the
ramifications of REIT taxation. This Article is therefore
somewhat of a rarity, and it presents information and analysis
that should become important to commentators who cover REIT
taxation and provides a framework for future analyses of REIT
taxation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a
comprehensive review of REIT taxation by recounting the history
of REITs and the evolution of REIT law over the last five decades
and by identifying the law's stated legislative purposes. The
review reveals that changes to the law over the years have made
the growth of the REIT industry possible, but the REIT regime
remains true to its original purposes of providing real-estate
investment opportunities to a broad cross section of the population
and channeling capital to the real estate markets. Part III
considers whether there is a problem with REITs from a tax-policy
perspective. The analysis in that Part shows that even though
REIT taxation is susceptible to policy critiques, its shortcomings
are not obvious when the criticisms are subject to careful
consideration. In fact, the analysis suggests that the greatest

&

TRSs, 148 TAX NOTES 413 (2015) (discussing the rules governing services that a REIT can
provide); Paul W. Decker, Ameek Ashok Ponda & Jonathan Stein, Toward a Workable
Definition of REIT Healthcare Facility, 133 TAX NOTES 1231 (2011) (contending that the
IRS erred in privately ruling that an independent living facility does not come within the
REIT definition of healthcare facility and suggesting legislation or an IRS ruling that allows
taxpayers to elect to treat independent living facilities as a healthcare facility); Ezra
Dyckman & Daniel W. Stahl, Opportunities and Pitfalls in Structuring UPREIT
Transactions, 142 TAX NOTES 95 (2014) (explaining UPREITs); Richard M. Lipton
Patricia W. McDonald, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: The FATCA/FIRPTA
Dichotomy, 120 J. TAX'N 248 (2014) (discussing how the law treats foreign investments in
U.S. real estate through REIT and other investment vehicles); Richard M. Nugent, REIT
Spinoffs: Passive REITs, Active Businesses, 146 TAX NOTES 1513 (2015) [hereinafter
Nugent, REIT Spinoffs] (arguing that the law supports tax-free REIT spinoffs, REIT
spinoffs are not a drain on tax revenues, and that the REIT definition of real property
reflects a current application of long-existing standard); Richard M. Nugent, REIT Spinoffs:
PassiveREITs, Active Businesses, Part 2, 146 TAX NOTES 1635 (2015); Ameek Ashok Ponda,
Foreign Pension Plans Investments in U.S. REITs, 74 TAX NOTES 1593 (1997) (discussing
the rules governing foreign pension plans investing in U.S. REITs and the tax rates on
REIT dividends as provided for in various treaties); Ameek Ashok Ponda, How Much Gain
Would a REIT Defer if a REIT Could Defer Gain?, 135 TAX NOTES 1249 (2012) (discussing
the built-in gains tax and purging dividends to which REITs are subject after a conversion
or spinoff); Willard B. Taylor, Closing the Gap Between Private Rulings and Regulations,
144 TAX NOTES 597 (2014) [hereinafter Taylor, Closing the Gap] (summarizing regulations
proposed in 2014 that would codify the definition of real property that has emerged in
several private letter rulings); Willard B. Taylor, More Comments on Camp's REIT
Proposals, 143 TAX NOTES 243 (2014) [hereinafter Taylor, Comments on Camp Proposal]
(commenting on the Camp Proposal and recommending other REIT reform alternatives).
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failing of the REIT regime is that it simply might look bad to the
lay observer. Nonetheless, studies show that REITs benefit the
economy, and those benefits appear to offset any negative
consequences of REIT taxation. 29 Because REIT taxation
withstands thoughtful tax-policy analysis, Part IV concludes that
the reform proposals generally do not promise to improve the
situation and that maintaining the status quo appears to be the
best course of action at the present time. Part V concludes.
II.

OVERVIEW OF REIT TAXATION

Recounting the history of REIT taxation provides an
opportunity to consider whether changes to the REIT law have
influenced investment and whether capital demand hypothesis
helps explain part of the increasing popularity of REITs. 30 If the
taxpayer-friendly changes to the law have increased REIT
popularity, certainly future taxpayer-friendly changes will further
increase the popularity of REITs. Alternatively, changes that
narrow the scope of REIT taxation could adversely affect the
popularity of REITs and could stem the flow of capital to U.S. real
estate markets. Of course, REIT popularity may not be the
appropriate purpose for modifying REIT taxation. Indeed, some
proponents of change argue that the preservation of the corporate
tax base should motivate the changes. 31 The following discussion
reveals the stated purpose of REIT taxation and provides a
framework for analyzing various reform alternatives.

A.

Prologue to REIT Taxation (1800s-1960)

REIT taxation became a part of the U.S. tax system in 1960,32
but the history of REITs appears to trace back to the nineteenth
in
formed
trusts
estate
real
several
when
century

&

29. , See CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 13, at 40-42 (examining different
studies which show that the advantages of REIT taxation outweigh the disadvantages).
The capital demand hypothesis provides that a change in the economic
30.
environment, including changes to the law, can increase investment opportunities and
change the demand for capital. See Feng, Price & Sirmans, supra note 14, at 310 (linking
demand for REIT stock to regulatory changes); Richard J. Buttimer, David C. Hyland
Anthony B. Sanders, REITs, IPO Waves and Long-Run Performance, 33 REAL EST. ECON.
51, 53-54, 68-79, 83-85 (2005) (presenting support for the capital demand hypothesis and
the relationship between IPOs and regulatory changes).
31.
See Boos, supra note 28, at 1298-99 (suggesting that the erosion of the corporate
tax base should motivate changes).
32.
See Excise Tax Upon Cigars, Pub. L. No. 86-779 §§ 856-858, 74 Stat. 998, 100308 (1960); Siemann, supra note 27, at 280 (providing a recent recounting of the legislative
history of REIT taxation).

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

14

[53:1

Massachusetts. 3 3 When Congress enacted the 1909 corporate
income tax act, the tax status of REITs became important because
if they were classified as corporations, their income would be
subject to the corporate income tax. 34 In 1910, the Supreme Court

held that real estate trusts formed for the purpose of purchasing,
improving, holding, and selling lands and buildings were not
subject to the corporate income tax. 35 The tax classification of real

estate trusts came into question again, however, after Congress
enacted the income tax in 1913.36 The Supreme Court held that a
real estate trust came within the definition of corporation under
the new statute, so they became subject to income tax. 37 The ruling

was broad enough to reach mutual funds and also subject them to
an entity-level tax. The mutual fund reacted quickly to the
imposition of the income tax and convinced Congress to enact
legislation in 1936 that would allow security portfolios, such as
mutual funds, to deduct dividends they distributed to their
members. 38 The real-estate-trust industry languished following
the Supreme Court's ruling, but eventually Congress enacted
legislation that breathed some life into the industry.39
One prominently stated purpose of REIT taxation was to
create parity between investments in real estate portfolios and
investments in securities portfolios. 40 Beginning in 1936,
regulated investment companies (RICs), which include mutual
funds, 41 that satisfied several requirements did not have to pay an

33.
See Henry Rottschaefer, Massachusetts Trust Under Federal Tax Law, 25 COLUM.
L. REV. 305, 307 (1925) (attributing the first extensive development of business trusts to
Massachusetts); Suuberg, supra note 27 (recounting the history of REITs); Sabrina R.
Pellerin, Steven J. Sabol & John R. Walter, mREITs and Their Risks 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
13-19R, 2013),
Working Paper No.
of Richmond,
/papers.cfm?abstractid=2357070# (claiming that "REITs have been important players in
the real estate market since the late 1800s or earlier").
34. See Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909) (imposing a 1% tax on the
income of every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit and
having a capital stock represented by shares).
Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 187 (1910).
35.
See Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, §§ II.A subdiv. 2, II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 166, 172 (1913)
36.
(imposing a tax on corporations, joint-stock companies, and associations).
Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 360-62 (1935).
37.
38.
See Suuberg, supra note 27, at 15-16.
See Godfrey & Bernstein, supra note 27, at 642.
39.
40.
See H.R. REP. No. 84-2842, at 3 (1956) ("[The proposed legislation] provides
substantially the same tax treatment for real estate investment trusts as present law
provides for regulated investment companies.").

41.

See Samuel D. Brunson, The Taxation of RICs: Replicating Portfolio Investment

or EliminatingDouble Taxation?, 20 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 2-3), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2486762.
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entity-level tax on distributed earnings. 42 Although aspects of
some of the requirements have changed since 1936, tax law still
allows RICs to deduct qualifying dividend payments made to
shareholders and thereby avoid entity-level taxes, if they satisfy
an organizational test, an income test, and an asset test.4 3 To
satisfy the organizational test today, the RIC must be a domestic
corporation registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(or elect under such Act to be a business development company) or
be a common trust fund or similar fund excepted by such Act and
not otherwise taxed as a "common trust fund." 4 4 To satisfy the
asset and income tests, at least 50% of the arrangement's assets
must be cash and diversified securities, 4 5 90% of the
arrangement's income must come from passive-type investments
in securities, 4 6 and the arrangement must distribute at least 90%
of its taxable income to shareholders. 47 The asset test specifically
includes a diversification requirement under which not more than
5% of the total value of a RIC's assets represented by securities of
a single issuer count toward the 50% asset requirement. 48
Furthermore, not more than 25% of the total value of its assets can
be represented by securities of a single issuer or of two or more
issuers that the RIC controls, or qualified publicly traded
partnerships.4 9 These requirements are intended to help limit the

42.
See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, §§ 13(a)(3), 48(e), 49 Stat. 1648,
1655, 1669 (1936) (providing a credit to mutual investment companies for amount of
dividend paid, and defining mutual investment companies-the term used for RICs in the
original act-as any corporation that distributes at least 90% of its income to shareholders
as taxable dividends and that derives at least 95% of its gross income from dividends,
interest, and gains from dispositions of property); John Morley, Collective Branding and
the Origins of Investment Fund Regulation, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 341, 358-61 (2012)
(describing the original 1936 law).
43.
See I.R.C. § 852(b) (2012); Stephen D. Fisher, RICs and the Retail Investor: A
Marriage of Convenience or Necessity?, 66 TAX LAw. 331, 339-40 (2013) (discussing RICs
and other types of passthrough and conduit entities).
44.
§§ 851(a), 584(a) (defining common trust fund).
45.
§ 851(b)(3)(A).
46.
§ 851(b)(2).
47.
§ 852(a).
48.
See § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (providing further that the RIC's ownership of more than
10% of voting securities of such issuer does not count toward the 50% asset requirement).
49.
§ 851(b)(3)(B). When discussing the tax treatment of an entity or its members,
this Article uses the term "partnership" to refer to any arrangement that comes within the
federal tax definition of partnership, which may include state-law partnerships and limited
liability companies. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2011, 2012, and 2006,
respectively) (establishing the difference between a partnership and corporation for federal
tax purposes); Bradley T. Borden, The FederalDefinition of Tax Partnership,43 Hous. L.
REV. 925, 971, 975 (2006) (discussing various tests used to define partnership for federal
tax purposes).
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erosion of the corporate tax base by making RIC taxation available
only to arrangements that have limited business activities.50 The
effect of the dividend deduction granted to RICs is that income
they earn is generally taxed only once, even though RICs come
within the definition of an association taxable as a corporation
(i.e., a tax corporation). 5' Thus, arrangements that satisfy the RIC
requirements are generally not subject to an entity-level tax, but
the shareholders pay tax on dividends they receive from the RIC
at the appropriate rates. 52
The stated purpose for granting favorable tax treatment to
RICs was to extend opportunities to invest in diversified portfolios
of assets to a larger percentage of the population. 53 Without RIC
taxation, investors had to purchase directly the securities of
numerous corporations to obtain diversified portfolios and avoid a
second level of taxation. Previously, the opportunity to diversify in
such a manner was generally only available to relatively wealthy
individuals who could get the benefits of professional management
by hiring their own trustee to manage their private portfolios. 54
Individuals who lacked the resources to create directly such
portfolios could invest in portfolio companies created as
investment trusts, which were entities formed to acquire and
manage diversified portfolios of securities.5 5 The problem with
such arrangements prior to 1936 was that they came within the
definition of tax corporation and were subject to entity-level
taxation, so the tax consequences of investing through investment
trusts were prohibitive.5 6 Because portfolio companies often
50.
See Brunson, supra note 41 (manuscript at 17) ("In enacting the RIC qualification
requirements, Congress has created a fence around the world of quasi-pass-through
entities, one which limits the erosion of the corporate tax base.").
51.
See id. (manuscript at 22); Fisher, supranote 43, at 339-40.
52.
See § 854(b)(1)(B)(i). If at least 95% of the RIC's income is qualified dividend
income, distributions to RIC shareholders will be qualified dividend income that
qualifies for the favorable tax rates. See § 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(11). If less than 95% of the
RIC's income is qualified dividend income, then the only portion of a RIC distribution
that is qualified dividend income to the RIC shareholders is that portion which equals
the portion of the RIC's total income that is qualified dividend income. See
§ 854(b)(1)(B)(i) (flush language).
53.
See Brunson, supra note 41, (manuscript at 23) ("RICs were designed as a way
for unsophisticated, low-to-middle-income investors to get the benefits of diversification and
professional portfolio management.").
54.
See Mark J. Roe, PoliticalElements in the Creationof a Mutual Fund Industry,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1483 (1991).
55.
See Revenue Act of 1936: Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
74th Cong., pt. 10, at 60 (1936) (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue); Roe, supra note 54, at 1475.
56.
See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 360-62 (1935) (holding that an
investment trust was an association subject to corporate taxation); Roe, supra note 54, at
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portfolio-company level became a third level of tax.5 7 First, the

income of each investee corporation was subject to tax. Second,
dividends received by the portfolio from investee corporations were
subject to the portfolio company's corporate tax. Third, dividends
paid by the portfolio company to its shareholders were subject to
tax. The tax at the portfolio-company level thus subjected
shareholders of such companies to a level of tax that did not apply
to wealthy individuals who could create a portfolio by investing
directly in corporate stock.
Proponents of the RIC tax regime argued that favorable tax
treatment for investment trusts would allow smaller investors to
invest in portfolio companies and obtain the same position that
wealthy investors could obtain through direct investment.5 8 The
RIC tax regime thus made portfolio investment a viable reality for
a larger portion of the population, and for a greater section of
middle-income investors in particular. 59 At the end of 2013, around
46% of U.S. households owned mutual funds,6 0 which are a type of
RIC, so the RIC tax regime benefits a very significant portion of
the population and makes portfolio investment a reality for a
broader section of the population. The 46% of the population
mostly includes the top half of the population based upon income
level.6 1 The rules therefore do not appear to significantly help the
most vulnerable members of society increase or diversify savings,

1481-83 (discussing the tax classification of investments trusts in the 1930s and extra cost
imposed by the tax classification of mutual funds).
57.
See Morley, supra note 42, at 356-57.
58.
See Revenue Act of 1936: Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
74th Cong. 776-77 (1936) (statement of John Sherman Myers); Consuelo L. Kertz & Paul
J. Simko, Mutual Fund Investing and Tax Uncertainty: The Need for New Disclosures, 7
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 103, 107 (2001) (recognizing that RICs also allow small investors to
obtain expert investment advice).
59.
See S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 348-51 (1934); Samuel D. Brunson, Mutual Funds,
Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (2013); Mark J. Roe, A Political
Theory of American CorporateFinance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 20 (1991) ("Mutual funds are
designed for unsophisticated investors who cannot assemble a diversified portfolio or
evaluate the mutual fund's portfolio.").
60.
See Ownership of Mutual Funds, ShareholderSentiment, and Use of the Internet,
2013, ICIRES. PERSP., Oct. 2013, at 1, http://www.ici.org/pdf/perl9-09.pdf.
61.
Only 23% of households with less than $50,000 of annual income held mutual
funds, while 69% of households with income greater than $50,000 held mutual funds. Id.
at 7. The typical amount of savings and investment for households with less than $50,000
of income was $7,500, while the typical savings and investments was $200,000 for
households with more than $50,000 of income. Id. The median U.S. household income was
$51,939 in 2013. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 5 (2014),

http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.
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but they do help the middle-income portion of the population
diversify savings.
REIT taxation is modeled after the RIC tax regime. 62 Prior to
the enactment of the RIC regime, real estate trusts held real
property,6 3 but the real-estate-trust industry apparently was not
sufficiently organized or motivated to join the mutual fund
industry to obtain favorable tax treatment in the 1930s. 6 4 That
inability to eliminate the double tax on the income of real estate
trusts was attributed with hobbling the real-estate-trust industry
and hampering its contributions to the growth of the national
economy. 65 Nonetheless, the industry eventually gathered itself

and made a push to obtain favorable tax treatment for real estate
trusts.66 The arguments in support of favorable tax treatment for

real estate trusts, as reported by the House of Representatives,
included "equality of tax treatment between the beneficiaries of
real estate trusts and shareholders of regulated investment
companies" and an expansion of investment "advantages normally
available only to those with larger resources."6 7 The proponents of
the legislation also contended that favorable tax treatment would
help channel private funds to the real estate market.68

62.
See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 3-4 (1960) (providing that the REIT tax regime
would create equality between investors in pools of real estate and securities).
63.
See Laurence M. Channing, Federal Taxation of the Income of Real Estate
Investment Companies, 36 TAXES 502, 502 (1958) ("Before securities investment trusts
became a factor in the economy there were many real estate trusts (and a few corporations)
organized as investment media in real estate (principally in Massachusetts), owned by
substantial numbers of people and with transferrable shares enjoying active markets.").
64.

See THEODORE S. LYNN, MICAH W. BLOOMFIELD & DAVID W. LOWDEN, REAL

ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS § 1:11 (2015) ("Whatever the reason-that the respective
positions were different, belief that success was unlikely, or lack of need due to absence of
taxable income-REITs did not seek and were not afforded conduit tax treatment when
RICs were.").
65.
See Channing, supranote 63, at 503 ("It would seem that the failure of real estate
investment trusts to grow and contribute more to the national economic life is due in
substantial part to the double tax to which their income is subjected.").
66.
See Lynn, supra note 27, at 78-79.
H.R. REP. No. 84-2842, at 4 (1956) ("These advantages include the spreading of
67.
the risk of loss by the greater diversification of investment which can be secured through
the pooling arrangements; the opportunity to secure the benefits of expert investment
counsel; and the means of collectively financing projects which the investors could not
undertake singly.").
68.
Id. ("[Favorable tax treatment for real estate trusts] is particularly important
at the present time because of the countrywide complaints about the shortage of
private capital and mortgage money for individual homes, apartment houses, office
buildings, factories, and hotels. At the present time the financing of these real estate
equities and mortgages is dependent largely on Government-guaranteed money, and
investments by special groups, such as insurance companies and pension trusts.");
LYNN, BLOOMFIELD & LOWDEN, supra note 64 ("The proponents of REIT legislation
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Nonetheless, Congress was careful to point out that favorable
taxation would be extended only to real estate arrangements that,
to the extent possible, were subject to the requirements and
conditions that applied to RICs. 6 9 It also made certain to clarify
that the favorable tax treatment would only extend to passive
investments in real estate. 70 Thus, the proponents of favorable
REIT legislation framed their arguments in terms of equity and
economic expediency-they argued that real estate (and its
investors) should benefit from the same tax treatment afforded to
RICs (and their investors) and that favorable REIT tax treatment
would help stimulate the economy. They also ensured that REITs
would be different from active businesses that were subject to
corporate tax, drawing a distinction to justify equal treatment
with RICs and different treatment from tax corporations.
Favorable tax provisions for REITs appeared in two separate
legislative proposals in 1956 and 1957.71 Both times the House and
Senate voted to enact the bills, but President Eisenhower vetoed
the 1956 proposal,7 2 and the two legislative bodies could not agree
on various aspects of provisions in a 1957 proposal, which was
ultimately rejected by the Conference Committee. 73 A few years

argued to developers and to the real estate industry that passage of such legislation
would lead to a rise in the value of property and that the ranks of potential buyers
would be increased. The proponents also argued to various government agencies that
REIT legislation would be a boon to urban renewal and would produce more 'Golden
Triangles."'). Proponents of subsequent REIT legislation raised the same arguments.
See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 12,796 (1985) (statement of Rep. Vander Jagt) ("The purpose
of the legislation was to provide an opportunity for small investors to obtain the
advantages of real estate investment normally available only to those with much
greater resources . . . . The product of [the REIT] tax regime is a mechanism for small
investors to combine their resources for investment in a diversified pool of real estate
assets under professional management, while enjoying the benefits of liquidity
represented by transferable securities having the attributes of corporate stock.").
69.
See H.R. REP. No. 84-2842, at 4.
70.
See id. ("[The House Ways and Means Committee] has also taken care to draw a
sharp line between passive investments and the active operation of businesses, and has
extended the conduit type of tax treatment only to the passive investments of real estate
trusts. [The Committee] believes that any real estate trust engaging in active business
operations should continue to be subject to the corporate tax in the same manner as is true
in the case of similar operations carried on by other comparable enterprises.").
71.
See H.R. 4392, 84th Cong. (1956); H.R. 8102, 85th Cong. (1957). The Senate
passed a slightly different version of the 1957 proposal. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 65
(1958); LYNN, BLOOMFIELD & LOWDEN, supranote 64.
72.
See 102 CONG. REC. 15,304-05 (1956) (Dwight D. Eisenhower's veto message
dated Aug. 10, 1956); see also Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Providing a Special
Method of Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 10,
1956), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=10575&st=4392&stl=.
73.
See H.R. REP. No. 85-2632, at 30 (1958) (Conf. Rep.).
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later, with a change of personnel at Treasury, 74 the President
appeared to have a change of heart and signed the first REIT bill
into law in 1960.75 Although President Eisenhower ultimately
signed the REIT legislation into law, his reasons for originally
vetoing it resonate in the current environment of real estate
spinoffs, REIT conversions, and the evolving applications of REIT
taxation. They also echo in arguments presented today as a basis
for REIT reform. First, President Eisenhower recognized that the
income of RICs differed from the income of real estate trusts. In
particular, the income of RICs "generally derive[s] from the
securities of corporations which are fully subject to corporate
income tax" and the conduit treatment afforded to RICs "merely
avoids an additional level of corporate taxation."76 The President
observed that by contrast, conduit treatment for real estate trusts
"would entirely remove the corporate income tax from much of the
income originating in their real estate operations."7 7 He was also
concerned that although REIT taxation was "intended to be
applicable only to a small number of trusts, it could, and might
well become, available to many real-estate companies which were
originally organized and have always carried on their activities as
fully taxable corporations."7 8 The President therefore appeared to
adequately address the parallel with RICs, and he very presciently
identified how REITs might grow and potentially erode the
corporate tax base. The issues that existed at the time REIT
taxation became the law still exist today. Even though President
Eisenhower signed REIT legislation into law a few short years
following the veto letter, proponents of REIT reform still rely upon
the reasons set forth in the veto letter as grounds for reforming
the REIT regime.79
74.
See LYNN, BLOOMFIELD & LOWDEN, supra note 64 (claiming that Dan Throop Smith,
Undersecretary for Tax Policy of the Treasury, was the main source of resistance to the REIT
legislation, and after he resigned in 1959, the president signed the legislation into law).
75.
See Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, § 10(a), 74 Stat. 98, 1003-08 (1960);
History of REITs, NAREIT, https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/history-reits (last
visited Sept. 18, 2015); Brad Thomas, Eisenhower Paved the Way for REIT Investors to
Enjoy Durable Dividends, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:54 AM), http://www.forbes.comlsites
/bradthomas/2012/12/12/eisenhower-paved-the-way-for-reit-investors-to-enjoy-durable-div
idends/.
76.
102 CONG. REC. 15,304-05 (1956); see supra text accompanying notes 57-58
(describing the third level of tax).
77.
102 CONG. REC. 15,304-05 (1956).
78.
Id.
79.
See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (indicating that Congress did
not intend REITs to erode the corporate tax base); sources cited supra note 3; Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 1105-07 (focusing on corporate tax lost as a result of REIT spinoffs and
conversions).
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In addition to repeating the earlier arguments for favorable
REIT taxation, the legislative history accompanying the 1960 act
addressed the President's original misgivings about the
legislation. In particular, it noted that the only income of a RIC
that previously had been subjected to income tax was corporate
dividends, while the interest income and capital gains of a RIC
were not subject to tax prior to being recognized by the RIC.so
Consequently, some RIC income was not subject to an entity-level
tax, and so, the argument went, excluding REIT income from
entity-level taxation was fair. The argument also provided that
interest income of RICs is an important element of their portfolios,
confirming that the number of specified levels of taxes with respect
to the income of the RIC is not the justification for favorable RIC
taxation.8 1 Instead, the primary justification for favorable RIC
taxation was to "accord individuals of small means an opportunity
to pool their investments in one of these companies, yet receive the
same treatment as those of greater wealth can obtain by direct
investments."8 2 Similarly, providing an opportunity to small
investors in real estate markets became a key purpose of the REIT
legislation in 1960.83 The following discussion illustrates that as
proponents of the REIT regime sought to change the law over the
years, they often echoed these original purposes. Nonetheless, the
current REIT regime is significantly different from the one
originally enacted by Congress. Some of the changes may not
reflect Congress's originally stated purpose.
B.

OriginalREIT Regime (1960)

Many of the basic components of the current REIT
requirements reflect the original law enacted in 1960, but changes
over the last twenty-five years or so have significantly changed the
scope of REIT taxation, as predicted by President Eisenhower
when he vetoed the first REIT proposed legislation. Tax law
generally treats REITs like tax corporations, but it grants REITs
a deduction for dividends paid to shareholders.8 4 The deduction for
dividends paid generally eliminates the double tax, but
taxable-REIT shareholders must pay tax on the REIT's distributed

80.
See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 3-4 (1960).
81.
Id. at 4.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 3.
84.
See I.R.C. § 857(b)(1), (b)(2)(B) (2012). Tax law treats REITs differently from tax
corporations in other ways, see § 857(b), but the deduction for dividends is the most
significant because it generally allows REITs to avoid the corporate double taxation.
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income.8 5 To qualify for the dividend-paid deduction, a qualifying
entity must elect to be a REIT and distribute at least 90% of its
taxable income each taxable year. 86 To be treated as a REIT, the
entity must satisfy an organizational test, assets tests, and income
tests.87
1. Organizational Test. Originally a REIT had to be a
state-law trust or other unincorporated association,8 8 but today, a
REIT can be a state-law corporation, trust, or association (which
include state-law partnerships and limited liability companies), as
long as it satisfies several requirements.89 To begin, a REIT must
be managed by one or more trustees or directors.9 0 The ownership
of a REIT must be evidenced by transferable shares or certificates
of beneficial interests, 91 the interests must be held by 100 or more
persons, 92 and generally the REIT ownership cannot be highly
concentrated in a small number of investors (i.e., closely held). 93
85.
§ 61(a)(7) (including dividends in gross income); § 301(c) (distinguishing various
portions of dividends); § 857(b)(3)(B) (providing that a portion of a REIT dividend can be
treated as long-term capital gain, if it represents capital gain recognized by the REIT);
Treas. Reg. § 1.857-6 (as amended in 1986) (requiring REIT shareholders to recognize
income in the year they receive a REIT dividend and describing how to compute the amount
of income). Income distributed to a tax-exempt REIT shareholder generally would not be
subject to income tax. See § 501(a) (exempting organizations such as charities, churches,
educational institutions, and retirement funds from taxation); § 512(b)(1) (excluding
dividends from the definition of unrelated business taxable income); Rev. Rul. 66-106,
1966-1 C.B. 151 (ruling that REIT dividends paid to an exempt employees' pension trust do
not constitute unrelated business taxable income). But see § 856(h)(3 (subjecting some
dividends paid from pension-held REITs to certain pension trusts to unrelated business
taxable income).
86.
§ 857(a)(1). This requirement was part of the original REIT statute. See Act of
Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, sec. 10(a), § 857(a)(1), 74 Stat. 98, 1006 (1960) (codified
at I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (Supp. II 1961)). Congress adopted it to reflect the conduit type of tax
treatment that it had granted to RICs. See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 8 (1960).
87.
To qualify as a REIT, an entity also must satisfy a filing requirement. See
§ 856(c)(1). It also must ascertain its ownership each year. See § 857(f).
88.
See sec. 10(a), § 856(a), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(a) (Supp. II
1961)).
89.
See § 856(a). A partnership or limited liability company can elect to be a tax
corporation, so they too can be REITs. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (2012).
90.
§ 856(a)(1). Originally, the law limited management to trustees to reflect the
requirement that a REIT generally be a trust. See sec. 10(a), § 856(a), 74 Stat. at 1004
(codified at I.R.C. § 856(a) (Supp. 111961)).
91.
§ 856(a)(2). This rule is the same as the original rule. See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(2),
74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(a)(2) (Supp. II 1961).
92.
§ 856(a)(5). This rule is the same as the original rule. See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(5),
74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(a)(5) (Supp. II 1961)).
93.
§ 856(a)(6). This rule differs slightly from the original rule, which required that
REITs not be personal holding companies if all of their income constituted
personal-holding-company income. See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(6), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at
I.R.C. § 856(a)(6) (Supp. II 1961)). The current REIT requirements incorporate the
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As a general matter, an arrangement is closely held, and thus
could not satisfy the organizational test, if during the last half of
the year not more than five individuals own more than 50% of the
value of the entity's outstanding stock. 94 Congress originally
conditioned REIT classification on real estate trusts not holding
property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
their trades or businesses. 95 Today, the statute preserves that
policy goal by having the income tests exclude the gains from the
sale of such property from the list of qualifying income, 96 and by
imposing a 100% penalty tax on the gains (without offset by losses)
from the sale of such property. 9 7 Finally, a REIT cannot be a
financial institution or insurance company, and it must otherwise
be classified as a tax corporation.9 8
2. Asset Tests. Today, as with the original REIT regime, at
least 75% of a REIT's assets must consist of real estate assets, cash
and cash items, and government securities. 99 Both the current and
original regimes defined real estate assets to include real property,
interests in real property and mortgages on real property, and
shares in other REITs. 0 0 The current regime also includes stock
or debt instruments that do not otherwise come within the
definition of real estate assets, but that the REIT holds as a
temporary investment of new capital.10 1 Real property includes
land and improvements thereon,1 02 and interests in real property
include fee ownership, co-ownership, leaseholds, and options to
acquire real property and interests in real property. 103 The

personal-holding-company definition of closely held, but does not adopt the rules related to
personal-holding-company income. See § 856(h)(1)(A).
See §§ 856(h)(1)(A), 542(a)(2), 857(f).
94.
95.
See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(4), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(a)(4) (Supp. II
1961)).
96.
See infra text accompanying note 115.
See § 857(b)(6).
97.
See § 856(a)(3), (4); supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing how several
98.
state-law entities can be classified as tax corporations). The original rule required REITs
to otherwise come within the definition of corporation, but did not prohibit them from being
a financial institution or insurance company. See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(3), 74 Stat. at 1004
(codified at I.R.C. § 856(a)(3) (Supp. II 1961)).
99.
Compare § 856(c)(4)(A), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(5)(A), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1961)).
100.
Compare § 856(c)(5)(B), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(6)(B), 74 Stat. at 1005 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(6)(B) (Supp. II 1961)).
See § 856(c)(5)(B) (providing that the investment is temporary if the REIT does
101.
not hold it for more than one year after receiving the new capital).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d) (2014).
102.
103.
§ 856(c)(5)(C).
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definition of real property has been the subject of numerous
rulings, which clarify the definition as the needs and use of real
estate in the economy have changed over time. 104 The current
definition of interests in real property includes options to acquire
real property and leaseholds in real property, but the original
definition did not.10 5 Both versions of the definition exclude
mineral, oil, and gas royalty interests. 106
The current REIT regime also includes a diversification
requirement that largely survives from the original version.1 07 A
REIT can hold only a limited amount of non-real estate assets. For
example, not more than 25% of its assets (in value) can be
nongovernmental securities and not more than 25% of its assets
(in value) can be securities in taxable REIT subsidiaries.1 0 8
Generally, not more than 5% of the REIT's assets (in value) can be
represented by the securities of one issuer.1 09 Finally, a REIT
cannot hold more than 10% (in vote and in value) of the
outstanding securities of any one issuer."i0 Congress designed
these rules to ensure diversification of nonqualifying assets to
reflect similar diversification requirements in the RIC regime."'
Because REITs can still concentrate all of their investment in a
single real estate asset, the diversification requirement generally
has little effect on most REITs, so the application of the
diversification requirement to REITs is significantly different
from application to RICs.112
3. Income Tests. Both the original and current REIT rules
limit the types of income that a REIT may have, but, as this brief

104.
See infra Part II.C.8 (discussing the definition of real property).
105.
Compare § 856(c)(5)(C), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(6)(C), 74 Stat. at 1005 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(6)(C) (Supp. II 1961)).
106.
Compare § 856(c)(5)(C), with see. 10(a), § 856(c)(6)(C), 74 Stat. at 1005 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(6)(C) (Supp. II 1961).
107.
Compare § 856(c)(4)(B), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(5)(B), 74 Stat. at 1004-05
(codified at I.R.C. § 856 (c)(5)(B) (Supp. 11 1961)).
108.
See § 856(c)(4)(B)(i), (ii). Because Congress did not enact the taxable REIT
subsidiary rules until 1999, the original REIT regime obviously did not include rules
limiting the value of the REIT's assets that could be attributed to taxable REIT
subsidiaries. See infra Part II.C.6.
109.
See § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(I). Government securities and securities in taxable REIT
subsidiaries are not subject to this rule. See § 856(c)(4).
110.
See § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(11), (III).
111.
See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 6 (1960); supra text accompanying note 49
(describing the RIC diversification requirement).
112.
See Carroll, supra note 27, at 344 (recognizing that the result of a RIC
concentrating the bulk of its investment in securities of a single industry is not the same
as a REIT concentrating the bulk of its investment in real estate).
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discussion illustrates, the two regimes are slightly different.
Under the current rules, a REIT must satisfy both a 75% gross
income test and a 95% gross income test (up from the 90% in the
original test). 113 The original and current income tests require that
at least 75% of the REIT's gross income derive from the following
types of income: (1) rents from real property, (2) interest from
obligations secured by mortgages on real property, (3) gain from
the sale of real property (including mortgages on real property),
(4) dividend income from other REITs and gain from the sale of
interests in other REITs, and (5) abatements and refunds on real
property. 1 14 The law now specifically excludes from the qualifying
list any gain from property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the REIT's trade or business and adds the
following items as permitted sources of income: (1) income and
gain derived from foreclosure property, (2) amounts received to
enter into loans or real estate contracts, (3) gains from the sale of
certain real estate assets that are not prohibited transactions, and
(4) qualified temporary investment income. 115 The 95% gross
income test requires that at least 95% of the REIT's gross income
derive from the sources in the 75% test, dividends, interest, or
capital gains on securities.11 6 Thus, the income test helps ensure
that REIT income is mostly from passive sources.
A REIT can satisfy the income tests if it holds only mortgages
because interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real
property and gains from sales of non-inventory mortgages on real
11 7
property are permitted types of income under the income tests.
If the entity holds only mortgages secured by real property, it will

Compare § 856(c)(2), (3), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)92), (3), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified
113.
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(2), (3) (Supp. II 1961)). Cross-border treaty rules may, however, require
diversification of the real estate owned by a REIT as a prerequisite to obtaining favorable
treaty rates on dividends from U.S. REITs. See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax
Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 10(2)(b), (3), (4)(a)(iii), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) T 209, at 10,553.
Compare § 856(c)(3)(A)-(E), with sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(3), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified
114.
at I.R.C. § 856(c)(3) (Supp. II 1961)).
See § 856(c)(3)(F)-(I). Prohibited transactions are defined in § 857(b)(6), and
115.
temporary investment income is defined in § 856(c)(5)(D). The qualifying list excludes
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business
by incorporating the definition from § 1221(a)(1). See § 856(c)(3)(C). The original version of
the statute included that prohibition on dealer property in the organizational test. See
supratext accompanying note 95.
See § 856(c)(2). Originally, the statute only required 90% of the REIT's income to
116.
satisfy the test. See sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(2), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(c)(2)
(Supp. II 1961)). But Congress raised the limit to 95% in 1976. See Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1604(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1749 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(c)(2) (1976)).
117.
See § 856(c)(3)(B)-(C).
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also satisfy the 95%-income test, which recognizes interest as a
permitted type of income.11 8 A REIT may also acquire and dispose
of mortgages, if the extent of the activity does not cause the REIT
to become a dealer and the mortgages to become inventory.1 19
From the outset, the definition of rents from real property has
been an important part of the income tests, as the primary source
of income for equity REITs will be rents from real property. 120 The
exclusions from the definition generally receive more attention
than the general definition. The original definition provided that
rents from real property included "rents from interests in real
property."1 2 1 It also excluded three types of receipts: (1) amounts
that depend in whole or in part on the income or profits derived by
any person from the property, 122 (2) amounts received from any
person controlled by the REIT,1 23 and (3) amounts received for
services rendered by the REIT to tenants or from managing or
operating the property.1 24 The third exclusion did, however, permit
the REIT to provide the services through an independent
contractor, so long as the REIT did not receive or derive any

118.
See § 856(c)(2)(B). REITs formed to acquire or issue residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) in years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis may not satisfy the asset
or income tests. For example, in many situations in recent years, RMBS entities did not
appear to acquire mortgages. See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, REMIC Tax
Enforcement as Financial-MarketRegulator, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 663, 694-715 (2014).
Instead, they appeared to receive payments pursuant to a pooling and service agreement
entered into with several other parties. See id. at 715-16. The rights under the pooling and
servicing agreement may not qualify as mortgages. See id. at 716. Courts are still
considering who holds security interests in mortgages that were a part of the MERS system,
many of which mortgages were part of pooling and servicing agreements. See id. at 726-28.
Consequently, some assets that mortgage REITs hold may not come within the definition
of mortgages on real property and the income such REITs received may not come within
the definition of interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real property.
119.
Gains from the sale of inventory are prohibited transactions subject to a 100%
tax, but which do not count against the income test. See § 856(c)(2)(D), (3)(D) (excluding
from REIT-qualifying income gain from the sale of property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business); § 857(b)(6) (imposing a tax on gain
from the sale of property described in § 1221(a)(1), which included inventory).
120.
See, e.g., Zivot, supranote 27, at 57-69 (recounting the evolution of the definition
of rents from real property and the integral role it plays in the REIT tax regime); Carroll,
supra note 27, at 325-38 (discussing the definition and policy aspects of the definition);
Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 1118, 1126 (recognizing that the definition of rents from
real property helps ensure that REIT income is passive).
121.
Sec. 10(a), § 856(d), 74 Stat. at 1005 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d) (Supp II. 1961)).
122.
Sec 10(a), § 856(d)(1), 74 Stat. at 1005 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(1) (Supp. II
1961)).
123.
See sec. 10(a), § 856(d)(2), 74 Stat. at 1005-06 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(2) (Supp.
II 1961)) (defining control as a 10% ownership by the REIT).
124.
Sec. 10(a), § 856(d)(3), 74 Stat. at 1006 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(3) (Supp. II
1961)).
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income from those services. 12 5 Each of the exceptions to the
definition of rents from real property is designed to ensure that
REITs do not derive income from the active conduct of a trade or
business. 126 Congress therefore used these exceptions to ensure
that REIT income derived from passive sources. If income
associated with real property does not come within the definition
of rents from real property, it will count against the income
tests. 127 The first two exceptions to the definition have remained
largely unchanged, but, as the discussion below illustrates, the
third exception has narrowed significantly, expanding the
definition of rents from real property and liberalizing the types of
services a REIT can perform. 128
In summary, tax law grants REITs a form of conduit
treatment, but it imposes specific organizational requirements
and restricts the types of assets REITs can hold and the types of
income they can earn. As a general matter, a significant portion of
a REIT's assets must be real estate assets, and most of its income
must derive from such assets. A REIT may buy and sell real estate
assets, but for the most part a REIT cannot be active in buying
and selling real estate assets because gain from such sale is
excluded from the lists of permitted income, 129 and such gains are
subject to a 100% tax. 130
In 1960, failure to meet any of the tests meant that the entity
could not qualify for REIT taxation, and all of the entity's taxable
income was subject to an entity-level tax, with no dividend-paid
deduction. 131 Subsequent changes have moved away from that

125.
See sec. 10(a), § 856(d)(3), 74 Stat. at 1006 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(3) (Supp. II
1961) (defining independent contractor as any person who does not own more than 35% of
the REIT beneficial interests and is not under 35% common control with the REIT).
126.
See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 6-7 (1960) ("Th[e] interest in restricting the income
of the trust to that of a passive nature also accounts for two of the restrictions (the
prohibition against sharing in income or profits and the prohibition against providing
tenant services or managing or operating the property] provided in the definition of 'rents
from real property."').
127.
See I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(C) (2012) (excluding impermissible tenant service income
from the definition of rents from real property).
See § 856(d)(2)(A), (B); infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.6.
128.
129.
See § 856(c)(3)(C) (excluding gain from the sale of property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business).
130.
§ 857(b)(6)(A).
131.
See Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, sec. 10(a), §§ 856-857, 74 Stat. 98,
1004 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 856-857 (Supp. II 1961)); Carroll, supra note 27, at 306-13
(describing the complex nature of the different requirements and some ambiguities of each).
The original act did provide some allowance from failure to meet the asset tests due to a
discrepancy in the value of the REIT's assets. See sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(5), 74 Stat. at 1005
(codified at I.R.C. § 856(c)(5) (Supp. II 1961)) (flush language).
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all-or-nothing treatment in favor of a regime of intermediate
sanctions and have expanded the types of services a REIT can
perform. Today, if a REIT fails to satisfy any of the tests in a given
year, it can correct the failure and retain REIT status if the failure
was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect and it pays an
intermediate sanction penalty for each failed requirement.1 32 A
significant question for REITs is whether payments from tenants
come within the definition of rents from real property.1 33 A REIT
can receive payments from tenants that do not come within the
definition of rents from real property, but those payments will
count against the income tests.1 34 If the amount of such receipts
from a single property exceeds 1% of the total receipts from the
property, all of the receipts from the property will fail to come
within the definition of rents from real property and will
jeopardize the REIT's status.1 35
C. Evolution of REIT Taxation
In the years that have followed the enactment of the original
REIT legislation, the rules governing REIT classification have
changed in many ways, making REIT taxation available to more
diverse investors and a much wider swath of property than was
held by real estate trusts in 1960. Now institutional investors can
own all of the stock of REITs,1 36 REITs have lower distribution
obligations,1 37 and they can provide more services.1 3 8 Various
structures also make REIT ownership and management much
easier.
1. Foreclosure Property and Mortgage REITs (1975). The
original REIT legislation included interests in mortgages in the
definition of real estate assets.1 39 From early on, mortgage REITs
were a part of total REIT market capitalization.1 4 0 Nonetheless,
the prohibition against holding property primarily for sale to

132.
See § 856(g)(1), (5); § 856(c)(7)(A), (C); § 857(b)(5); § 860; see also Treas. Reg.
1.857-11 (2014) (applying § 852(e) to REITs).
133.
See infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.6. (discussing how services may affect whether
payments from tenants are rent from real property).
134.
See § 856(d)(2)(C); (d)(7).
135.
See § 856(d)(7)(B); Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 751.
136.
See infra Part II.C.4.
137.
See infra Part II.C.5.
138.
See infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.6.
139.
See Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, sec. 10(a), § 856(c)(6)(B), 74 Stat.
98, 1005 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(c)(6)(B) (Supp. II 1961)).
140.
See infra Appendix A.
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customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business puts
mortgage REITs at a competitive disadvantage. 141 Foreclosing on
defaulting mortgages would put such REITs in possession of assets
they might prefer to sell shortly after acquisition. Property
disposed of shortly after acquisition could come within the
definition of property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of the REIT's trade or business. 142 Consequently,
if a mortgage REIT foreclosed on property and shortly thereafter
disposed of the property, it would have lost its REIT status if the
property came within the definition of held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business. 143 With
the original rules, mortgage REITs would have to choose from
among three unattractive alternatives when a mortgagee
defaulted on a loan: (1) not foreclose on the property and
potentially lose the ability to control the collateral and preserve its
value; (2) foreclose on the property and hold it long term; or
(3) foreclose on the property, dispose of it shortly after foreclosure,
and risk losing REIT status. The potential loss of REIT status or
other bad results undoubtedly dissuaded many parties from
forming mortgage REITs in the first place, because some
borrowers can be expected to default and foreclosure is thus a real
possibility for mortgage holders. 144
In 1975, Congress adopted a rule that mitigated the effect of
the original rule and made mortgage REITs economically viable.
The 1975 amendment provided that a real estate trust would not
lose its REIT status even though it held "foreclosure property"
primarily for sale to its customers in the ordinary course of its
trade or business.1 45 It defined foreclosure property generally to
include any property acquired as result of a lessee or mortgagee
defaulting, if the REIT elected to treat the property as foreclosure
property and held it less than two years following the

141.
See supra text accomanying note 95.
142.
Whether a person holds property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of a trade or business is based upon a multiple-factor facts-and-circumstances test
that has no bright lines. See Bradley T. Borden, Nathan R. Brown & E. John Wagner, II, A
Case For Simpler Gain BifurcationFor Real Estate Developers, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 279, 291300 (2014) (describing some of the factors courts consider to determine if property comes
within the definition).
143.
See sec. 10(a), § 856(a)(4), 74 Stat. at 1004 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(a)(4) (Supp. II
1961)).
144.
Indeed, following legislative changes discussed below, the market capitalization
of mortgage REITs began an upward climb, and within a decade and half the number of
mortgage REITs reached an all-time high. See infra Appendix A.
145.
See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 6(b), 88 Stat. 2108, 2112-13 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(a)(4) (Supp. V 1976)).
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foreclosure.14 6 That definition remains largely intact today, 147 but
the current statute incorporates foreclosure property into the
income test instead of making it a part of the organizational test. 148
Even though Congress allows REITs to hold and sell foreclosure
property, it requires REITs to pay entity-level taxes at regular
corporate rates on gains from the disposition of such property. 149
Rules governing certain types of mortgage REITs changed
further in 1986 when Congress enacted a new regime governing
certain types of mortgage pools. In 1986, Congress created a tax
regime for real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs)
providing flow-through taxation to mortgage pools that issue
multiple classes of multiple-maturity securities. 15 0 It also provided
that interests in REMICs come within the definition of real estate
assets for REIT purposes,11 so REITs can hold REMIC interests
as their sole asset class or as part of a diversified pool of real estate
assets.1 52 The multiple classes of multiple-maturity securities
(including regular and residual interests in REMICs)1 5 3 in a
mortgage pool raise complex accounting issues that the REMIC
rules address. 154 One such rule requires the holders of residual
146.
See § 6(a), 88 Stat. at 2112-13 (1975) (codified at I.R.C. § 856(e) (Supp. V 1976)).
147.
See I.R.C. § 856(e) (2012).
148.
See § 856(c)(2)(F), (3)(F); supra text accompanying note 95.
149.
See § 857(b)(4). This is similar to the original rule as amended in 1975. See § 6(c),
88 Stat. at 2113 (codified at I.R.C. § 857(b)(4) (Supp. V 1976)).
150.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 671(a), §§ 860A-860G, 100
Stat. 2085, 2308-17 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (Supp. IV 1987)).
151.
See § 671(b), 100 Stat. at 2317 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(c)(5)(D) (Supp. IV 1987)).
The current law retains this rule. See § 856(c)(5)(E) (2012).
152.
Because the REIT rules treat a REMIC interest as a real estate asset, a REIT
should not jeopardize its REIT status if its sole assets are interests in a single REMIC. See
§ 856(c)(5)(E), (c)(4) (providing that a REMIC interest is a real estate asset, and applying
the diversification rules only to securities that do not come within the definition of real
estate asset).
153.
See § 860D(a)(2).
154.
See § 860B (setting forth the rules governing the tax treatment of holders of
REMIC regular interests); § 860C (setting forth the rules governing the tax treatment of
holders REMIC residual interests); § 860E (requiring residual interest holders to recognize
excess inclusions); § 860F (imposing a 100% tax on certain prohibited transactions); see also
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM

ACT OF 1986, at 411-12 (Comm. Print 1987) ("Holders of 'regular interests' generally take
into income that portion of the income of the REMIC that would be recognized by an accrual
method holder of a debt instrument that had the same terms as the particular regular
interest; holders of 'residual interests' take into account all of the net income of the REMIC
that is not taken into account by the holders of the regular interests."); JAMES E. PEASLEE
& DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS

AND RELATED TOPiCS, 826-85 (describing the tax treatment of REMICs and holders of
REMIC interests); Borden & Reiss, supra note 118, at 669-76 (recounting the development
of the REMIC rules and the need for the complex accounting system); Kirk Van Brunt, Tax
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interests to recognize "excess inclusion" income.1 55 The person who
recognizes excess inclusion income cannot offset it with net
operating losses 15 6 and must treat it as unrelated business taxable
income if the holder is a tax-exempt entity 15 7 and is not eligible for
any reduction in withholding tax (by treaty or otherwise). 15 8 The
REMIC rules also generally require REITs that hold REMIC
residual interests to pass any excess inclusion income through to
REIT shareholders.1 59 REITs must, however, pay tax on the excess
inclusion income to the extent the excess inclusion would be
allocated to a disqualified organization (i.e., one that would not
otherwise pay tax on the excess inclusion income) that holds REIT
stock. 160
Congress provided the REMIC flow-through tax rules to
mortgage pools that issue multiple classes of multiple-maturity
securities, meet several requirements that ensure the pool of
mortgages remains static, and elect to be treated as REMICs.16 1
Other mortgage pools that issue multiple classes of
multiple-maturity securities generally come within the definition
of "taxable mortgage pool" (TMP) and are taxed as corporations. 1 62
A REIT, or a REIT subsidiary, that holds a pool of mortgages
would generally come within the definition of TMP, 163 but tax law
appears to exempt TMP REITs from corporate taxation. In lieu of
paying the corporate tax, TMP REITs must use a reasonable
method to calculate excess inclusion income, allocate it to their
(non-disqualified organization) shareholders in proportion to
dividends paid, pay tax on any excess inclusion income allocated
to disqualified organizations, and withhold the appropriate tax on

Aspects of REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 149, 154-56 (1994) (describing how
cash flows into and out of REMICs do not match tax aspects of those flows); Bruce Kayle,
Where Has All the Income Gone? The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and Principalin
Coupon Stripping and Related Transactions, 7 VA. TAX REV. 303, 348 (1987) (describing
why holders of REMIC residual interests must recognize the difference between the income
taken into account by the holders of REMIC regular interests and the income generated by
the REMIC).
155.
See § 860E(a)(1).
156.
See § 860E(a)(3).
157.
See § 860E(b).
158.
See § 860G(b)(2); I.R.S. Notice 2006-97, § 2, 2006-2 C.B. 904.
159.
See § 860E(d).
160.
See § 860E(e)(6); Rev. Rul. 2006-58, 2006-2 C.B. 876 (illustrating the application
of the excess-inclusions tax to a REIT that has a charitable remainder trust (i.e., a
disqualified organization) as a shareholder).
161.
See §§ 860D, 860F, 860G(a)(3).
162.
See § 7701(i).
163.
See § 7701(i)(3).
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excess inclusion income allocated to foreign persons. 164 REITs can
take steps, such as not issuing multiple-maturity securities, to
avoid the negative tax consequences and complexities of being a

TMP REIT. 165
Mortgage REITs provide an example of how REIT taxation
has expanded beyond what Congress originally perceived as the
scope of the REIT regime. Mortgage REITs raise particularly
complex tax accounting and finance issues because they overlap
the REMIC rules and raise the same concerns that REMICs raise.
Mortgage pools made headlines in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis because they were populated with low-quality loans, to the
extent they held any assets at all. 16 6 Although they received less
attention than mortgage-backed securities, mortgage REITs also
experienced significant difficulty during the financial crisis,16 7 but
they continue to be popular among investors and feature
prominently in news stories. 168 They are also drawing the
attention of government officials. 169 The complexity of mortgage
REITs makes them the province of a very small segment of the
financial and legal industries. Perhaps that makes them
susceptible to manipulation by those who control the industry, and
it certainly flies in the face one of the original purposes of the REIT
regime, which was to make real estate investments available to a

See I.R.S. Notice 2006-97, § 5, 2006-2 C.B. 905.
164.
165.
See K. Peter Ritter, Mortgage REITs-A Primer, 9 J. TAx'N FIN. PRODUCTS 23,
30-31 (2011); see generally Robert H. Bergdolt & Robert J. Le Duc, Public Nontraded
Mortgage REITs-Issues and Opportunities,7 J. TAX'N FIN. PRODUCTS 37 (2008) (discussing
securities and tax issues raised by mortgage REITs).
166.

See ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE

RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 59-81 (2013) (describing the securitization process that
led to low-quality mortgage pools); Borden & Reiss, supra note 118, at 669-91 (describing
the role that mortgage pools played in the financial crisis); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 227 (2011).

See, e.g., Ilaina Jonas, Mortgage REIT Woes are a Blast from the Past, REUTERS
167.
(Aug. 15, 2007, 8:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/16/us-mortgagereits
-idUSN1526504220070816.
168.
See, e.g., Lewis Braham, Why Mortgage REITs Deserve Some Love in 2014,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-15/why
Telis Demos, Mortgage REITs See
-mortgage-reits-deserve-some-love-in-2014.html;
Explosive Growth, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2013, 1:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com
4
2
/articles/SB1000142412788732449370457843 84078291603 ; Stephen Gandel, Inside the
Mortgage Companies Freaking out the Fed, FORTUNE (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:02 PM),
http://fortune.com/2013/02/19/inside-the-mortgage-companies-freaking-out-the-fed/;
Robbie Whelan, Mortgage REITs Remain in Fed's Sights, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013, 2:56
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/11/08/mortgage-reits-remain-in-feds-sites/.
169.

See, e.g., SABRINA R. PELLERIN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,

ASSESSING THE RISKS OF MORTGAGE REITS 1-2 (2013), https://www.richmondfed.org
/publications/researcheconomicbriefl2013/pdf/eb_13-1l.pdf.
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broader cross section of society. 170 The complexity of a REIT that
holds pools of mortgages or mortgage-backed securities is probably
beyond the comprehension of most investors, especially those with
limited investment resources. Consequently, small investors
would be unlikely to invest in them, except as part of a diversified
portfolio.
The expansion of mortgage REITs fulfills President
Eisenhower's prediction that the REIT regime would grow to
encompass multiple types of arrangements that Congress could
not have anticipated in 1960.171 Because mortgage pools can obtain
flow-through treatment under the REMIC rules, mortgage REITs
would not appear to draw income from corporations, so they
probably do not erode the corporate tax base.
2. Vertical Integration and Internal Management (1986).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a watershed event in U.S. tax law
history 72 and is considered to be the most significant development
in REIT taxation because it allowed REITs to move from being
portfolios of real estate to becoming operating businesses that
could develop and manage for their own account. 173 Prior to the
1986 Act, REITs generally could not provide direct services to
tenants. 174 Instead, they had to hire independent contractors to
provide the services.17 5 This rule was intended to allay concerns
expressed at the time of the original REIT legislation that if the
law did not restrict the type of services that a REIT provided, then
corporations with active businesses and some real estate, such as
restaurants and hotels, would be exempt from corporate tax.17 6
170.
171.

See supra text accompanying note 67.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.

172.
See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAx REFORM 285-89 (1987)

(discussing the politics of the 1986 act and its historical significance).
173.
See Constance Moore, REIT Timeline: Celebrating 50 Years of REITs and
NAREIT-Discussion of Tax Reform Act of 1986, REIT, http://www.reit.com/time
line/videos.php?id=15.#14 (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (explaining in a short video segment
the effect of the changes in the 1986 act).
174.
See supra text accompanying note 124.
175.
See supra text accompanying note 125.
176.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. Some commentators expressed
skepticism about whether the arguments for the passive requirement were sound and
attributed them to the REIT rules being modeled after the RIC rules. See, e.g., Charles D.
Post & William B. King, Final REIT Regulations Adopted; the Changes and the Effects, 17
J. TAX'N 54, 54-55 (1962) ("It was considered that since mutual funds invested passively in
stocks and bonds, only passive investment in real estate assets should receive conduit
treatment. It is immaterial whether these and other assumptions were correct; the
significant fact is that these assumptions are basic tenets in the theology of the
legislation.").
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The restriction on the type of services that a REIT can provide also
ensures that the REIT's income derives from real estate, not from
services. This reflects the Congressional intent to provide
preferential tax treatment to income from real estate, and not
income from other sources.17 7
The REIT industry found this rule to be too restrictive and
successfully lobbied members of Congress to change the definition
to include income derived from certain types of services provided
by REITs.1 78 Proponents of change, echoing arguments raised in
support of the original REIT legislation, 179 argued that general
changes to real estate taxation had presented the REIT industry
with significant challenges. 18 0 They contended that Congress
needed "to update the REIT tax rules and reconcile them with real
estate taxation generally so that REIT[s] and their shareholders
will be able to compete more effectively and to continue their
important function of enhancing the flow of capital to economically
viable, income-oriented real estate projects."18 1 The proponents
recognized that hiring an independent contractor to provide
services to tenants created agency costs that adversely affected
REITs' ability to compete with other forms of real estate
ownership. 182 The rule evolved through the years to become more
lenient, and although 1986 may have been the watershed year,
changes prior to and following 1986 contribute to the more lenient
approach to real estate services that exists today.
The first important change to the definition occurred in 1976.
In that year, Congress expanded the definition of rents from real
property to include "charges for services customarily furnished or
rendered in connection with the rental of real property, whether
177.
See supra text accompanying note 70.
178.
See LYNN, BLOOMFIELD & LOWDEN, supranote 64, § 1:23.
179.
See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
180.
See 131 CONG. REC. 12,796-97 (1985) (statement of Rep. Vander Jagt).
181.
See 131 CONG. REC. 12,796.
182.
See 131 CONG. REC. 12,797 ("It is axiomatic in the real estate industry at large
that hands-on, effective management is fundamental to the successful performance of a real
estate investment, and management by contractor often results in costly and unsatisfactory
performance that is not in the best interests of the REIT or its shareholders. Put simply, a
REIT, like any real estate investor, must have the opportunity to manage directly its
investments."). Indeed subsequent studies have confirmed that externally-managed REITs
underperform internally-managed REITs. See Dennis R. Capozza & Paul J. Sequin, Debt,
Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The ExternalAdvisor Puzzle, 20 J. REAL EST.
FIN. & ECON. 91, 98-102 (2000) (finding that externally-managed REITs underperform
internally-managed REITs by 7%). Also, "[ilnformation is more transparent and symmetric
in internally managed ... REITs ... so underwriters are willing to reduce the gross spreads
for internally managed REITs." Hsuan-Chi Chen & Chiuling Lu, How Much Do REITs Pay
for Their IPOs?, 33 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 105, 120 (2006).
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or not such charges are separately stated." 183 The stated purpose
of the amendment was to help the law better reflect normal
commercial practice. 8 4 The new provision did not allow REITs to
provide such services. They still had to hire independent
contractors to provide services and manage the property, but they
no longer had to determine whether amounts they received were
payment for customary tenant services. 185 Thus, the amendment
alleviated some accounting pressure and the specter of losing
REIT status if tenants made a single bundled payment to REITs,
who would then pay the contractors for the services, but the
amendment did not free REITs to provide services directly.
In 1986, Congress used a few words to radically update the
rule for services. The amended statute allowed REITs to provide
services usually rendered in connection with a leased building,
by incorporating the rule that allows tax-exempt entities to
provide customary tenant services to tenants of their buildings
without incurring unrelated business taxable income.18 6 A
tax-exempt entity can receive rents without triggering taxable
income.' 8 7 The IRS has interpreted rents for this purpose to
include amounts received for services "customarily rendered in
connection with the rental of rooms or other space for occupancy
only."18 8 Customary tenant services include furnishing heat and
light; cleaning public entrances, exits, stairways, and lobbies;
and collecting trash. 189 Rents do not, however, include payment
for noncustomary tenant services rendered for the convenience
of the occupant, such as maid services.19 0 Therefore, the 1986
change allowed REITs to provide services directly, so long as
they were customary, as provided in the 1976 amendment, and
came within the definition of rents for purposes of the
tax-exempt rules. The 1986 change significantly altered the
management of REITs. Even though Congress changed the
"overly restrictive [original rule, the change] liberalized [the
183.
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 1604(b), § 856(d)(1)(B), 90
Stat. 1520, 1749 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(1)(B) (1976)).
184.
See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 474 (1976). The Senate report intended the geographic
market within which a building is located to establish whether the services are customary.
See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 474.
185.
See sec. 1604(b), § 856(d)(1)(B), 90 Stat. at 1749-50 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 856(d)(2)(C) (1976)).
186.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 663(a), § 856(d)(2), 100 Stat.
2085, 2302 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1987)) (flush language).
187.
See I.R.C. § 512(b)(3) (2012).
188.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1992).
189.
See id.
190.
See id.
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rule] consistent with maintaining the essential passivity of the
REIT."1 91
Subsequent statutory amendments have modified the format
of the definition of rents from real property and extended
permitted services to those provided by taxable REIT subsidiaries.
First, in 1997, Congress simplified the language of exceptions to
rents from real property by eliminating the reference to services
provided by a REIT and introducing "impermissible tenant service
income" as a type of receipt excluded from the definition of rents
from real property. 192 The definition of impermissible tenant
services income incorporated the rules from earlier statutes by
including services and management and operation activity
provided by the REIT within the definition. 193 The new rules
excluded from the definition of impermissible tenant service
income (1) those services provided by an independent contractor
as long as the REIT did not receive any income from those services
and (2) those services that were allowed under the tax-exempt
rules. 194 The new rules also provided that as long as the receipts
from impermissible tenant services do not exceed more than 1% of
the total receipts from a property, only the receipts from
impermissible services will fail to be rents from real property.1 95
First, if the receipts from impermissible services exceed the 1%
threshold, then all of the receipts from the property will fail to
come within the definition of rents from real property.196 Second,
in 1999, Congress excluded services provided by a taxable REIT
subsidiary from the definition of impermissible tenant services,1 97
subject to several rules governing taxable REIT subsidies,
discussed below.198
191.

See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAxATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

TAx REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 391 (Comm. Print 1987).
192.
See I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(C), Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
sec. 1252(a), § 856(d)(2)(C), 111 Stat. 788, 1031 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(C) (Supp. III
1998)).
193.
See sec. 1252(b), § 856(d)(7)(A), 111 Stat. at 1031-32 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(A) (Supp. III 1998)).
194.
See sec. 1252(b), § 856(d)(7)(C), 111 Stat. at 1031-32 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(C) (Supp. III 1998)); supra text accompanying note 187-90(describing the types
of payments from services that are not taxable income to a tax-exempt).
195.
See sec. 1252(b), § 856(d)(7)(C), 111 Stat. at 1031-32 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(C) (Supp. III 1998)).
196.
See sec. 1252(b), § 856(d)(7)(B), 111 Stat. at 1032 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(7)(B)
(Supp. III 1998)); Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 751.
197.
See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-170, sec. 542(a), § 856(d)(7)(C)(i), 113 Stat. 1860, 1941 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1999)).
198.
See infra Part II.C.6.
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A concern is that
[t]hrough all of these changes to the [impermissible tenant
service income] rules over the years, the objective was
primarily to bring clarity and consistency-not to change the
underlying rationale for REIT rules, i.e. maintaining its
passive investment status versus active. But when we look
at the final results today, it seems we've come full circle.
REIT's engage in what can only be described as 'active'
service in many of the tenant services it can now provide.19 9
Nonetheless, the income that a taxable REIT subsidiary
recognizes is subject to entity-level corporate tax, so only passive
income flows through a REIT to its shareholders. 2 0 0 One could
argue that the more lenient rules appropriately made REITs more
similar to limited partnerships. In fact, one commentator later
recommended that the appropriate limit on services that a REIT
can provide should be the services that a limited partnership
provides to tenants of property it owns. 201 The reasoning for the
expansive allowance of REIT services was that REIT legislation
was intended to grant small investors the same access to real
estate investment that large investors had, and REITs needed to
provide some services to be competitive with other types of
ownership structures. 202 To accomplish that degree of equity, the
REIT rules would have to allow REITs to provide services that
other real estate investors could provide to their tenants. 203 As
discussed below, the more liberal rules allowing REITs to provide
more tenant services opened the door for tax-free REIT spinoffs. 204
Not only did the rules reject Congress's early concern about
limiting the services a REIT can perform, they also opened the
door to explicitly facilitate corporate-tax-base erosion through
REIT spinoffs. Other later innovations facilitated tax-free
contributions to REIT structures and the ability to raise additional
capital for REITs.
3. UPREITs (1992). Some of the changes in the REIT
industry have occurred outside the statutory regime, having
grown out of property owner innovations. UPREITs are an
example of such an innovation. The UPREIT structure provides a
199.
Zivot, supranote 27, at 66.
200.
See I.R.C. § 856()(1) (2012) (defining taxable REIT subsidiary as a corporation
that is not a REIT); infra Part II.C.6.
See Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 1131-34.
201.
202.
See supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
See Harvard Note, supra note 27, at 1132-33.
203.
204.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-05.
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mechanism for property owners to join a REIT without incurring
tax liability on the transfer of property to a REIT. 205 The general
corporate tax rules apply to REIT formations and other REIT
organizational transactions. 2 0 6 Consequently, property owners
who are not part of the original ownership group of a REIT, or who
experience diversification by contributing property to a REIT,
would generally be subject to tax on the transfer of property to a
REIT in exchange for REIT interests. 207 Through an innovation
involving the partnership tax rules rather than the corporate tax
rules, the UPREIT structure allows property owners to avoid these
pitfalls. If the REIT forms a partnership (commonly referred to as
an umbrella partnership) 208 of which it is the general partner and
property owners transfer property to the partnership instead of to
the REIT, then the transfer to the partnership can be tax-free. 209
A REIT that is the general partner of the umbrella partnership is
commonly referred to as an UPREIT (i.e., umbrella partnership
REIT). 210 Figure 5 provides a basic illustration of the UPREIT
structure.

205.

ABOUT

See NAT'L AsS'N OF REAL ESTATE INV. TRUSTS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

REITS

9

(2012),

https://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/portals/0/PDF/REIT

-FAQ.pdf.
206.
See John P. Napoli & John F. Smith, EmergingIssues in UPREIT Transactions,
26 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 187, 193-96 (1999) (describing the potential taxes imposed on the
contribution of real property to a REIT under the corporate tax rules).
207.
See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2012) (allowing nonrecognition on the transfer of property to
a controlled corporation); § 368(c) (defining control as ownership of at least 80% of the vote
and value of a corporation); § 351(e) (prohibiting the application of the general
nonrecognition rule to transfers to investment companies); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(c)(1) (2008) (defining transfer to an investment company as a transfer to a REIT
that results in diversification). Even if the general nonrecognition rule would otherwise
apply, the property owners would recognize gain to the extent any contributed liability
exceeded the adjusted basis of contributed property. See § 357(c); see also Blake D. Rubin,
Andrea R. Macintosh & Jonathan I. Forrest, Doing a Deal with a REIT from the Property
Owner's Perspective, 27 J. REAL. EST. TAX'N 15, 17-19 (1999) (describing the tax perils of
contributing property directly to a REIT); Napoli & Smith, supra note 206, at 193-96.
208.
See Daniel F. Cullen, UPREITs-StructuringFractionalInterest Tender Offers,
34 REAL EST. TAX'N 165, 165 (2007) ("The REIT is the general partner of the umbrella or
operating partnership (OP), which issues one share of stock for each general partner
interest. . . .").
See § 721(a) (granting nonrecognition to transfers of property to partnerships in
209.
exchange for partnership interests). The partnership tax rules provide that the
nonrecognition does not apply to transfers of property to a partnership that comes within
the definition of investment company. See § 721(b). But the IRS has sanctioned the UPREIT
structure if the operating partnership does not come within the general definition of
investment company. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (2012), Example 4.
210.
See Cullen, supranote 208, at 165.
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Figure 5: UPREIT Structure
Shareholders
Limited
Partners

UPREIT

REI
tUmbrell
(Oerating)
Partnership

For purposes of the REIT asset and income tests, the
partnership interest that the UPREIT owns is treated as an
interest in the umbrella partnership's underlying property, and
the UPREIT's share of the partnership's income retains its
character as it flows through from the umbrella partnership. 211
Consequently, if the interest in the umbrella partnership is the
only asset that the UPREIT owns, the assets and income of the
umbrella partnership will have to satisfy the REIT asset and
income tests, and the REIT must satisfy the organization test. 2 12
The holders of limited partnership interests in the umbrella REIT
generally have the right after the lapse of some period of time
following their contribution to the umbrella partnership to put
those interests into the partnership for an amount equal to the
value of a comparable number of shares of UPREIT stock. 213 The
211.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (2014) (providing that the REIT is treated as owning
its proportionate share of the partnership assets and gross income based upon its capital
interest in the partnership).
212.
See Michael K. Carnevale et al., An Introductionto UPREITs, 19 TAX MGMT. REAL
EST. J. 3, 5 (2003) (describing that the look-through rules only relate to the REIT
qualification tests, so the general allocation rules apply to determine the UPREIT's share
of the partnership's taxable income); supra Part II.B (discussing the REIT qualification
tests).
213.
Richard M. Lipton, UPREITs: Fad or Fixture?, 71 TAXES 395, 402 n.45 (1993)
(suggesting that limited partners should not be able to convert their interests to REIT stock
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umbrella partnership typically has the right to satisfy this
put-right with actual UPREIT stock, which it can obtain from the
UPREIT in exchange for more interest in the umbrella
partnership. 214 The UPREIT structure also provides an
opportunity for property owners to obtain additional capital, as
was illustrated by the Taubman Centers, Inc., IPO in 1992.215
Taubman Centers was, in fact, the first property owner to use the
UPREIT structure in a REIT public offering. 216 Since then, a
majority of REITs that have gone public-and nearly half of all
publicly traded REITs-use the UPREIT structure. 217
The Taubman Centers structure helps illustrate how the
UPREIT structure can provide capital to property owners.
Taubman Centers, the UPREIT, held an interest in the umbrella
partnership, which owned a portfolio of shopping centers. 218 Alfred
Taubman and his partners developed and controlled the portfolio
properties. 219 The UPREIT allowed Taubman to retain control of
the property and raise $295 million through an UPREIT IPO and
convert debt held by pension funds into equity in the umbrella
partnership without triggering capital gains. 220 Within a few years
after the IPO, Taubman Centers exchanged shopping centers for
partnership units held by General Motors Pension Trust.22 1 All of
these transactions were accomplished tax-free.
The Taubman Centers transaction illustrates aspects of a
basic UPREIT structure, but that structure is also common in
other arrangements. Generally, property owners contribute

for at least one year to avoid the application of the step-transaction doctrine); Cornell, supra
note 27, at 1578, 1589-91.
214.
Telephone interview with Ameek Ashok Ponda, Partner & Dir. of Tax Dep't,
Sullivan & Worchester (June 2, 2015) [hereinafter Ponda Interview].
215.
See Anna Robaton, Taubman Centers Lifts Up REITs, REIT, Nov.-Dec. 2011, at
1,
http://investors.taubman.com/files/docevents/interviews/1-29318204finalREIT
Magazine-eprint.pdf.
216.
See Rubin, Macintosh & Forrest, supra note 207, at 16; Taubman Ctrs., Inc.,
Registration Statement (Form S-11) (Nov. 20, 1992).
217.
See Brent W. Ambrose & Peter Linneman, The Maturing of REITs, 3 WHARTON
REAL EST. REV. 37, 40 (1999) (claiming that UPREITs accounted for 77% of the REIT equity
market capitalization); Steven D. Dolvin & Mark K. Pyles, REITIPOsand the Cost of Going
Public, 39 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 92, 97 (2009) (reporting that 65% of the REIT IPOs
after 1992 were UPREITs); Feng, Price & Sirmans, supra note 14, at 316 (reporting that
73% of publicly held equity REITs and 67% of all REITs (public and private) are UPREITs);
Rubin, Macintosh & Forrest, supra note 207, at 16 (citing Philip S. Payne, UPREIT
Conversions:Issues and Opportunities, REIT REP., Autumn 1998, at 54).
218.
See Ambrose & Linneman, supra note 217, at 40.
219.
See id.
220.
See id.
221.
See id.
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property to the umbrella partnership in exchange for limited
partnership interests. 222 A newly formed UPREIT simultaneously
raises money in an IPO and contributes the money to the umbrella
partnership. 223 The umbrella partnership generally uses the
money to pay down liabilities on the property, acquire additional
property, or saves the money for future acquisitions. 2 2 4 The limited
partners generally have the right to exchange their
limited-partner interests for equivalent value in UPREIT stock
(and in practice, the umbrella partnership obtains, and satisfies
this claim with, actual UPREIT stock), 225 but securities laws
generally require the limited partners to wait at least one year to
convert their interests to UPREIT stock. 226 The conversion of
partnership interests to UPREIT stock would be a taxable event,
so some partners may not want to convert their partnership
interests to UPREIT stock. In the meantime, because the value of
the UPREIT stock is based upon the real estate held by the
umbrella partnership and because the limited partners share in
distributions from the umbrella partnership, the limited
partnership interests are economically equivalent to the UPREIT
stock.2 27 Consequently, some limited partners may retain their
umbrella partnership interests indefinitely, and interests held by
individuals at the time of their deaths would get a basis step up. 2 2 8
Following the step up, the estate or heirs could convert the
interests into UPREIT stock recognizing little or no taxable gain.
The UPREIT structure is another example of how the REIT
structures have evolved to accommodate arrangements that were
not contemplated at the time Congress created the REIT regime.
The UPREIT structure also provides an opportunity for some
property owners to obtain the benefits of REIT status by
contributing their property to an umbrella partnership. This
provides such property owners opportunities that are generally
only available to wealthier investors, so perhaps UREITs reflect

222.
See Rubin, Macintosh & Forrest, supra note 207, at 19-20; Phillip S. Scherrer,
The UPREIT: Solving the Tax Problem of Owners of Depreciated Property, 25 REAL EST.
REV. 24, 25 (1996).
223.
See Rubin, Macintosh & Forrest, supra note 207, at 20.
224.
See id.
225.
Ponda Interview, supra note 219.
226.
See Rubin, Macintosh & Forrest, supra note 207, at 21.
See Terence Floyd Cuff, Investing in an UPREIT-How the OrdinaryPartnership
227.
Provisions Get Even More Complicated, 102 J. TAX'N 42, 43 (2005); John J. Grant, Tax
Planningfor Umbrella PartnershipREITs, 21 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 195, 218 (1994), Singer,
supra note 27, at 335.
228.
See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2012).
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the original purposes of REIT taxation by allowing smaller
investors to gain the opportunities normally available to larger
investors. 229
4. Pension Look-Through Rule (1993).
The
REIT
classification requirements generally require REITs to have at
least 100 shareholders and to not be closely held. 2 3 0 A REIT is
closely held for this purpose if, at any time during the last half of
its taxable year, more than 50% in value of its stock is owned
directly or indirectly by five or fewer individuals. 231 The general
rule considers certain tax-exempt entities, including qualified
pension plans, to be individuals for purposes of this rule. 2 32
Consequently, under the general rule, five or fewer qualified
pension plans could not hold more than 50% in value of a REIT.
That rule limited the amount of capital that institutional investors
brought to the real estate market. In his 1992 State of the Union
Address, President George Bush said that he planned to "make it
easier for pension plans to purchase real estate." 2 3 3 Congress also

took an interest in providing greater opportunities for pension
funds to invest in REITs. 234 Prior to 1993, the five-or-fewer rule
applied to U.S. pension plans but ironically did not restrict foreign
pension plans from investing in REITs because a look-through rule
applied to them, 235 so Congress had to change the law to treat U.S.
and foreign pension plans similarly. 236 In 1993 Congress passed
legislation that minimized the effect of the five-or-fewer
requirement by adopting a pension look-through rule for qualified
pension plans. 2 3 7 The pension look-through counts beneficiaries of

229.
See supra text accompanying note 67.
See § 856(a)(5), (6); § 856(h); see also supra text accompanying note 92.
230.
231.
See § 856(h)(1) (providing that § 542(a)(2), with some modifications, applies for
purposes of determining whether a REIT is closely held); § 542(a)(2); see also supra text
accompanying notes 93-94.
232.
See § 542(a)(2).
233.
See President George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
on the
State of the Union (Jan. 28,
1992)
(transcript available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=20544) (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
234.
See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. 19,356 (1993) (statement of Rep. Jim Moran); David H.
Downs, The Value of TargetingInstitutional Investors: Evidence from the Five-or-Fewer
Rule Change, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 613, 614-16 (1998) (discussing the events leading up to
the enactment of the pension-look-through rule).
235.
See § 542(a)(2) (treating only organizations within §§ 401(a), 501(c)(17), and 509(a),
which do not include foreign pension plans, as individuals for purposes of the five-or-fewer rule).
236.
See 139 CONG. REC. 19,356 (1993) (statement of Rep. Jim Moran).
237.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 13149,
§ 856(h)(3)(A),(E), 107 Stat. 312, 445-46 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(h)(3)(A), (E) (Supp. V
1994)).
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qualified pension plans (and the plan itself) to determine whether
the REIT is closely held. 2 38 Thus, if a qualified plan owns 75% of a
REIT's stock and it has 500 beneficiaries, the look-through rule
would treat the beneficiaries as owning the REIT's stock in
proportion to their actuarial interests in the qualified plan. 23 9 The
plan's 75% ownership would thus be spread over all 500
beneficiaries, and the plan would not be treated as owning 75% of
the REIT. Assuming no five of the 500 beneficiaries (or direct
shareholders in the REIT) have actuarial interests in the qualified
plan (or directly in the REIT) that equate to more than 50%
ownership of the REIT, the REIT would not be deemed to be closely
held by virtue of the plan's 75% ownership interest. The pension
look-through rule therefore helps REITs avoid disqualification if a
few pension plans hold significant amounts of a REIT's stock.
Nonetheless, pension plans have to avoid other potential pitfalls
to ensure that they are not taxed on REIT dividends.
Even if a REIT can avoid being closely held, if the REIT comes
within the definition of pension-held REIT, a qualified plan that
holds stock in the REIT could be subject to tax on any unrelated
business taxable income (UBTI). The qualified plan will have
UBTI in proportion to its share of income that would be UBTI to
the REIT, if the REIT were a tax-exempt entity. 240 A REIT is a
pension-held REIT only if the REIT would not have satisfied the
closely-held requirement but for the look-through rule and a
qualified trust owns at least 25% of the value of the REIT or one
or more qualified trusts (each of which owns at least 10% of the
REIT) in the aggregate own more than 50% of the value of the
REIT. 241

Rental from real estate and gains from the sale of real estate
held for use in a trade or business or for investment generally do
not come within the definition of UBTI, 2 4 2 but rent or gain that is

238.
See sec. 13149, § 856(h)(3)(A)(i), 107 Stat. at 445 (codified at I.R.C.
856(h)(3)(A)(i) (Supp.V 1994)).
239.
See § 856(h)(3)(A)(i).
240.
See § 856(h)(3)(C) (applying this rule to pension-held REITs). Indeed, pension
funds use REITs that are not pension-held REITs to block income that would otherwise be
UBTI to the pension. See Willard B. Taylor, "Blockers," "Stoppers," and the Entity
ClassificationRules, 64 TAX LAW. 1, 6-7 (2010).
241.
See § 856(h)(3)(D).
242.
See § 512(a) (defining UBTI, and allowing for modifications defined in § 512(b));
§ 512(b)(3) (excluding all rents from real property from UBTI); § 512(b)(5) (excluding most
gains from the sale of property from UBTI); see also Bradley T. Borden & Katherine E.
David, Sales of Church Real Property to Parishioners,TAX'N EXEMPTS, July-Aug. 2012, at
4-5 (discussing UBTI and the exemption for sales of property).
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Thus, even if a pension-held

REIT limits its activities to owning and leasing real estate and
only provides customary tenants' services, the pension trust that
holds shares of a pension-held REIT would have no UBTI only if
the REIT had no debt-financed income. The consequence of a
qualified plan owning an interest in a pension-held REIT could,
therefore, be significant. Even though REITs generally should
have income from real estate rent and sales of property held for
investment or for use in a rental business, which would not be
UBTI to the REIT, 244 REITs also generally use debt to purchase or
construct real property and therefore have debt-financed
income. 245 Pension trusts can ensure that they do not have UBTI
from a REIT by either ensuring that none of the REIT's income
comes within the definition of UBTI or by ensuring that the REIT
is not a pension-held REIT. Because of debt financing, the former
alternative is not feasible, so pension trusts invest in
non-pension-held REITs.
The rules governing qualified trusts' ownership of REIT stock
appear to leave a loophole for state-sponsored pension funds.
State-sponsored pension funds often will not come within the
definition of qualified pension trust for purposes of the
look-through rules because they will not satisfy all of the qualified
trust requirements that private pension trusts satisfy.246
Nonetheless, such plans are not individuals, so they are not an
entity treated as a trust for the REIT definition of "closely held."
Therefore, they would not count toward the five-individual rule or
the pension-held rules and should be able to own a large interest
in a REIT without triggering the closely-held prohibition or the
pension-held rules.

24

7

243.
See § 514. But see § 514(c)(9) (providing an exception to this rule for qualified
pension trusts and other qualified organizations).
244.
See § 856(c)(2).
245.
See generally Zhilan Feng, Chinmoy Ghosh & C.F. Sirmans, On the Capital
Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), 34 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcoN. 81, 90
(2007) (reporting that on average REITs maintain a debt ratio of above 50% while non-REIT
firms have maintained a ratio below 50%, and a REIT's debt ratio grows and stabilizes
around 65% ten years after an IPO).
246.
See § 401(a) (defining qualified trust); § 856(h)(3)(E) (requiring a pension trust to be a
qualified trust to qualify for the look-through rule). State pension plans are tax exempt, even if they
do not come within the definition of qualified trust. See § 457(a) (providing that amounts deferred
through or income earned in an eligible deferred compensation plan are subject to tax when paid
to a participant); § 457(b) (defining eligible deferred compensation plan as one established and
maintained by an eligible employer that satisfies several other requirements); § 457(e)(1) (defining
eligible employer to include states and their political subdivisions and agencies).
247.
See Bradley T. Borden, Real Estate Transactionsby Tax-Exempt Entities, 591-3d
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) A-9 (2015).
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The pension-look-through rule opened the door for pensions
to own considerable amounts of REIT stock. Surely in 1960,
Congress did not foresee the rise of private pension funds and their
future interest in owning REIT equity. 248 Pension funds owning
REIT stock does not appear to be inconsistent with the original
purpose of the REIT regime, which was to make real estate
portfolio investment available to a broad group of individual
investors. Because pension funds own assets on behalf of
employees, their ownership of REIT equity provides indirect
ownership of real estate to a significant segment of the
population. 249 Nonetheless, the significant rise in REIT market
capitalization following the enactment of the pension-look-through
rules suggests that the change has brought more capital to real
estate markets, 250 which was one purpose REIT proponents
originally espoused in favor of the REIT regime. 25 1
5. More Lenient Distribution Requirement (1999). Prior to
2000, tax law required REITs to distribute at least 95% of their
taxable income to avoid entity-level tax on all taxable income. 252
Legislation in 1999 reduced the requirement to 90%, so now REITs
must distribute at least 90% of their taxable income as dividends
each year. 2 5 3 The history of this rule appears to trace back to the
RIC rules.25 4 At the time Congress enacted the REIT rules,
open-end and closed-end funds competed for investor
contributions, but most funds were closed-end funds. 255 Open-end
funds buy back shares from shareholders upon the shareholder
request, but holders of interests in closed-end funds generally
must sell their interests in the public market to cash out of their
investments. 256 Prior to the RIC legislation, closed-end funds were
Nonetheless, shortly after Congress enacted the 1960 legislation, the IRS
248.
sanctioned REIT stock ownership by pension trusts. See Rev. Rul. 66-106, 1966-1 C.B. 151
(ruling that REIT dividends paid to an exempt employee's pension trust do not constitute
unrelated taxable income).
REIT,
REITs
by
the
Numbers,
249.
Economic
Impact
of REITs:
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015)
https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/reits-numbers
(claiming that more than 70 million Americans invest in REITs through their retirement
plans).
See infra Appendix A.
250.
See supra text accompanying note 68.
251.
See § 857(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1999).
252.
253.
See § 857(a)(1)(A); Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-170, sec. 556(a), § 857(a)(1)(A), 113 Stat. 1860, 1949 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 857(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1999)).
See H.R. Rep. No. 86-2020, at 3 (1960).
254.
255.
See Brunson, supra note 41 (manuscript at 11); Morley, supra note 42, at 348-55.
256.
See Brunson, supranote 41 (manuscript at 11); Morley, supra note 42, at 348.

46

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[53:1

much more popular among investors than open-end funds. 257
Commentators speculate that managers of open-end funds lobbied
Congress for the RIC distribution requirement to put open-end
and closed-end funds on similar grounds. 258 Thus, the RIC
distribution requirement is a product "of self-interested lobbying
and historical accident, rather than functional necessity." 2 59

The RIC distribution requirement carried over to the REIT
regime as part of the effort to assure that real estate trusts would
be treated the same as RICs. 26 0 Nonetheless, commentators see in
the REIT distribution requirement a device that "prevent[s] REITs
from becoming unconstrained tax deferral devices." 261 The REIT
distribution requirement can result in REIT taxable income being
subject to a higher effective tax rate than corporate taxable
income. 262 Undoubtedly the distribution rules prevent REITs from
retaining earnings in excess of taxable income, but REIT
distributions average more than 120% of REIT taxable income. 263
Several commentators have tried to explain why REITs pay
dividends in excess of taxable income. 264 They suggest that REITs
might use high dividend payouts to control agency costs,

265

to

257.
See Brunson, supra note 41 (manuscript at 11); Morley, supranote 42, at 349-50.
258.
See Brunson, supra note 41 (manuscript at 11); Morley, supra note 42, at 346,
391.
259.
See Morley, supra note 42, at 346.
260.
See supra note 86 (illustrating the dividend-paid deduction for qualifying REITs).
261.
See Austan Goolsbee & Edward Maydew, Taxes and OrganizationalForm: The
Case of REIT Spin-offs, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 441, 444 (2002).
262.
See Bradley T. Borden, CounterintuitiveTax Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoffs, 146
TAx NOTES 381, 382-84 (2015) [hereinafter Borden, Counterintuitive Tax Revenue Effect]
(showing that if individuals hold all of the stock of a corporation and a REIT and the
corporation distributes only 25% of its taxable income, the effective tax rate on the REIT
taxable income can be greater than the effective tax rate on the corporate taxable income).
263.
See Walter I. Boudry, An Examinationof REIT Dividend Payout Policy, 39 REAL
EST. ECON. 601, 612-14 (2011) (estimating discretionary dividends to be 17.9% of total
dividends, making the taxable portion 82.1% and the total dividend 121.8% (100 - 82.1) of
taxable income); REIT.com, Historical Tax Treatment of REIT Common Share Dividends,
YEAR-END TAX REPORTING
DATA, https://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/Industry
Data/HistoricalDividendAllocationSummary.pdf
(showing
the following
dividend
composition of publicly-traded REITs: 69% ordinary income, 17% return of capital, 14%
long-term capital gain). Distributions in excess of taxable income suggest that REIT cash
flow exceeds REIT taxable income. This is expected because depreciation deductions reduce
taxable income but do not affect cash flow. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2012) (granting the
depreciation deduction independent of cash payments).
264.
See CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 13, at 134-38 (listing five reasons
gleaned from scholarly work and the popular press).
265.
See Ko Wang, John Erickson & George W. Gau, Dividend Policiesand Dividend
Announcement Effects for Real EstateInvestment Trusts, 21 REAL EST. ECON. 185, 197, 199200 (1993).
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reduce asymmetric information, 266 to attract investors, 267 to signal
private information, 268 and to signal future cash flow
expectations. 26 9 Higher cash flow also affects the dividend
policy.2 70 Empirical analysis suggests that REITs pay higher
dividends to adjust toward a target level of total dividends and
provide dividend smoothing, which appears to provide the best
explanation of REIT dividends in excess of taxable income.27 1
Finally, because depreciation deductions reduce taxable income
but not cash flow, 2 7 2 the total dividend in excess of the taxable
portion could be attributed in part to that distinction.
The distribution requirement also serves an important tax
accounting function. Perhaps the greatest challenge that
partnership tax faces is properly governing allocations of tax items
to partners. 273 Even though REIT taxation is often referred to as a
flow-through or conduit tax regime, it does not incorporate
complex allocation rules comparable to those found in the
partnership tax rules. 2 7 4 Instead, the REIT regime merely requires
266.
See Cynthia G. McDonald, Terry D. Nixon & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., The
Changing Asymmetric Information Component of REIT Spreads: A Study of Anticipated
Announcements, 20 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 195, 201-04 (2000).
267.
See CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 13, at 137-38.
268.
See Wang, Erickson & Gau, supra note 265, at 193-194, 198-99.
269.
See Michael Bradley, Dennis R. Capozza & Paul J. Sequin, Dividend Policy and
Cash-Flow Uncertainty, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 555, 571-77 (1998) (considering both
asymmetric information and signaling to conclude that reducing dividends signals future
cash-flow volatility); William Hardin, III & Matthew D. Hill, REIT Dividend Determinants:
Excess Dividends and CapitalMarkets, 36 REAL EST. ECoN. 349, 363-64 (2008) (concluding
that REITs pay excess dividends based on actual and expected operating cash flows and
are aware that a reduced dividend would send a negative signal).
270.
See Boudry, supra note 263, at 621.
See Boudry, supra note 263, at 625-26.
271.
272.
See I.R.C. §§ 167-168 (2012).
273.
Several articles discuss challenges that allocations rules face. See, e.g., Bradley
T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion ofPartners'Interestsin a Partnership,79 U. CIN. L. REV.
1077, 1098 (2011); Gregg D. Polsky, DeterringTax-Driven PartnershipAllocations, 64 TAX
LAW. 97 (2010); Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of PartnershipAllocations,
30 VA. TAX REV. 465 (2011); Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K- Substance, Shattered
Ceilings, and the Problem of ContributedProperty, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1433-35 (2009);
Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item
Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 335-38 (2008); Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and
Efficiency in PartnershipAllocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1074-79 (2006); Stephen Utz,
Allocation and Reallocation in Accordance with the Partners'Interests in the Partnership,
56 TAX LAW. 357, 364-66 (2003); Walter D. Schwidetzky, The PartnershipAllocation Rules
of Section 704(b): To Be or Not to Be, 17 VA. TAX REV. 707, 708, 740 (1998); Mark P. Gergen,
Reforming Subchapter K Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1, 9-15 (1990); Lawrence
Lokken, PartnershipAllocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 545, 613 (1986).
274.
See I.R.C. § 704(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 to -3 (as amended in 2013) (presenting
rules governing partnership allocations of tax items); supra note 273 (citing articles that
discuss the complexity of the allocation rules).
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the shareholders to whom distributions are made to report the
distributions as dividends, to the extent the distributions
represent taxable income of the REIT, 27 5 and allows REIT
shareholders to recognize relevant portions of the dividends as
capital gain that flows through from the REIT. 2 7 6 REITs may have
different classes of stock, 277 so a distribution might only cover the
REIT's obligations to holders of preferred stock, and only those
shareholders would recognize dividend income on the distribution.
The holders of other classes of REIT stock who do not receive
distributions would not recognize any income. Thus, REIT
taxation effectively allocates all of the income from any given tax
year only to the shareholders to whom the REIT makes a
distribution. Those shareholders appear to obtain the economic
benefit of the distribution and the taxable income associated with
it,278 so the law appears to properly allocate the REIT's tax items
to shareholders. The requirement to distribute taxable income
thus solves problems that exist in the partnership tax regime,
which does not require distributions and struggles to properly
govern the allocation of tax items.2 79
6. Taxable REIT Subsidiaries and Further Expansion of
Tenant Services (1999). As discussed above, the REIT industry in
the past successfully argued that REITs are at a competitive
disadvantage compared to other real estate owners because the
REIT regime requires REIT revenues to be passive and restricts
the types of services that a REIT can perform. 280 Although the
1986 changes allowed REITs to directly provide customary tenant

275.
See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends in gross income); § 301(c) (defining
dividend); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-6 (as amended in 1986) (requiring REIT shareholders to
recognize income in the year they receive a REIT dividend and describing how to compute
the amount of income). Distributions are also dividend income if they are part of a purging
dividend from the REIT. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(b)(4) (as
amended in 2014) (illustrating section 1374 treatment on REIT election).
276.
See I.R.C. § 857(b)(3)(B) (providing that a portion of a REIT dividend can be
treated as long-term capital gain, if it represents capital gain recognized by the REIT).
277.
See Michael E. Shaff, The Services Trend of Friendly REIT Rulings Continues, 4
COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 17, 19 (2013) (noting that a REIT had three different classes
of stock).
278.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in 2013) (requiring that the
partner to whom a tax item is allocated must also bear the economic burden and enjoy the
tax benefit associated with the tax item). Commentators question, however, whether the
rules adequately ensure that partnership economic results follow tax-item allocations. See
supra note 273.
279.
See supra note 273.
280.
See supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
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services, 281 the rules still significantly restricted the services
REITs could provide with respect to their real estate. In 1999,
Congress expanded the exception to impermissible tenant service
income to allow REITs to provide noncustomary tenant services
through a taxable REIT subsidiary. 28 2 After that change, REITs
may now indirectly provide noncustomary tenant services to
tenants through a subsidiary, subject to certain organizational,
ownerships, funding, and accounting rules. 2 8 3 The organizational
rules provide that a taxable REIT subsidiary must be a
corporation that is not a REIT, in which the REIT holds some stock
(without a minimum or maximum ownership requirement, so the
rules allow a REIT to be the sole owner) and that makes an
election, along with the REIT, to be a taxable REIT subsidiary. 284
The definition also includes any corporation more than 35% of the
voting or value of which is owned by a taxable REIT subsidiary. 285
A corporation that directly or indirectly operates or manages a
lodging or health care facility (or provides the brand name for such
a facility), does not come within the definition of taxable REIT
subsidiary. 286 Finally, the value of all of the taxable REIT
subsidiary stock held by a REIT cannot exceed 25% of the value of
the REIT's total assets. 287
The accounting and funding rules are somewhat complex, but
they help ensure that any amount paid by tenants that are for
services provided by the taxable REIT subsidiary are subject to a
full entity-level tax. For example, a REIT's standard lease
agreement may provide that tenants will make payments only to
include
payments
the
though
even
REIT,
the

See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
281.
282.
See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-170, § 542(a), 113 Stat. 1860, 1941 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1999)).
As part of the 1986 amendments, Congress allowed REITs to hold property through
wholly-owned qualified REIT subsidiaries, which tax law disregarded. See Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 662(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2300-02 (codified at I.R.C. § 856(i)
(Supp. IV 1987)). The 1999 amendment specifically provided that a qualified REIT
subsidiary could not be a taxable REIT subsidiary. See § 543(b), 113 Stat. at 1944 (codified
at I.R.C. § 856(i)(2) (Supp. IV 1999)).
283.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-38, 2002-2 C.B. 4-6 (ruling favorably for a taxable REIT
subsidiary that provided housekeeping services); David L. Brandon & Mario J. Deluca,
Opportunity Knocks for Taxable REIT Subsidiaries, 92 J. TAX'N 141, 141-42 (2000)
("Although TRSs are taxed as ordinary C corporations, they generally may provide any type
of noncustomary tenant services, without using an independent contractor . . . ."); Decker,
Kaplan & Ponda, supra note 28, at 421.
284.
See I.R.C. § 856(1)(1) (2012).
See § 856(1)(2).
285.
286.
See § 856()(3). See Decker, Ponda & Stein, supra note 28, at 1234-35.
See § 856(c)(4)(B)(ii).
287.
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non-separately-stated amounts for noncustomary tenant services
(such as housekeeping) provided by a taxable REIT subsidiary to
the tenants. 288 The amounts the REIT receives that are
attributable to the taxable REIT subsidiary's services do not come
within the definition of impermissible tenant services, 289 but if the
REIT does not pay those amounts to the taxable REIT subsidiary
as compensation, then the REIT must pay a 100% tax on the
amounts by which the taxable
REIT subsidiary is
undercompensated. 290 The 100% tax does not apply, however, if
the amount attributable to services to a property is less than 1%
of the total amount the REIT receives from the tenant with respect
to the property. 291 The 100% tax also does not apply if the amount
the REIT pays to the taxable REIT subsidiary is at least 150% of
the costs the taxable REIT subsidiary incurs to provide the
services. 292 The REIT can, of course, avoid the 100% tax by paying
sufficient compensation to the REIT subsidiary for the services it
provides. Any amounts paid by the REIT to the taxable REIT
subsidiary for services are of course subject to the taxable REIT
subsidiary's corporate tax rate. 2 9 3 Consequently, REITs would
prefer to pay as little as possible to the taxable REIT subsidiary
but still avoid the 100% tax. Of the two alternatives, paying
amounts to the subsidiary should provide the better tax result
because the subsidiary will pay tax at the corporate rate, not the
100% rate the REIT would pay.
In limited circumstances, a taxable REIT subsidiary may
lease property from the REIT, and the amounts paid by the taxable
REIT subsidiary will come within the definition of rents from real
property, regardless of the percentage ownership the REIT has in
the subsidiary. 294 For the payments to qualify as rents from real
property, however, the REIT cannot rent more than 10% of the

288.
See Rev. Rul. 2002-38, 2002-2 C.B. 4.
289.
See § 856(d)(7)(C)(i).
290.
See § 857(b)(7); Rev. Rul. 2002-38, 2002-2 C.B. 4. The amounts representing
payments for services that the REIT does not pay to the taxable REIT subsidiary are called
"redetermined rents." See I.R.C. § 857(b)(7)(B)(i). The amount of redetermined rents relies
upon (and replaces) I.R.C. § 482. See id.; § 857(b)(7)(E).
291.
See § 857(b)(7)(B)(ii).
292.
See § 857(b)(7)(B)(v). Even if the REIT satisfies this requirement, the IRS may
allocate a portion of the rent to the taxable REIT subsidiary, and the reallocated portion
would be subject to the taxable REIT subsidiary's corporate tax rate. See Rev. Rul. 2002-38,
2002-2 C.B. 4.
293.
See § 11.
294.
See § 856(d)(8). This is an exception to the general rule that excludes from the
definition of rents from real property any amount that a REIT receives from a person in
which the REIT has at least a 10% ownership interest. See § 856(d)(2)(B).
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leased space of the property to a taxable REIT subsidiary or other
person under the REIT's control. 29 5 To come within this rule, the
amount the taxable REIT subsidiary pays in rent must, however,
be substantially comparable to rent paid by other tenants for use
of the property. 296 Recall that a taxable REIT subsidiary cannot
manage or operate the REIT's lodging or health care facilities. 297
Nonetheless, the leasing rules allow a taxable REIT subsidiary to
lease such facilities from the REIT (without restriction on the
portion of the property the subsidiary may lease), if an eligible
independent contractor manages or operates the facilities. 298
By allowing taxable REIT subsidiaries to operate and manage
property and provide other noncustomary tenant services to REIT
tenants, Congress effectively eliminated any remaining barriers
that otherwise prohibited REITs from actively managing property
and providing cutting-edge services at properties. With these
taxable REIT subsidiary rules, a REIT can now form a wholly
owned corporate subsidiary and manage the property and provide
noncustomary tenant services through that subsidiary. Because
the REIT controls the taxable REIT subsidiary, the subsidiary's
actions occur at the REIT's direction, so the REIT essentially
provides the services. This rule clearly extends the REIT regime
beyond that originally envisioned by Congress, but the entity-level
tax paid on services provided by the taxable REIT subsidiary
ensures that the rule does not erode the corporate tax base with
respect to noncustomary tenant services. The expansion also
moves REIT operations closer to partnership operations, providing
REIT investors treatment that more closely reflects treatment
afforded direct investors in real estate.
The REIT industry cheers these changes because REITs can
reduce agency costs by controlling the provision of tenant services
through taxable REIT subsidiaries, instead of hiring independent
contractors. 299 Tenants also prefer receiving services from the

295.
See § 856(d)(8)(A)(i). A person is under the REIT's control for this purpose if the
REIT owns (directly or by attribution) at least 10% of the vote or value, in the case of a
corporation, or at least 10% of the assets or net profits of a noncorporate entity. See
§ 856(d)(2)(B).
296.
See § 856(d)(8)(A)(ii).
297.
See supra text accompanying note 286.
298.
See § 856(d)(8)(B) (allowing the taxable REIT subsidiary to hold licenses or
permits enabling the operation or management of the property and to employ the workers
of such facilities or property located outside the United States, if the eligible independent
contractor is responsible for the daily supervision and direction of such individuals); see
also § 856(d)(9) (defining eligible independent contractor).
299.
See supra note 182.

52

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[ 53:1

REIT because they are familiar with REIT management. 300
Finally, the taxable REIT subsidiary rules have fewer foot faults
and gotcha provisions than prior rules.
7. REIT Spinoffs (2001). The review of the history of REIT
taxation to this point shows that Congress has significantly
relaxed the rules governing services that REITs can provide
tenants. In addition to allowing REITs to take greater control of
their assets through the types of services they can provide, the
changes opened the door for the IRS to later rule that REITs can
satisfy the active trade or business requirement of the tax-free
spinoff rules. 30 1 A tax-free REIT spinoff requires that both the
operating corporation and the REIT be engaged in a historically
active trade or business immediately following the spinoff. 30 2 Prior

to the 1986 expansion of the types of services that a REIT can
perform, the IRS had ruled that a REIT cannot satisfy the tax-free
spinoff active trade or business requirement. 303 After Congress
enacted the 1986 changes, a REIT could perform "activities that
can constitute active and substantial management and
operational functions with respect to rental activity." 304
Consequently, a REIT now can satisfy the tax-free spinoff active
trade or business requirement, so a REIT spinoff can be tax-free. 305
8. REIT Definition of Real Estate (1969-Present). The
primary assets of REITs must be primarily real estate assets, 306
which includes real property. 307 Some commentators claim that
the application of REIT taxation is expanding as the IRS issues
rulings granting REIT classification to entities that hold assets
that appear to stretch the boundaries of the definition of "real
property."3 0 8 For example, over the past few decades the IRS has
300.
Ponda Interview, supra note 214.
301.
See Staffaroni, supra note 27, at 544-45 (noting that the Service changed its view
in 2001).
302.
See § 355(b)(1).
303.
See Rev. Rul. 73-236, 1973-1 C.B. 183-84.
304.
See Rev. Rul. 2001-29, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 1349.
305.
See id.
306.
See § 856(c)(4)(A) (requiring that at least 75% of a REIT's assets be real estate
assets, cash, and government securities).
307.
See § 856(c)(5)(B) (defining real estate assets to include real property).
308.
See Micah W. Bloomfield & Neal D. Richards, New Rulings PresentOpportunities,
but Not Carte Blanche, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 1 (2013); Boos, supra note 28, at
1292 ('These examples, combined with a potentially liberal interpretation of what
constitutes real property, have made REITs a more attractive entity structure for avoiding
taxes."); John Patrick Dowdall, Defining Real Property and Its Consequences, 4 COLUM. J.
TAX L. TAX MATTERS 5, 5 (2013); Todd D. Keator, REITs and the Expanding Universe of
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ruled that the following types of property come within the
definition of real property: railroad property (including tracks,
roadbeds, buildings, bridges, and tunnels);30 9 mobile home units;3 10
a total energy system that produces electricity, steam, hot water,
and refrigeration for commercial and industrial buildings;3 11
components of a microwave transmission system, including
buildings, transmitting and receiving towers, and a chain link
fence; 312 central
refrigeration systems of cold storage
313
warehouses;
an electricity transmission system; 314 a gas
315
pipeline system;
a product delivery system consisting of hoses,
pipes, manifolds, valves, an underground scale, loading racks, a
system of insulated heat traced pipes, storage tanks, boilers,
blending devices, interests or rights to occupy the land, and
various driveways, docks, rail spurs, dikes, containment areas,
and security fencing; 316 wireless and broadcast communication
towers; 317 and billboards. 318 Figure 6 contrasts the traditional
notion of real property at the time Congress created the REIT tax
regime with today's understanding of what constitutes real
property. 3 19

.

"Rentsfrom Real Property,"4 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 12, 12 (2013) (noting that the
IRS has recently issued several private letter rulings that expand the definition of real
property in the context of infrastructure assets); Steven F. Mount, New Wine in Old Bottles:
Has the Definition of "Real Estate Assets" Been Expanded for Real Estate Investment
Trusts?, 54 TAX MGMT. MEMO. 383, 383 (2013); Michael E. Shaff, The Services Trend of
Friendly REIT Rulings Continues, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 17, 20 (2013) ("The
Service continues its long-standing practice of issuing favorable rulings, private as well as
published, on REIT qualification issues, including assets constituting real property . .
309.
See Rev. Rul. 69-94, 1969-1 C.B. 189.
310.
See Rev. Rul. 71-220, 1971-1 C.B. 210.
311.
See Rev. Rul. 73-425, 1973-2 C.B. 222-23.
312.
See Rev. Rul. 75-424, 1975-2 C.B. 270.
313.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-04-019 (Oct. 30, 1998).
314.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-25-025 (Mar. 22, 2007).
315.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-37-006 (Mar. 3, 2009).
316.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-05-018 (Oct. 6, 2009).
317.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-29-007 (Apr. 6, 2011).
318.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-43-011 (July 19, 2011).
319.
What constitutes traditional REIT assets is a point of controversy. For instance,
in 1969, the IRS ruled that railroad property comes within the REIT definition of real
property. See Rev. Rul. 69-94, 1969-1 C.B. 189. Because that ruling followed shortly after
the 1960 REIT legislation, some people view railroad property as a traditional REIT asset.
Consequently, any attempt to classify real property as traditional and non-traditional REIT
assets will be met with conflicting views. The difficulty in identifying a definitive list of
traditional and non-traditional REIT assets lends support to the view that the REIT
definition of real property is not expanding.
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Figure 6:
Evolution of REIT Asset Groups
REIT Assets
(Today)
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Data Centers
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Mortgages
Mortgage-Backed
Securities
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* Prisons
* Rail Road Properties
* Storage Facilities
* Telecommunication
Assets
* Timber Assets
* More...

Other commentators, the Treasury, and the IRS do not
perceive this evolution as an expansion of the definition of real
property. 320 More recently, the Treasury Department published
proposed regulations that would codify a definition of real property
that is consistent with prior IRS rulings, 32 1 so all indications are
that the use of REITs will continue to grow. 3 2 2 The proposed
regulations define real property generally as land and
improvements to the land.323 Land includes "water and air space
superjacent to land and natural products and deposits that are

320.
See Nugent, REIT Spinoffs, supra note 28, at 1519-23; Ameek Ashok Ponda,
PractitionerSuggests Modificationsto ProposedREITRegs, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 177-22
(Aug. 11, 2014) (applauding the publication of the proposed regulations and recommending
some changes to them).
321.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10, 79 Fed. Reg. 27508, 27511 (May 10, 2014). The
regulations fill an important gap in the REIT rules. See, e.g., Taylor, Closing the Gap, supra
note 28, at 597 (praising the regulations for addressing the definition of real property and
recommending that the IRS issue more guidance related to other REIT issues, such as the
definition of rent from real property and determining the value of a REIT's assets).
322.
See Steven F. Mount, Definition of 'eal Property"for Real Estate Investment
Trusts-Prop. Reg. § 1.856-10 "Codifies" Current Law, 55 TAX. MGMT. MEMO. 371, 378
(2014) (noting that the definition of real property has expanded to include certain intangible
assets); see also Taylor, Closing the Gap, supra note 28, at 598 (noting that the REITs' rapid
growth reflects the IRS's willingess to expand on what constitutes real property and what
constitutes rent from real property).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10(b).
323.
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unsevered from the land." 3 2 4 Improvements

to land include
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and their structural
structures
"inherently permanent
32 5 which must serve a passive function, such as
components,"
containing, supporting, sheltering, covering, or protecting. 326 The
proposed definition includes property that the IRS had previously
ruled comes within the definition of real estate assets, so such
property would continue to qualify as real property under the
proposed regulations. The proposed regulations also include
intangible property, such as the goodwill of a REIT, in the
definition of real property. 327 The inclusion of goodwill within the
definition provides guidance needed by REITs that merge or
otherwise acquire property and must account for part of the
acquired assets as goodwill. 328 Thus, the proposed regulations
would appear to provide the basis for continuing to interpret the
definition of real property to account for changes in the economy.
As a result, the application of the REIT regime will most likely
continue to expand.
The interpretation of the definition of real property is an
example of how REIT developments have followed President
Eisenhower's prediction that REITs would include not just the
traditional type of real property held by real estate trusts in
1960 when Congress created REITs, but would grow to
unanticipated uses of the REIT tax regime. 329 One could argue,
however that the expansion of the REIT regime is consistent
with the stated purpose of making investment in a diverse
portfolio of real estate available to more investors. REITs now
offer the average investor the opportunity to invest in REITs
that hold only billboards, railroad property, prisons, or other
nontraditional types of real estate. 330 That opportunity would
not be available if the IRS had restricted the definition of real
property. Furthermore, President Eisenhower appeared to have
assuaged his own concerns about the possible expansion of the
REIT regime by signing the REIT legislation into law shortly
after expressing his concern. 331

See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10(c).
324.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10(d)(1).
325.
326.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10(d)(2)(iii)(A).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-10(f).
327.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-13-009 (Dec. 13, 2007) (ruling that to the extent the
328.
value of real estate intangibles (determined as part of a REIT property acquisition) is
inextricably linked to the underlying real estate, the intangibles will be treated as real
estate assets under the REIT asset test).
See supra text accompanying note 78.
329.
See Taylor, Closing the Gap, supra note 28, at 598.
330.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
331.
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The interpretation of the definition of real property may
encroach on other aspects of the limits of the REIT regime. As
assets that have traditionally been an integral part of operating
businesses come within the definition of real property, questions
arise regarding whether the revenue from such property is from
an active source. The taxable REIT subsidiary rules help illustrate
this concept. A taxable REIT subsidiary may manage and operate
an apartment complex that a REIT owns. The management helps
facilitate the rental of the property to resident tenants. Contrast
that with the type of operation that Windstream does with respect
to its real estate assets. It provides telecommunication and other
technology services to its customers and requires fiber and copper
networks to provide those services. 332 Its assets serve a single
purpose and will have a single tenant following the spinoff. The
lease to the Windstream will undoubtedly require Windstream,
not the REIT, to maintain the real estate assets. 333 The
single-tenant, single-purpose nature of the Windstream real
estate, makes it similar to other assets, such as football stadiums
that have a single tenant and a single purpose. The focus of the
regulations on the physical nature of real estate suggests that the
IRS and Treasury do not consider the use of the property to be a
meaningful part of the REIT definition of real estate. 334 Under that
interpretation, the REIT definition arguably has not expanded
since Congress first enacted REIT taxation.
III. WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH REITs?

The discussion to this point describes REITs, but it does not
implicate REIT taxation in any wrongdoing or serious policy
violation. Much of the focus in the media and the Camp Proposal
is on REIT spinoffs and conversions and the so-called expansion of
the definition of real estate. 335 The concern is that REIT taxation
erodes the corporate tax base by treating REITs and regular
corporations
differently. 336
Embedded
within
the
corporate-tax-base erosion concern is an inequity argument:
corporate-tax-base erosion occurs because tax law treats real

332.
See Windstream News Release, Windstream to Spin Off Assets into Publicly
Traded REIT, WINDSTREAM (July 29, 2014), http://news.windstream.com/article
display.cfm?article id=1561.

333.

See id.

334.
See supra text accompanying notes 309-28 (indicating the different types of
properties that have come within the definition of real property).

335.

See supra notes 1-3.

336.

See id.
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estate owned by regular corporations differently from real estate
owned by REITs. 337 In pursuit of benefits provided by REIT
taxation, property owners expend significant resources to separate
property ownership from operations, perhaps resulting in
The
structures. 338
ownership
less-than-optimally-efficient
a
tax-policy
from
taxation
potential problems with REIT
standpoint therefore appear to be threefold: (1) it negatively
affects tax revenue, (2) it creates inequity, and (3) it fosters
inefficiency. The following discussion illustrates that none of these
perceived problems stand up well under careful scrutiny.
Because none of these policy concerns warrant the negative
attention directed at REITs, this Article suggests that bad optics,
more than bad policy, may motivate the media and Representative
Camp. 3 3 9 In other words, because REIT spinoffs look something like
corporate inversions and take income from regular corporations,
people think they are bad. 3 4 0 Even though eliminating bad optics is
not a tax policy objective, this analysis considers it as an explanation
for the criticism of REIT taxation. By recognizing that bad optics are
causing consternation and addressing bad optics directly, this Article
should help assuage the concerns of those who are deceived by
superficial appearances. In fact, the following analysis illustrates
that REIT taxation generally accomplishes the stated purposes for
enacting the REIT regime-it makes real estate portfolio ownership
available to a larger portion of the population, it channels capital to
the real estate market, and it enhances equity between RIC and real
estate investors. 34 1
A.

Tax-Base Erosion

Tax-base erosion is the primary complaint about REIT
spinoffs and conversions with a particular focus on the
corporate-tax-base erosion. 342 In fact, one of the Camp Proposal's
337.
Inequity results when the law treats two similarly situated persons differently.
See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1982)
("[Equity] in morals means this: things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness." (quoting
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V. 3, 1131a-31b (W.D. Ross trans., 1925))).
338.
See infra Part III.C.1.
See supranotes 2-3.
339.
See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Year in Review: REIT and PTP Converters-the Other
340.
Corporate Deserters?, 146 TAX NOTES 20 (2015) (recognizing that observers compare REIT
spinoffs and conversions to corporate inversions).
341.
See supratext accompanying notes 62-70.
342.
See supra notes 2-3. Other commentators also focus on corporate-tax-base
erosion. See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Sears' REIT Considerations Represent Base Erosion
Threat, 145 TAx NOTES 751, 751-52 (Nov. 17, 2014) (considering the announcement by
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enumerated reasons for eliminating tax-free REIT spinoffs is that
the "REIT rules were not intended to facilitate erosion of the
corporate tax base." 3 4 3 The focus on corporate-tax-base erosion as
a criticism of REIT taxation is problematic for several reasons.
First, the concern about eroding the corporate tax base featured
prominently in President Eisenhower's 1957 veto letter. 344 The
President's stated objection did not reflect a concern of CongressCongress had already passed the bill. 34 5 The concern about REIT
taxation eroding the corporate tax base therefore should not be
attributed to Congress. Apparently Congress was not concerned
about the effect the legislation would have on the corporate tax
base, or it realized that expanding opportunities for real estate
investment and channeling capital to real estate markets would
outweigh the cost of corporate-tax-base erosion.
Second, within a few years after expressing concern that the
REIT legislation would erode the corporate tax base, President
Eisenhower signed the REIT legislation that has the same effect
on the corporate tax base that the previously vetoed legislation
would have had. 346 Apparently, the President was no longer
concerned that corporate-tax-base erosion should hold up
enactment of the statute. 347 His change of heart could be
attributed to a realization that the erosion of the corporate tax
base would be less than originally estimated or that the benefits
of REIT legislation would outweigh the costs of eroding the
corporate tax base. The events leading up to the enactment of
REIT legislation suggest that the possibility of corporate-tax-base
erosion did not deter REIT legislation even though Congress and
the President were aware of the tax-base-erosion arguments. To
the extent they were concerned that REIT taxation might erode
the corporate tax base, they addressed the concern by restricting

Sears that it would spin off its real estate assets into a REIT in taxable sale-leaseback);
Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1105-07.
343.
See WAYS & MEANS COMM. MAJORITY TAx STAFF, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT
OF 2014: DISCUSSION DRAFT, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 123 (Comm. Print 2014).

&

344.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
345.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-70, 72-76.
346.
See supra text accompanying note 75.
347.
Perhaps attributing such careful thought to President Eisenhower is
inappropriate because the opposition to the REIT legislation appears to have come from
Dan Throop Smith, an Under Secretary at Treasury at the time. See LYNN, BLOOMFIELD
LOWDEN, supra note 64, § 1.11. While Mr. Smith was at Treasury, the presidency opposed
REIT legislation, but President Eisenhower signed the legislation shortly after Mr. Smith
left Treasury in 1959. See id. This may suggest that President Eisenhower's stated
opposition reflected the views of a single highly-influential individual, and that the concern
for corporate-tax-base erosion was not widespread.
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REIT activities to help ensure that REIT tax benefits only apply
to passive income from real estate.3 48
Third, corporate-tax-base erosion is a misguided criticism of
REIT taxation. One estimate concludes that lost tax revenue as a
result of corporate-tax-base erosion could be as high as $2 billion
per year, 349 but that estimate, as a critique of REIT taxation, is
misleading, and corporate-tax-base erosion as a criticism of REIT
taxation is misplaced. Corporate tax revenue is one source of
government revenue, and a reduction of corporate tax revenue is
significant only if it is not offset by tax revenue from other sources.
Even though REITs may erode the corporate tax base, they also
can increase tax revenues from other sources. REITs must
distribute their taxable income, 35 0 and individual REIT
shareholders pay tax at higher rates than corporate
shareholders. 351 The tax revenue lost from erosion of the corporate
tax base can be offset by income resulting from the REIT
distribution requirement and the higher tax rate on REIT
dividends. 352 The tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and
conversions that divert income from corporations to REITs is very
small. In fact, estimates of the tax revenue to be gained by the
REIT reforms in the Camp Proposal would have been a measly
$200 million in 2015.353 That estimate is similar to other estimates
of the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs. 354 In fact, the negative
tax-revenue effect of REITs diverting income from corporations
results from the favorable tax treatment afforded to tax-exempt
entities and foreign investors who invest in REITs. 3 5 5

348.
See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 4 (1960) (reiterating that the Congress intended to
restrict REIT taxation to passive investments); supra text accompanying notes 80-83
(discussing the purpose for enacting the REIT regime).
349.
See Sullivan, supranote 16, at 1104.
350.
See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (2012); supra text accompanying note 86.
351.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 557-66; Borden,
CounterintuitibeTax Revenue Effect, supra note 262, at 382.
352.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 562-66; see also Baron, supra
note 27, at 177-78, 186 (1973) (discussing the distribution requirement and higher tax rate
on REIT dividends).
353.

See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF

THE "TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014," JCX-20-14, at 10 (Comm. Print 2014) [hereinafter J. COMM.,
ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS]. The $2 billion estimate is closer to the overall tax-revenue effect
of REIT taxation. See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 611-13.
354.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 592-99 (estimating that the
overall tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs is about $250 million).
355.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 566-83, 594-99
(deconstructing the stock ownership of REITs and regular corporations and showing that
the special tax treatment afforded to tax-exempt and foreign investors accounts for the
negative tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and conversions).
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of

tax

revenue,

corporate-tax-base erosion is a red herring. REITs that form from
partnerships, and therefore erode the partnership-income tax
base, actually have a greater negative tax-revenue effect
(approximately $1.8 billion) 356 than REITs that form from
of
the
spinoffs.
Erosion
conversions
or
corporate
because
some
REIT
partnership-income tax base results
shareholders qualify for tax benefits that are not available to
members of partnerships. 35 7 In particular, tax-exempt and foreign
investors obtain tax benefits by investing in REITs that they could
not obtain by investing in partnerships. 35 8 Thus, the cause of both
corporate-tax-base erosion and partnership-income-tax-base
erosion is similarly the favorable treatment the tax rules afford to
tax-exempt and foreign investors. The overall tax-revenue effect of
REIT taxation and favorable treatment of tax-exempt and foreign
investors is around $2 billion a year, which is a minute percentage
of total government receipts. 359 Other benefits and the stated
purposes of REIT taxation may outweigh its tax-revenue costs.
Fifth, the focus on corporate-tax-base erosion should not
overshadow the expressed purposes of REIT taxation. Congress's
expressed purposes for enacting the REIT legislation was to give
more investors the opportunity to invest in diversified real estate
portfolios and to channel more capital to the real estate markets. 360
These benefits may have been more important to Congress than
the potential loss of corporate tax revenue. Indeed the REIT
industry extolls economic benefits provided by REITs, claiming
they support nearly 1 million jobs and provide investment
opportunities through pensions and retirement plans for 70
million Americans, including teachers and firefighters. 36 1
Additionally, more recent studies claim that publicly-traded

356.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 599-611.
357.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 608-11 (noting the
differences between the two).
358.
See id. (noting the difference between REITs and partnerships); Michael
Hirschfeld & Shaul Grossman, Opportunitiesfor the ForeignInvestor in U.S. Real EstateIf Planning Comes First, 94 J. TAX'N 36, 46-47 (2001) ("A significant advantage of the REIT
for foreign investors is that investment in a REIT does not cause the foreign investor to be
engaged in a U.S. trade or business with respect to the entity's operating income, unlike an
investment in a partnership or LLC. The investor thus avoids the necessity of having to file
annual income tax returns.").
359.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 611-12 (estimating that the
tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation is 0.0729% of total government tax revenue).
360.
See supratext accompanying notes 67-68, 80-83.
361.
See Economic Impact of REITs: REITs by the Numbers, REIT,
https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/reits-numbers (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
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REITs help stabilize the commercial real estate market. 3 6 2 The

small cost that results from REITs eroding the corporate tax base
therefore appears to be offset by other benefits that REITs provide.
Finally, the concern about corporate-tax-base erosion is
outdated. The concern about erosion of the corporate tax base was
perhaps more meaningful in 1960, when Congress enacted the
favorable REIT taxation regime. At that time, entity taxation
applied to any entity that was separate from its owners, as
determined using a multiple-factor corporate-resemblance test. 36 3
The view that corporations were separate entities and
partnerships were aggregates of their owners was more prominent
then. 3 6 4 Indeed, real estate investors (and mutual funds before
them through RICs) felt compelled to seek preferential tax
treatment through a separate REIT tax regime because the courts
had held that business trusts were subject to corporate taxation. 365
Today, separate legal status of an entity largely is irrelevant as
tax law grants partnership flow-through taxation to limited
liability companies that can have all of the entity attributes
commonly attributed to corporations and are viewed as business
entities separate from their owners. 366

See infra text accompanying notes 446-86.
362.
363.
See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 420-24 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that
an association should be classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes because it had
corporate attributes: (1) centralized management, (2) continuity of life, and (3) limited
liability to the owners). Regulations promulgated in 1960 incorporated six factors (the first
two of which are common with partnerships and corporations) into the test for corporation:
"(i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,
(iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests." See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960); Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the
Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 42138 (2005) (recounting the history of these entity classification rules).
364.
See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of PartnershipTaxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. 719, 723-41 (2009) (briefly recounting the development of theories and laws of
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies); Bradley T. Borden,
Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245,
252-65 (2010) (describing the three tax regimes and how they apply to partnerships and
corporations); Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the
Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 830-32 (2005) (discussing the
history of the entity-aggregate dichotomy).
365.
See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1935) (holding that a state-law trust
was subject to corporate taxation because it had characteristics that resembled those of a
corporation); supratext accompanying notes 53-58.
366.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2011, 2012, and 2006,
respectively) (providing that a noncorporate U.S. entity, such as a limited liability company,
will be treated as corporation only if it elects that classification); Kleinberger, supra note
364, at 841 ("[Ilt does appear that the predominate forms of closely held businessesgeneral partnerships, close corporations, and LLCs-are indeed all entities now.").

62

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[53:1

Corporate-tax-base erosion does not justify the attention that
REIT taxation has received recently. Even though REITs may
erode the corporate tax base, the REIT distribution requirement
can generate income that offsets the effects of the eroded corporate
tax base. Furthermore, Congress enacted REIT legislation to
accomplish specific purposes. The non-tax benefits of REIT
taxation may offset the small of negative tax-revenue effect that
REIT taxation might have. Consequently, corporate-tax-base
erosion is not a significant problem of REIT taxation.
B. Inequity of PreferentialTreatment
The inequity argument embedded in the criticism of REITs is
less salient than the corporate-tax-base-erosion argument, and it
is more difficult to present as justification for reforming REIT
taxation. As stated above, the inequity argument is embedded in
the tax-base erosion argument, even though the arguments do not
expressly refer to inequity.3 6 7 The inequity argument provides that
REITs receive favorable treatment compared to regular
corporations, but an equity analysis must also compare REITs to
partnerships and other ownership arrangements. Those several
points of reference take the wind out of the sails of the inequity
claims against REIT taxation.
1. REIT Taxation as a Classic Equity Conundrum. The
most prominent inequity argument cites the difference between
corporate taxation and REIT taxation and claims that REITs
erode the corporate tax base, and the tax treatment afforded
REITs grants an unfair advantage to REIT investors. 36 8 A proper

367.
See supra text accompanying note 337.
368.
See Cauble, supra note 27, at 173-78 (recommending REIT reform that would
limit the types of income that qualify for conduit treatment of publicly traded entities); Jane
G. Gravelle, Non-Neutral Taxation and the Efficiency Gains of the 1986 Tax Reform ActA
New
Look
18-23
(NBER, Working Paper Series,
No.
2964,
1989),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2964.pdf (concluding that 1986 tax reform eliminated
different tax treatment of corporate and non-corporate capital and decreased inefficiency
and dead weight loss); Martin A. Sullivan, How Much Do Converted and Nontraditional
REITs Cost the U.S.
Treasury? TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (Sept. 8,
2014),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsflPermalink/MSUN-9NRFWQ?OpenDocument
(claiming that REIT spinoffs and conversions reduced corporate tax liability by an amount
between $900 million and $2.2 billion in 2014); Martin A. Sullivan, REIT Conversions:Good
for Wall Street. Not Good for America, TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsflPermalink/MSUN
-9NXQLG?OpenDocument (stating with respect to REIT spinoffs and conversions: "[T1here
is the economic inefficiency that results from the unfairness of allowing a lucky few to
escape the tax while others are left bearing the burden").
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equity analysis cannot, however, merely compare the tax
treatment of real estate held by REITs to the tax treatment of real
estate held by regular corporations to determine whether the law
treats similar situations similarly. 36 9 One of the original stated
purposes of REIT legislation was to grant real estate investors tax
treatment that was similar to the tax treatment afforded RIC
investors, 370 so Congress intended to treat the assets of REITs
differently from the assets held by regular corporations but
similarly to assets held by RICs. As Figure 7 illustrates, a
comparison of REITs to corporations on the one hand and to RICs
on the other does not conclusively establish that the law should
treat REITs in the same manner that it treats either of these other
types of arrangements. Thus, REITs create a classic equity
conundrum. 37 1

369.
See Bradley T. Borden, QuantitativeModel for Measuring Line-DrawingInequity,
98 IOWA L. REV. 971, 976-80 (2013) (considering the difficulty of drawing lines that
separate arrangements that receive different tax treatment); Bradley T. Borden, The
Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. 643, 671 (2008) [hereinafter
Borden, Equity Conundrum] (discussing inequity analyses in the context of multiple
comparison points).
370.
See supra text accompanying notes 67, 81.
371.
See Borden, Equity Conundrum, supranote 369, at 660-95 (describing the equity
conundrum raised by tax-free exchanges, which the law treats as continued ownership of
the same property instead of as the exchange for one property for non-like-kind property,
and how the law could address that conundrum).
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Figure 7: REIT Equity Conundrum
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Figure 7 suggests that perhaps the most striking difference
between corporations on the one hand and RICs and REITs on the
other hand is the level of business activity and the purpose of the
entities. That raises the question of whether the type of income
should determine whether an entity should be subject to
entity-level taxation and whether the level of business activity
should define what type of property should qualify for REIT
treatment. Many of the provisions of the REIT qualification test
restrict a REIT's level of activity. 37 2 Although those considerations
may not appear relevant to facilitate small investment in a
diversified portfolio or to channel capital to real estate markets,
Congress clearly intended to limit the benefit of REIT taxation to
passive investments in real estate. Active corporations can access
capital provided by smaller investors through RICs, so they are
not disadvantaged compared to REITs. Thus, the relevant
differences in activity would appear to be the characteristic that
justifies treating REITs and active corporations differently. REITs
may now provide more services to the tenants of property they hold
See Siemann, supra note 27, at 275-77 (explaining the different requirements
372.
that REITs have to follow and indicating that Congress wanted to limit the favorable tax
treatment given to REITs to companies that are passively invested in real estate and not
businesses that engage in active trade).
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directly or indirectly through taxable REIT subsidiaries. 373 Those
services, when considered in total, may make some REITs look like
active businesses. Nonetheless, income recognized by taxable
REIT subsidiaries for business activities is subject to an
entity-level tax. 3 7 4

Simply comparing REITs to corporations in today's
environment is inappropriate because many REITs could form as
partnerships instead of becoming corporations. 3 7 5 Therefore, the
inequity analysis must also consider whether REITs should be
compared to partnerships instead of corporations. 376 As Figure 8
illustrates, some REIT attributes are similar to corporations and
some are similar to partnerships, so the law must choose whether
to tax REITs more like corporations or more like partnerships.
Today a significant amount of real estate is owned through
partnerships and limited liability companies.3 7 7 Those are
generally closely held entities held by the wealthiest members of
society, 378 but they can also be publicly traded. 3 79 If an
arrangement incorporates, it will be subject to the entity-level tax;
if it becomes a publicly traded partnership, it can escape an

373.
See supra Part II.C.2, 6 (describing the evolution of services REITs can provide).
374.
See supra text accompanying notes 288-93 (describing the entity-level tax).
See supra text accompanying notes 351-57 (noting that tax revenue loss from
375.
erosion of corporate tax is small compared to the erosion from REITs that form from
partnerships).
376.
See Cauble, supra note 27, at 154-55 (recognizing that REITs are like both
corporations and publicly traded partnerships); Borden, Equity Conundrum, supra note
369, at 660-95 (illustrating that the equity analysis must consider multiple alternatives
when a tax situation is similar to more than one situation).
See SOI Tax Stats-PartnershipStatistics:Table 4. Partnershipswith Net Rental
377.
Real EstateIncome (Loss), by Selected IndustrialGroup, Tax Year 2012, http://www.irs.gov
luac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Partnership -Statistics-Rental-Real-Estate-Income-Partnerships -with
-Rental-Real-Estate-Income (last updated Aug. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Partnership Tax
Stats] (showing that partnerships had $488 billion of gross rents from real estate in 2012).
378.
To avoid registration requirements, partnerships would generally avoid general
solicitation and advertising and only accept investments from accredited investors. See
Rober C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach CorporateAmerica:A Roadmap for Achieving
Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 277 n.234 (2007) (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (2006) as authority for excluding accredited investors from the general
rules governing securities regulation). An accredited investor is an individual with a net
worth (or joint net worth with spouse) of more than $1 million or at least $200,000 of income
(or $300,000 of joint income with spouse) in the two preceding years and expects the same
level in current year. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2014). Of the 1.5 million
partnerships, 99.99% are closely held. See PartnershipTax Stats, supranote 377 (providing
that about 1.5 million partnerships filed tax returns in 2012); PTPs Currently Traded on
U.S. Exchanges, MLP Funds and MLP Indexes, NAT'L ASS'N OF PUBLICLY TRADED P'SHIPS,

http://www.naptp.org/PTPlOl/CurrentPTPs (last updated July 22, 2015) (listing about 150
publicly traded partnerships, of which only 18 are real estate and financial).
See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012) (governing publicly traded partnerships).
379.
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entity-level tax if and only if a sufficient portion of its income is
from passive, REIT-like sources.3 80

Figure 8: Alternatives to REIT
Formation

Eorotion

...

___

ftflTTax
Partnership

Entity-Level Tax

Income Tax Conduit

Active Business

Passive
Facilitates small

Flow-Through Taxation
Active Business
Generally for wealthy

throgh ublc oferngs investment in diversified investors, but can be

t
income from active and
passive sources
Entity separate from
owners

real estate portfolio
Income from passive real
estate ownership
Entity separate from
owners

publicly traded, if passive
Income from active real
estate ownership
Entity separate from
owners

Tax law generally treats publicly traded partnerships as
corporations and subjects their income to an entity-level tax. 3 81
The law exempts publicly traded partnerships from that
entity-level tax, however, if at least 90% of a partnership's
income is from passive sources, including rents and gains from
the sale of real property. 382 The rules governing publicly traded
partnerships incorporate the REIT definition of rents from real
property, but they have more liberal rules regarding services,
which do not prevent publicly traded partnerships from directly
providing customary tenant services. 383 Nonetheless, rents for
publicly traded partnerships only include payments for
customary tenant services provided by publicly traded
partnerships to their tenants, and do not include payments for
noncustomary tenant services whether provided by an

380.
381.
382.
383.

See § 7704.
See § 7704(a).
See § 7704(c)(2), (d)(1)(C)-(D).
See § 7704(d)(3)(A).
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independent contractor or otherwise. 384 Consequently, investors
in publicly traded partnerships get the same flow-through
advantage afforded to REITs, 385 but greater restrictions apply
to the types of services that a REIT may provide directly to
tenants. The equity analysis must consider whether the law
that treats REITs and partnerships differently is justified and
whether the law should treat REITs more like partnerships
(either those that are publicly traded or those that are privately
held).
Finding the right point of comparison among the various
types of entities that REITs resemble in some way may be a
challenge. A focus on entity attributes would appear to be
inadequate to solve the inequity conundrum because each type of
arrangement can have similar entity attributes. 386 Instead, an
entity's type of income may be a better point of reference. If
entities that have only passive types of income should qualify for
flow-through or conduit taxation, then REITs, publicly traded
partnerships, and RICs, rightly qualify for that treatment, and
corporations that have active income do not. Consequently, even
though tax law treats REITs and regular corporations differently,
that different treatment alone does not validate the inequity
argument against REIT taxation because REITs are also like RICs
and partnerships in some ways.
2. Inequity of Gotcha Legislation. The equity analysis should
also consider how changes to the law would treat entities before
and after the change. Legislation that would prohibit tax-free

384.
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-795, at 401 (1988) ("With respect to the definition of real
property rents, it is clarified that non-application of the independent contractor rule
(section 856(d)(2)(C)) does not affect the requirement that the nature of the income be rent.
Thus, the fact that the independent contractor rule does not apply for purposes of
determining the qualifying income of a partnership does not mean that amounts received
by a partnership, which amounts include amounts for services that are not customarily
furnished in connection with the rental of real property, constitute real property rents
(section 856(d)(1)(B)). For example, where the partnership receives or accrues amounts
attributable to the performance of services that are not customarily furnished in connection
with the rental of real property (e.g., to the extent that the furnishing of hotel or motel
services causes amounts not to be treated as rents from real property under present law),
then the partnership is treated as not receiving qualifying income.").
385.
Nonetheless, some commentators argue that the definition of qualifying income
for publicly traded partnerships is too broad, deviates from the stated purpose of the
regime, and should be narrowed. See Emily Cauble, Redefining Qualifying Income for
Publicly Traded Partnerships,145 TAX NOTES 107, 107 (2014). They recommend reform of
publicly traded partnerships as a way of raising revenue. See id.
386.
For example, tax partnerships, RICs, and REITs can be limited liability
companies, which have many of the attributes of a corporation. See Fisher, supra note 43,
at 338-42; supra text accompanying notes 89, 363-66 (noting the different entities a REIT
can be).
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REIT spinoffs would constitute a form of "gotcha legislation." Such
a change in the law would prevent corporations that held real
estate from obtaining tax treatment that other corporations had
obtained by already spinning off their real estate assets. It would
also lock in corporate tax treatment for entire entities that formed
as corporations with real estate and treat them differently from
those that formed using the post-spinoff structure with an
operating corporation leasing property from a REIT (see Figure 9).
Preventing corporations from spinning off real estate assets would
therefore lock them into a form that they could not have foreseen
as favorable. The law should not be out to get property owners who
could not foresee the developments that have occurred in the REIT
industry, nor should it disfavor business owners who, at the
inception of their businesses, cannot afford the type of advice
required to set up or include a REIT.
3. TransactionalInequity. The equity analysis should also
consider whether tax law treats different types of transactions
appropriately. For instance, tax law favors REIT spinoffs over
sale-leasebacks. A corporation could accomplish the same
economic arrangement that it accomplishes with a REIT spinoff by
simply selling property to a REIT and then leasing it back. Even
though a sale-leaseback is economically equivalent to a REIT
spinoff, tax law grants favorable tax treatment to the REIT
spinoff, but not to the sale-leaseback. 387 That disparate treatment
generally favors REIT spinoffs over sale-leasebacks, 3 88 but such
favored treatment of a transaction does not appear to create any
serious inequity because corporations generally should be able to
spin off real estate instead of having to sell it. If the cost of
spinning off property exceeds the cost of a sale-leaseback, however,

In some situations, however, a sale-leaseback can qualify for nonrecognition
387.
under I.R.C. § 1031. See, e.g., Century Elec. v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951); Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 32 A.F.T.R.2d 73-5816 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding that the
sale-leasebacks were tax-free exchanges). But see Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d
453, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1959) (classifying transaction as a sale rather than an exchange
because record lacked findings that cash received by taxpayer fully equated to fee taxpayer
conveyed to vendee-lessor and leaseback called for a rent fully equal to rental value of the
property); City Investing Co. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 1, 9 (1962) (holding that sale-leasebacks
were not tax-free exchanges). See also BRADLEY T. BORDEN, TAX-FREE LIKE-KIND
EXCHANGES ¶3.2[31[b], at 3-19 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing the tax treatment of
sale-leasebacks and the factors that determine whether they are tax-free exchanges).
388.
Nonetheless, some corporations' tax and non-tax situation may justify using a
sale-leaseback structure to remove real estate assets from the corporation. See, e.g., Elliott,
supra note 342, at 751 (reporting on the announcement that Sears Holdings Corp. would
sell real estate assets to a REIT to help alleviate its cash-shortage problem and lease them
back).
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the law favors wealthier corporations who can afford the costs to
cover the complexity of a REIT spinoff. 389 Taxpayers would also
presumably prefer to have a choice. If the property has built-in
loss, the corporation would prefer to do a sale-leaseback and
recognize the loss. 3 9 0 Without the opportunity to transfer property
tax-free, some corporations would not be able to justify the spinoff
because the tax benefit obtained through REIT ownership would
not offset the tax incurred on the sale. 39 1 Spinoffs are a partial way
around that lock-in effect. 392 The movement of real estate from
operating corporations to REITs after the IRS blessed tax-free
spinoffs of real estate may be evidence that the lock-in effect
dissuades property owners from transferring real estate into the
hands of the most tax-efficient owner. 393 The law would be
inequitable if it allowed some corporations to spinoff real estate
assets but prevented others from doing the same thing.
C. Efficiency Aspects of Separate Operationsand Ownership
The current REIT rules encourage multiple-entity structures
that separate operations from ownership with either the use of a
taxable REIT subsidiary or a long-term lease. That separation
creates costs and provides benefits, with uncertain net results.
"The underlying idea of a REIT [spinoff] is that the efficient owner
of property can be different from the efficient user of the property
and taxes can be a major contributor to this divergence." 394 An
efficient tax regime should not, however, favor one form of

389.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2014-11-002 (Dec. 13, 2013); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2013-37-007 (Sept. 28, 2012) (granting favorable tax treatment to complex REIT spinoffs);
Andrea Macintosh Whiteway, Caroline H. Ngo & Britt Haxton, REIT (Real Estate
Investment Trusts) Spin-Offs: Recent Transactions and IRS Rulings, NAT'L L. REV. (Nov.
12, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/reit-real-estate-investment-trusts-spin
-offs-recent-transactions-and-irs-rulings (describing the complex nature of recent REIT
spinoffs).
390.
To obtain loss treatment, the corporation must ensure that the sale-leaseback is
not a tax-free like-kind exchange. See supra note 387 (discussing cases that have addressed
the matter).
391.
Some people familiar with REIT spinoffs claim they are the provinces of ailing
companies that have tax losses. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 342, at 751 (reporting that
Sears plans to do a sale-leaseback of its property, apparently unconcerned about generating
taxable gain on the disposition of it real estate because it has sufficient tax losses to offset
the gain). An anonymous voicemail left with the Author on February 1, 2015, claimed that
all REIT spinoffs have been by companies with tax losses.
392.
See Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261, at 453-55.
393.
See id., at 442-43. But see supra note 391 (noting that some people have claimed
that REIT spinoffs are the provinces of ailing companies).
394.
See Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261, at 453.
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ownership over another, 395 but the current system favors
OpCo-PropCo structures,3 9 6 taxable REIT subsidiary structures,
and UPREIT structures over other, economically equivalent
transactions and arrangements. By simply changing the legal
form of an arrangement, such as creating a wholly-owned taxable
REIT subsidiary, a REIT can perform all of the services that other
REITs have to hire an independent contractor to perform and
which a publicly traded partnership can perform directly. 397 The
efficiency concern is that the formalism encourages REITs to use
structures that may not have any non-tax justification, so they
may create deadweight loss. 3 9 8 As the following discussion reveals,
however, structures that separate operations and ownership may
also create transparency and otherwise mitigate agency costs.
1. Separation Creates Costs. REIT taxation creates
incentives for property owners to separate real estate ownership
from operations. Most separations are formalistic, however, as the
operating entity retains control over the real estate through
long-term leases or some other mechanism, or the REIT uses a
taxable REIT subsidiary to manage and operate the property. 399
Some commentators observe that separating real estate from

395.
See Louis Kaplow, Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 647, 65158 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); David Gamage, How Should
Governments Promote DistributiveJustice?:A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice
of Tax Instruments, 68 TAx L. REV. 1, 82 (2014); Gravelle, supranote 368.
396.
The OpCo-PropCo structure results from a REIT spinoff with an operating
corporation (OpCo) leasing the property from a REIT (PropCo). See infra Figure 9,
Structure (2).
397.
See supra text accompanying notes 382-85. Because the law does not restrict the
type of services that a subsidiary of a publicly traded partnership can perform, a publicly
traded partnership can form a subsidiary to provide any type of services to the partnership's
tenants.
398.
Martin A. Sullivan, The Economic Inefficiency of REIT Conversions, 144 TAX
NOTES 1229, 1229-30 (2014) (claiming that the REIT rules limit REIT investment
opportunities, encourage investment in real estate over other investments, and increase
tax-planning and compliance costs). Deadweight loss, or excess burden, is the loss of welfare
above and beyond tax collected when tax law distorts economic behavior. See HARVEY S.
ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 331 (8th ed. 2008).
399.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-20-007 (Feb. 11, 2013) (ruling with respect to
a REIT conversion of a publicly-traded private prison company that would manage the
property through a taxable REIT subsidiary following the conversion); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2013-17-001 (Jan. 16, 2013) (ruling with respect to a conversion of a publicly-traded
corrections company that would manage the property through a taxable REIT subsidiary
following the conversion); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-37-007 (Sept. 28, 2012) (describing a
REIT spinoff that included a long-term contract granting the operating company continued
use of the property); Windstream News Release, supra note 332 (providing that the
operating corporation will enter into a long-term triple-net lease with the REIT).
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operations may raise agency and other costs,
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400

which could

explain why more corporations have not yet spun off their real
estate holdings. This suggests that even though spinoffs provide
an opportunity for some corporations to legally separate
operations and real estate, other corporations cannot take
advantage of that opportunity because of cost restrictions.
Consider four different corporate ownership structures
depicted in Figure 9, three of which legally separate operations
and real estate ownership for tax purposes, one of which can
separate ownership and management, and all of which can provide
common control of operations and real estate.401

Figure 9: Separation of Operations and
Real Estate Ownership
Shareholders
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The first structure (1) is a corporation that owns both the
operations and real estate assets, either directly or through
wholly-owned subsidiaries one of which conducts the operations
and the other of which owns the real estate. This structure
provides common control of both the operations and the real
estate, but it typically does not separate them for tax purposes.

400.
See Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261, at 450-51.
401.
The separation may be by law only because one party or group of owners may
retain control of both ownership and operations, so the separation may be legal but not
economic or substantive.
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The income from the operations and ownership would be subject
to corporate tax. 4 02 The second structure (2) (an OpCo-PropCo
structure) is the result of a REIT spinoff (or carefully crafted
pre-formation structure). The spinoff creates a new REIT and the
original corporation continues as an operating corporation.
Immediately following the spinoff, the shareholders of the original
corporation own all of the stock of the operating corporation and
the REIT (but over time the shareholding might diverge and
become similar to the third structure (3)). A long-term lease, with
options to renew, gives the operating corporation practical control
of the real estate for a long time. If the assets are unique to the
operating corporation, they are even more locked in because the
REIT would have few, if any, other buyers for its property. Income
from the operations of this structure would be subject to corporate
tax, 4 0 3 but the income from the real estate would flow through to
the REIT shareholders with the REIT dividends. 404
The third structure (3) results over time after a REIT spinoff
as shareholders sell their interests and the identical, overlapping
ownership of the two entities diverges. 40 Common ownership ends
as the overlap of operating corporation shareholders and REIT
shareholders diminishes. 406 Even though the operating
402.
See I.R.C. §§ 11, 856(1) (2012).
403.
See §§ 11, 856(1).
404.
See supra notes 84-87.
405.
Common ownership of an operating corporation and a stapled REIT would not,
however, diverge over time. The stock of the operating corporation and stapled REIT trade
as one, so the stock of both entities track each other, and the two entities are under common
management. See Wern, supranote 27, at 725-26. Prior to June 30, 1983, property owners
could form stapled REITs, which tied a REIT to an operating corporation through various
agreements, but the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 prohibited future formation of stapled
REITs by treating the corporation and REIT as a single entity for REIT testing purposes.
See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 136(a), 98 Stat. 494, 669-70 (codified at
I.R.C. § 269B(a)(3), (c)(3) (Supp. I 1984)). The law defines stapled entities as ones that have
more than 50% of their outstanding value under common ownership. See I.R.C. § 269B(c)(2).
Stapled REITs that existed prior to June 30, 1983 were able to purchase additional real
estate and continue to grow. See Michael T. Madison, Jeffry R. Dwyer & Steven W. Bender,
Securitization of Commercial Real Estate, in 1 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 4:34
(2014). In 1998, Congress leveled the playing field by prohibiting stapled REITs from
acquiring additional property after March 26, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 7002, 112 Stat. 685, 827.
Consequently, stapled REITs, if any remain, are not as important today as they were a few
of decades ago.
406.
See Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261, at 446. But see PETER M. FASS, MICHAEL
E. SHAFF & DONALD B. ZIEF, Stapled and "Clipped"REITs, in REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
TRUSTS HANDBOOK § 6:77 (2014) (reporting the creation of a new paired-share REIT that
will avoid being classified as a stapled REIT by ensuring that not more than 45% of the
stock of the REIT will trade with stock of the operating corporation). Extended Stay
America, Inc. and ESH Hospitality, Inc. offered paired shares in their recent IPO. See
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corporation and the REIT are no longer under common ownership
and control, the operating corporation can still largely control the
real estate as a practical matter and for a long time through the
long-term lease and the options to renew it. Consequently, even
though the operating corporation and the REIT are not under
common control, the shareholders of the operating corporation
ultimately control both the operations and the real estate assets,
so practically, they are under common control. Income from the
operations is subject to corporate tax,407 but income from the real
estate flows through to the REIT shareholders with REIT
dividends. 408 The fourth structure (4) inverts the ownership. The
shareholders own the REIT directly and the REIT owns a
subsidiary that manages the property. 409 The income of the
subsidiary is subject to corporate tax,410 but the REIT's distributed
rental income flows through to its shareholders free of entity-level
taxation. 411 Because the REIT wholly owns the subsidiary, it
controls both the management and the real estate, but tax law
treats them as being separate.
Inefficiency is a serious matter because it strikes at the heart
of one of the fundamental purposes of REIT taxation. The efforts
REITs expend to separate ownership and control add complexity
to the structures, increase the cost of an investment, and dilute
the value of an investment. Those costs result in a lower return for
investors and less capital flowing directly to real estate markets.
Those costs are unjustified, if the only purpose and result of
incurring the costs is to reduce taxes. Even though the current
structures create costs, they also appear to provide some non-tax
benefits that may outweigh or offset some of their costs, so the
complex structures may not create deadweight loss.
2. Separation Promotes Diversification and Transparency.
Even though separating operations and ownership may increase
costs, it also provides investors opportunities to specialize their
investments in real estate and allows corporations to specialize in
Extended Stay Am., Inc. & ESH Hosp., Inc., Final Prospectus (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1507563/000119312513440419/d565367d424b4.ht
m.

407.
See § 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
408.
409.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-20-007 (Feb. 11, 2013); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2013-17-001 (Jan. 16, 2013) (managing property through a REIT subsidiary).
410.
See §§ 11, 856(1).
411.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. Any redetermined rents attributable
to the services provided by the taxable REIT subsidiary will, of course, be subject to a 100%
tax. See § 857(b)(7).
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property ownership and operations. 412 Specialized ownership and
operations are partially undermined by structures that lock in
control of the real estate and operations under common ownership
or through other arrangements, 4 13 but the separation provides
greater choice for investors and other real efficiency benefits. For
instance, the separation allows the operating corporation to
remove liabilities from its balance sheet. 4 14 Even though the
operating corporation may have a long-term obligation in the form
of a lease of assets that are essential to its operations (e.g.
Windstream cannot provide telecommunication services without
the networks), rating agencies may treat a long-term lease
differently from other liabilities. Such different treatment may
result in better debt ratings, which reduce the operating
corporation's cost of capital following the spinoff. The structure
following a spinoff also creates different claims to cash flows and
residual upsides and downsides for the respective capital
providers to the operating corporation and REITs. Consequently,
separating operations and ownership may provide several
financial benefits to investors.
Separation of operations and ownership also facilitates
portfolio
diversification.
According to
portfolio theory,
diversification is the gold standard of investing strategies. 415 As
one example, portfolio experts recommend that 10% to 15% of an
individual's investment portfolio should consist of real estate
holdings in REIT funds. 416 REIT spinoffs enhance investors' ability
to diversify their portfolios. 417 REIT spinoffs allow a person to
acquire both the stock of the operating corporation and the stock
of the new REIT, which may create the appearance of greater
portfolio diversity. The spinoff does not, however, change the
composition of the underlying assets of the investor who held the
corporate stock prior to the spinoff (investors in corporations
indirectly own the corporations' real estate assets). Nonetheless,
412.
See Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261, at 453-54.
413.
See supra text accompanying notes 403-08.
414.
See, e.g., Windstream News Release, supra note 332 (providing that the spinoff
will reduce Windstream's debt by approximately $3.2 billion and increase its free cash flow).
415.
See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952)
(introducing portfolio theory).
416.

See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET, 368-71 (1999).

Other research supports adding equity REITs to an investment portfolio, even though
REITs do not provide a direct substitute for unsecuritized real estate. See CHAN, ERICKSON
& WANG, supra note 13, at 215-18.
417.
See Joe Light, Use REITs to Invest Like a Property Mogul, WALL ST. J. (June 22,
2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/article-email/use-reits-to-invest-like-a-property
-mogul-1434731193-IMyQjAxMTI1MTIOMjcyMzlzWj.
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over time following the spinoff, shareholders may sell off shares of
the operating corporation or REIT to rebalance their portfolios.418
Also, following a spinoff, REITs may diversify their holdings by
acquiring other real estate, or REITs (i.e., those with the largest
taxable REIT subsidiaries) may provide more tenant services and
begin to function more like operating corporations. Some analysts
claim that including REITs in an investment portfolio can lower
overall portfolio risk and improve returns, 419 so REIT spinoffs
provide an opportunity for investors to invest specifically in
business operations or real property.
The opportunity to invest more specifically in a particular type
of asset is another benefit that REIT taxation provides. If real estate
is held in operating corporations, investors may not be able to
adequately determine the value of the real estate relative to other
corporate assets. Separate entities that provide specific information
about operations and ownership respectively should provide better
information to investors, and investors should be able to modulate
their investment holdings to suit their personal preferences with
greater precision. Separation of operations and ownership therefore
facilitates micro diversification of investors' portfolios. Small
investors could, for instance, choose to expand their holdings of
billboard REITs, data center REITs, or any other type of specialty
REIT according to their own preferences. A broad definition of REIT
real property in fact allows individual investors to hold a portfolio of
only specialized real estate or a portfolio of diversified real estate
holdings. Thus, the separation of operations and ownership provides
investment opportunities to individual investors that they would not
have otherwise. These additional opportunities for individual
investors are consistent with the original purpose of REIT
taxation. 420
REIT spinoffs and the formation of REITs in general also
appear to provide monitoring benefits as sophisticated investors
require REITs to provide more information and use that

418.
See, Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supranote 27, at 584 ("REIT spinoffs will also
affect the asset allocation of many investors' portfolios, and some investors, such as index
mutual funds, will likely sell or purchase stock in either the new REIT or the old corporation
following a REIT spinoff to preserve the approriate asset allocation.") (citing William F.
Sharpe, Adaptive Asset Allocation Policies, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 45, 45-47 (2010)).
419.
See Hsuan-Chi Chen, Robert (Chi-Wing) Fok & Chiuling Lu, An Analysis of
Lockups in REITIPOs, 43 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 359, 372 (2011); Stephen Lee & Simon
Stevenson, The Casefor REITs in the Mixed-Asset Portfolio is the Short and Long Run, 11
J. REAL EST. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 55, 60-67 (2005) (finding that including REITs in an
investment portfolio provides both return enhancement and risk reduction).
420.
See supranotes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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information to influence REIT behavior. 42 1 Additional
information and monitoring help reduce the risk-related
fluctuations in the price of REIT stock, 422 and institutional
ownership helps create value and transfer wealth "through the
increased opportunity for REIT managers to communicate with
a less-dispersed, more-sophisticated investor base." 4 2 3 As the
number of financial analysts following an equity REIT's stock
increases (and the information about the REIT increases as a
result), the risk related to that stock declines. 424 Thus, as a
result of REIT spinoffs, investors will have more information
about the assets transferred to REITs and they will be able to
better monitor the management of that property. The greater
transparency may lead to more efficient property management.
Consequently, separating real estate from corporate operations
may increase the value of the real estate. That increase in value
may offset any tax revenue lost as a result of REIT taxation
generally and REIT spinoffs in particular.
Using complex structures to separate operations and property
ownership create a mixed bag. The separation generates
transaction costs and may create agency costs as between the
operator and owner of the property. The separation also provides
for specialized ownership and operations and results in greater
information and monitoring of the real estate, which may reduce
agency costs between investors and managers of both the
operating entity and the REIT. Because separating operations
from ownership appears to simultaneously enhance and diminish
inefficiency, net efficiency effect of separating operations from
ownership is unclear. Therefore, an efficiency argument does not
justify condemning REIT taxation.

See, e.g., Zhilan Feng et al., Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEO
421.
Compensation, 40 J. REAL. EST. FIN. ECON. 446, 474-76 (2010) (finding that institutional
investment in REITs affects CEO compensation).
422.
See CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supranote 13, at 107; Crain, Cudd & Brown, supra
note 13, at 281-83 (finding that the greater presence of institutional investors in the REIT
market caused unsystematic risk to play a lesser role in REIT returns).
423.
See Downs, supra note 234, at 640.
424.
See Terence Khoo, David Hartzell & Martin Hoesli, An Investigation of the
Change in Real Estate Investment Trust Betas, 21 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. Ass'N
107, 117-25 (1993) (using variability of returns as a measure of risk). But see David H.
Downs & Z. Nuray Guner, Is the Information Deficiency in Real Estate Evident in Public
Market Trading?, 27 REAL EST. ECoN. 517, 539 (1999) (concluding that trade
informativeness increases in the number of analysts following a REIT, but that does not
solve the adverse-selection problem faced by REIT investors).
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D. Bad Optics of REIT Taxation
Because the tax-revenue effect, inequity, and inefficiency
arguments do not justify condemning REIT taxation, the ire
directed toward REITs appears to be the result of bad optics. 4 2 5
Public perception of a tax regime has not traditionally been a
criterion of the quality or validity of the regime, and it should not
carry influence in the current decision-making process regarding
REITs. REITs are conduit entities, so they are not subject to the
entity-level tax. A corporation that spins off its real estate would
appear to be making a pure tax play, but assessing the tax effect
of a REIT spinoff requires sophisticated analysis, 426 with views of
the effect diverging significantly. 4 27 A proper assessment of REIT
spinoffs and conversions and REIT taxation generally requires
careful analysis of the tax-revenue effect.
Without conducting sufficient analyses to assess the
tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and conversions, the media
focused on the appearance of the transactions, 4 28 which look bad
because they appear to erode the corporate tax base. This type of
eye test does not take into account the tax-revenue offset obtained
from the higher tax rate imposed on REIT shareholders, the effect
of the REIT distribution requirement, or the effect of the stock
price surge following the announcement of a REIT spinoff. 4 2 9
Identifying and quantifying the effect REITs have on the
425.
See Elliott, supra 340, at 22 ("It's almost as if perception matters more than the
bottom line-there are indications that either the overall loss of tax revenue to the fisc from
these conversions hasn't been significant or that it's something that Congress has decided
is worth the trade-off. It's hard to equate REIT/PTP conversions with inversions because
the IRS gave its blessing to many of the conversions, but avoidance is a dirty word that
REIT and PTP players will have to find a way to negotiate if they want to secure their
futures.").
426.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supranote 27, at 562-99 (presenting a dynamic
analysis for evaluating the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs); Goolsbee & Maydew, supra
note 261, at 443.
427.
See J. CoMM., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS, supra note 353, at 10 (estimating
that the Camp Proposal would increase tax revenue by $5.9 billion over ten years with a
$200 million increase in 2015, by prohibiting REIT spinoffs); Borden, Rethinking the Effect,
supra note 27, at 598 (estimating that the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and
conversions in 2013 was no more than $260 million); Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 261,
at 451 (estimating in 2002 that potential lost tax revenue from REIT spinoffs could be as
great as $2.3 billion); Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1104 (estimating the effect of REIT spinoffs
and conversions to be between $900 million and $2.2 billion based upon 2014 profit levels).
428.
See supra note 3.
429.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 583-86 (incorporating those
variables into a dynamic analysis of the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation); see also
Borden, Counterintuitive Tax Revenue Effect, supranote 262, at 382-84 (showing how the
tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff can be positive even though the spinoff erodes the
corporate tax base).
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partnership-income tax base is much more complex and
nuanced.430 Even though REITs appear to draw down tax revenue
more from partnership-income-tax-base erosion than they do from
corporate-tax-base erosion, the difficulty of detecting that problem
allows the problem to escape the eye test. Casual observers might
be less apt to examine partnership-income-tax-base erosion
because the idea of REITs eroding the tax base of another type of
flow-through entity is counterintuitive. Consequently, REITs do
not look bad compared to partnerships at first blush. Because the
tax-base-erosion arguments focus only on the corporate tax base,
the arguments appear to stem from bad optics and lack validity.
Modifying REIT taxation based upon lay commentators'
reactions to bad optics could significantly affect the achievement
of the purposes of REIT taxation. If groundswell grows for REIT
reform because of bad optics, the law could change in ways that
accomplish little or no meaningful reform and changes could inflict
considerable economic harm. Any change to the law could restrict
the ability of small investors investing in diversified pools of real
estate, could slow the flow of capital to real estate markets, and
could impair real estate markets and the general economy. Thus,
bad optics could have serious negative effects, and academics and
others should take seriously the obligation of studying issues
related to REIT taxation and helping others better understand
those issues.

IV.

REFORM ALTERNATIVES

The analysis of what is the matter with REITs reveals four
ostensible problems with REIT taxation: (1) REITs appear to have
a negative effect on tax revenue, (2) REITs create inequity, (3) the
current REIT regime fosters inefficient transactions and
structures, and (4) REIT taxation looks bad to a lay audience when
compared to corporate taxation. That analysis reveals that bad
optics appears to be the driving force behind REIT reform
discussions, so lawmakers should proceed with care when
considering REIT reform. In fact, analyses of REIT reform
consider the stated purposes for enacting the REIT regime: (1) to
provide greater investment opportunities for small investors and
(2) to channel capital to real estate markets. 431 It should also
430.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 599-611 (estimating the
tax-revenue effect of investors forming REITs instead of partnerships).
431.
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Some commentators also claim
that preserving the corporate tax base is one purpose of the REIT regime. See, e.g., Johnson,
Reinvigorating the REIT's Neutrality, supra note 27, at 90-91.
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consider other benefits that derive from REIT taxation, including
better monitoring opportunities 432 and more stable real estate
markets. 433 If a reform proposal does not better facilitate those
purposes, perhaps it should be scrapped.
Three possible REIT reform alternatives come to mind as a
result of considering the ostensible problems of REIT taxation.
First, lawmakers could disregard reform and maintain status quo.
Second, reform could eliminate the preferential tax treatment that
REITs afford real estate by either expanding or contracting the
entity-level tax, or by modifying the REIT rules. Tax law could also
eliminate preferential tax treatment by modifying the rules
governing tax-exempt and foreign investors. Third, reform could
consider removing the formalistic aspect of the current system and
make preferential tax treatment for real estate easier to obtain.
The following discussion considers each alternative in turn.
A.

Maintain Status Quo

Amidst the discussion of REIT reform, one alternative is to
maintain status quo, even though the status quo is perhaps
illusory. Based upon the trajectory of REIT legislation, if
lawmakers do nothing to restrict REIT taxation, over time it will
most likely continue to evolve in ways that make passive real
estate ownership more convenient. Consequently, maintaining
status quo undoubtedly means continued expansion of the REIT
regime along the trajectory of the past fifty-plus years. The
tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation is nominal, 434 but maintaining
the status quo would not decrease that nominal effect, either from
corporate- or partnership-income-tax-base erosion. Favorableness
of other tax-policy objectives nonetheless bode well for
maintaining the status quo.
This Article recounts the history of REITs and explains
several developments that have occurred since Congress enacted
the original REIT regime in 1960;435 the discussion is actually light
on the technical details. 4 36 REIT taxation therefore comes across
as complex with numerous technical requirements and
voluminous rulings and regulations that interpret those
requirements. That perceived complexity may raise the concern
432.
See supra text accompanying notes 421-24.
433.
See supra text accompanying notes 448-50.
434.
See J. COMM., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS, supra note 353.
435.
See supra Part II.B-C.
The technical details are evidenced in part by the numerous pages of tax code and
436.
regulations that this Article does not cover.
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that the current state of the law undermines the original purpose
of making real-estate-portfolio ownership available to a broader
cross section of the population. Complexity of the tax system in
general, and the place of REITs in that system, also increase the
difficulty of assessing the revenue effects of REIT taxation, 437 and
continued development in this area could add more complexity.
Nonetheless, those who work closely with the REIT rules
undoubtedly applaud the developments that have occurred over
the years because the current rules provide greater certainty
about the types of services that REITs can provide and therefore
reduce the cost of complying with the rules and managing real
estate.4 38
The status quo also does not, however, eliminate the inequity
that exists between REITs and corporations on one hand and
partnerships on the other, but that inequity conundrum would be
difficult to solve. 4 39 The status quo also does not resolve the
inefficiencies that result from the structures currently in use, 4 40

but it does preserve the efficiencies that stem from the current
system. 441 Maintaining status quo will not improve the bad optics
of the current system, but perhaps a greater focus on REIT
taxation by more policy analysts will help dispel some of the
misunderstanding related to REIT taxation. Despite its
shortcomings, the status quo should not give way to a different
system unless the different system proves to be better. The status
quo incorporates the experience of more than fifty years of practice
that make the rules more practical and help to make ownership of
real estate available to even more investors.
Information about the financial performance of REITs
suggests that more capital is flowing to the REIT markets as a
result of several changes to the law over the past half-century. 442
Although one might expect the capital to flow disproportionately
to a relatively small group of real estate professionals and former

437.
See, e.g., Boos, supra note 28, at 1289 ("These REIT conversions provide
significant tax benefits for the eligible businesses; however, even bigger consequences may
stem from the grant rate for REIT conversions in private letter rulings."). But see Borden,
Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 592-99 (presenting a dynamic analysis of the
tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and conversions, which shows that the tax-revenue
effect is nominal).
438.
See supra Part II.C.2, 6. (discussing the changes to rules governing services that
REITs may provide).
See supra Part III.B.1.
439.
See supra Part III.C.1.
440.
441.
See supra Part III.C.2.
442.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-15.
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property owners, empirical studies of REIT IPOs suggest that
REITs are primarily funded using proceeds generated from IPOs,
suggesting the money does not disproportionately go to preexisting
REIT owners. 443 The REIT industry touts the benefits it provides
to the economy including job creation and investment
opportunities for beneficiaries, such as teachers and police officers,
of pension plans that invest in REITs. 4 4 4 If these claims are valid,
they could be lost if Congress eliminated REITs and no other
ownership structure could sufficiently fill the void that would be
left by the elimination of REITs. 4 4 5
Analysts are not certain that the price performance of REIT
stock correlates to the performance of real estate. 446 In fact, as
REITs provide more services and as institutional ownership of
REITs increase, they may perform more like non-REIT stock than
like real estate, 447 so REIT performance may not be indicative of
the performance of the real estate that REITs own. Nonetheless,
one study suggests that the information provided by REITs, the
attention they receive from analysts, and institutional investment
in REITs helps stabilize real estate markets, preventing the
oversupply of commercial real estate. 448 The study concludes that
"the commercial property supply response in periods of high asset
price returns was increasingly moderated as the share of assets

&

See, e.g., Chen, Fok & Lu, supra note 419, at 365, 376 (finding that REIT IPO
443.
lockup agreements tend to cover longer periods than traditional IPO lockup agreements
and most insiders tend to retain their REIT shares following the unlock date); Dolvin
Pyles, supranote 217, at 99-100 (finding that even though the retention rate of preexisting
REIT owners is lower than the retention rate of shareholders in traditional IPOs,
preexisting ownership as a percentage of total REIT IPO issuance is much smaller than the
percentage for nontraditional IPOs).
444.
See Economic Impact of REITs: REITs by the Numbers, supra note 361.
If REITs did not hold real estate, perhaps the real estate would be owned and
445.
operated by other investors and create the same benefits that REITs currently create. More
study is needed to determine whether REIT taxation creates jobs that would not otherwise
exist in the absence of a REIT regime.
See CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 13, at 197-203 (reviewing the studies
446.
that consider whether REIT stock performance more closely correlates to the general stock
market or to real estate, and providing references to studies that support both conclusions).
See supra text accompanying notes 421-24.
447.
See FRANK PACKER, TIMOTHY RIDDIOUGH & JIMMY SHEK, CAN SECURITIZATION
448.
WORK? LESSONS FROM THE U.S. REIT MARKET 8-10 (2013), https://www.reit.com/sites

&

/default/files/media/PDFs/Can%20Securitization%2Work_001.pdf; Packer, Riddiough
Shek, supra note 26, at 136-42. This work has been touted by the REIT industry as making
"it clear that REITs provide real benefits for the broader commercial real estate industry,
for investors and for our nation's economy." See Ronald L. Havner, Beneficial Influence of
REITs, REIT: REAL EST. INV. TODAY (Mar.-Apr. 2014), https://www.reit.com/node
/16799/beneficial-influence-reits.
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held by REITs increased." 449 It also finds claims that REITs, "by
moderating construction boom and bust tendencies, can generate
positive spillover benefits to the economy at large."4 5 0 This study
is fairly recent, but, if it withstands scrutiny, it suggests that REIT
taxation provides significant non-tax benefits to the economy.
Those non-tax benefits should offset the estimated $2 billion of
tax-revenue loss REIT taxation may cause. 451 Consequently, even
though REIT taxation may cause some tax-revenue loss, the
benefit it provides offsets that cost.
Even though maintaining status quo does not accomplish all
of the tax-policy goals discussed above, it accomplishes Congress's
goals in enacting REIT taxation, it has inertia and familiarity on
its side, and it provides non-tax economic benefits to the economy.
Consequently, its benefits offset its deficiencies.
B.

EliminatePreferentialTreatment

Congress could eliminate some or all of the deficiencies of
REIT taxation by repealing or narrowing REIT taxation, changing
the tax treatment of REIT investors, changing the scope of
entity-level taxation, or some combination of these actions. The
tax-revenue effect resulting from REIT taxation derives most
significantly from the overlap of three tax policies-(1) the
preferential tax treatment that REITs afford real estate assets
compared to assets of regular corporations, (2) the preferential tax
treatment afforded to tax-exempt investors, and (3) the
preferential treaty rates available to foreign investors in REITs
(see Figure 10).452 Partnership and corporate tax policy also affect
the inequity, inefficiencies, and bad optics of REIT taxation.

449.
See Packer, Riddiough & Shek, supra note 26, at 141.
450.
See id. at 142.
451.
See supra text accompanying notes 349-53 (summarizing estimates of the
tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation).
452.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 566-83, 592-613 (illustrating
that the various tax policies affect the tax-revenue impact of REIT taxation and presenting
a mathematical model that suggests that variables other than corporate-tax-base erosion
contribute most significantly to lost tax revenue that may result from REIT taxation).
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Figure 10: Cause of REIT
Tax-Revenue Effect
REIT
Taxatlon

To eliminate or significantly reduce perceived problems
caused by REIT taxation, lawmakers are faced with the task of
making changes that would affect real estate tax policy, corporate
or partnership tax policy, retirement-plan tax policy, international
tax policy, or all. Such changes could include reforming REIT
taxation by scaling it back in one of multiple possible ways,
altering rules governing retirement savings and tax-exempt and
foreign investments, eliminating double taxation, or expanding
entity-level taxation. The following analysis considers each
alternative in turn.

1.

Scale Back REIT Taxation. Reform could scale back REIT

taxation in a number of ways, including completely repealing the

REIT regime, prohibiting future tax-free REIT spinoffs and
conversions, narrowing the definition of real property, and
restricting the types of services a REIT can perform.4 53 As
discussed above, REIT taxation causes nominal tax-revenue

453.
Commentators have recommended various types of reform. See, e.g., Boos, supra
note 28, at 1298-1302 (recommending all three types of reform); Taylor, Comments on
Camp Proposal, supra note 28, at 244-45 (recommending restricting the activities that
taxable REIT subsidiaries may provide, amending the earnings stripping rules that apply
to debt of a taxable REIT subsidiary, and suggesting that the definition of real property
should not include goodwill of an operating business).
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4 54

so its repeal would not significantly increase tax revenue.
Instead, it could have the unfortunate consequence of driving
capital from U.S. real estate markets and destabilizing the
markets. Repeal of REIT taxation would also limit the portion of
the population that can invest in real estate. Consequently,
complete repeal would eliminate any benefits that REIT taxation
provides to small investors, the real estate market, and the
general economy. 455 The cost of such a loss could exceed the
nominal potential increase in tax revenue collected in the absence
of REIT taxation. 456 Repeal of REIT taxation would not solve the
inequity problem because tax law would still treat regular
corporations, partnerships, and RICs differently. It would solve
the inefficiencies related to REIT ownership of real estate, but it
would eliminate the efficiency benefits of REIT taxation. 457 Of
course, if REIT taxation did not exist, it would cease to be an
eyesore to those who criticize it. That would be a small gain at a
significant cost.
Scaling back other aspects of the REIT regime would probably
nominally affect tax revenue, if at all, but such changes could
increase complexity and inefficiency. For instance, if Congress
were to restrict the type of services a REIT can provide directly or
through a taxable REIT subsidiary, REITs would have to create
more complicated separation arrangements, which would have to
include independent contractors. Such arrangements add costs, 4 5 8
so they would increase inefficiencies. Restrictions on the types of
services that a REIT can provide would not improve equity
because REIT income would still be treated differently from
income of regular corporations, and REITs would be even more
restricted than partnerships. 4 59 More restrictive rules would also
make REITs less attractive and drive capital from the real estate
markets, and a decline in real estate investment would curtail the
benefits that currently stem from REIT taxation. Consequently,
restricting the types of services that REITs may provide would not
appear to further any significant tax-policy objective.
Some commentators are concerned that REITs provide
advantageous, tax treatment to too broad a class of real estate, and
losses,

454.
See supra text accompanying notes 349-53.
455.
See supra text accompanying notes 446-51.
456.
See supra text accompanying notes 349-53 (providing that the total tax-revenue
effect of REIT taxation is approximately $2 billion).
457.
See supra Part III.C.
458.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
459.
See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the equity conundrum that exists under the
current tax system).
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recommend narrowing the class of assets that qualify for REIT
taxation. 460 Such a change in the law would accomplish little in
terms of tax policy objectives. The different tax treatment afforded
REITs and regular corporations would remain the same, but the
different tax treatment afforded REITs and partnerships would be
amplified because REITs would not be able to hold property that
partnerships can hold. Consequently, such a change would not
improve equity. Such a change would do little to improve efficiency
because REITs would continue to use the current structures to
hold the types of assets that they hold. The change would
negatively affect the transparency and other benefits that result
from separate operations and ownership of certain types of real
estate because such property would no longer qualify for REIT
taxation. Furthermore, the types of assets that were not held by
REITs at the time Congress enacted the first REIT regime are a
fraction of the total property held by REITs, so changing the law
to restrict the types of assets that REITs hold would not
significantly increase tax revenues. Perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of changing the law to restrict the types of
assets that a REIT can hold is that doing so would improve optics.
That should not, however, be a motivation for changing the law.
Another reform alternative is to prohibit tax-free REIT
spinoffs and conversions. 46 1 As explained above, prohibiting
tax-free REIT spinoffs would not improve equity. 462 Because the
spinoff rules only apply to corporations, 4 63 an operating
corporation cannot spin off a publicly traded partnership tax-free.
Consequently, prohibiting tax-free REIT spinoffs would make
REITs and publicly traded partnerships similar in that respect. In
fact, prohibiting REIT spinoffs would amplify the disparate
treatment between regular corporations that hold real estate and
spun-off REITs and newly formed arrangements that separate
operations and real estate ownership from the outset. 464 As
discussed above, the structures that result from REIT spinoffs
impair certain types of efficiencies and improve other types. 465 The

460.
See, e.g., Boos, supra note 28, at 1299-1300 (discussing reform alternatives for
narrowing the REIT definition of real property).
461.
See Camp Proposal, supranote 2, §§ 3631, 3647.
462.
See supra Part III.B.3.
463.
See I.R.C. § 355(a) (2012) (requiring a dividing corporation to distribute stock or
securities to its shareholders or security holders).
464.
See supra Part III.B.3.
465.
See supra text accompanying note 400 (recognizing that separating operations
and ownership can increase agency costs); supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text
(presenting industry complaints that the use of independent contractors creates agency
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tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs is miniscule, 4 66 so curtailing
them would not materially affect tax revenues. In fact, eliminating
favorable treatment afforded to REITs and REIT spinoffs would
not eliminate inequity, but only redraw the boundary lines at a
new point that would have its own inequities, and it would not
materially improve efficiency or tax revenues. As with other
reform alternatives, such a change would appear to do nothing
more than improve optics. Consequently, such changes do not
enjoy any significant policy support.
A discussion of scaling back REIT taxation requires
considering whether the nature of real estate warrants granting it
favorable tax treatment. The fundamental attributes of real
estate, i.e., land and permanent structures on the land, is that it
is immovable. 467 Traditionally, real estate assets remain in use
longer than other types of assets. For example, buildings remain
useful and valuable for decades and many can retain their
usefulness and value for centuries. By contrast, personal property
generally does not remain useful for such long periods. Personal
property, such as manufacturing equipment, is apt to become
obsolete much faster than a building. Even personal property such
as rolling railroad stock or large construction equipment generally
does not remain useful as long as buildings do. Because of its
inherent permanency and uniqueness, real estate may play a more
critical role in the stability of the economy and therefore should
receive preferential tax treatment for that reason. Nonetheless,
the last decade suggests that unregulated channeling of capital to
some real estate markets can cause financial havoc, as is evident
from the collapse of mortgage-backed securities. 468
Although structured real estate finance appears to be a
proximate cause of the 2008 financial crisis, much of the problems
that stem from the crisis are attributable to wrongdoing by loan
originators and promoters of mortgage-backed securities. 469 For
years prior to the crash, structured finance appeared to serve its
purpose of bringing additional capital to the residential market

costs); see also Decker, Kaplan & Ponda, supra note 28, at 414-22 (recounting the
development of rules governing services that REITs may provide).
466.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 599 (estimating the
tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs to be around $250 million); see also Nugent, supra note
28, at 1529-30 (discussing offsetting factors to the effect of REIT spinoffs on tax-revenue).
467.

See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16.

468.
See Borden & Reiss, supranote 118, at 680-91 (discussing the bad behavior that
resulted from the demand for mortgage-backed securities).
469.

See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xxii-

xxiv, 109-11, 127-44 (2011); Borden & Reiss, supra note 118, at 680-91.
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and making capital more affordable. 470 The lack of regulation,
however, enables some bad actors to have an outsized influence on
the market and cause significant harm.4 71 A well-regulated real
estate finance market, which could include REITs, would appear
to be the basis for a strong economy.
The legislative history of the original REIT legislation
contains very little about why real estate should receive
preferential tax treatment. The earliest proponents of REIT
taxation wisely focused on obtaining treatment for real estate that
was similar to treatment provided to mutual funds, and argued
that preferential real estate treatment would help channel capital
to real estate markets and strengthen the economy. 472 1n later
years, proponents of REIT taxation argued that creating greater
opportunities for pension funds to invest in REITs would provide
much needed capital to the real estate markets. 473 They argued
that the lack of capital depressed the real estate market, which
has a "negative multiplier effect on our economy."4 7 4 According to

that argument, because real estate is used as collateral for most
loans, "[w]hen land and property values decline, banks are forced
to call in loans or require more cash, forcing some businesses into
bankruptcy and drying up credit for others."4 7 5 Finally, a
significant portion of local-government revenues come from real
estate property taxes, so "[dieclining land and property values
invariably mean cuts in vital public services." 4 76
REIT critics may look to studies from other areas of the law
to argue against the preferential treatment REIT taxation
provides to real estate and to argue for its partial or total repeal.
Tax law grants preferential treatment for homeowners in the form
of mortgage interest deductions, 477 property tax deductions, 478 and

470.
See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home
FinanceAct of 1970, Standardizationand the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 768-97, 80243 (2005) (describing the history of the mortgage-backed
securities industry and its purpose to bring more capital to the residential real estate
market, and concluding that "the availability of affordable mortgage money and
assembly-line lending practices that are the direct result of the secondary market propel
an unprecedented deluge of conveyances and refinances").
471.
See supranote 469 and accompanying text.
472.
See supratext accompanying notes 65-68.
473.
See 139 CONG. REC. 19356 (Aug. 5, 1993) (statement of Jim Moran).
474.
See id.
475.
See id.
476.
See id.
477.
See I.R.C. § 163(a), (h)(2)(D) (2012).
478.
See § 164(a)(2).
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exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence. 479 Such
favorable tax treatment has been the object of serious criticism,
with critics claiming that the preferential treatment does not
benefit homeowners. Instead, it encourages undesirable consumer
borrowing against home equity with the value of the incentives
capitalized into the price of the property. 480 Some research
suggests that home ownership is lower in jurisdictions that
provide higher tax subsidies, 481 suggesting that tax incentives
alone do not influence home ownership. Because the
home-mortgage interest deduction distorts behavior and creates a
false baseline for home prices, perhaps its only saving grace is a
short-term benefit it provides to the housing industry. 482
The criticisms of the tax incentives related to home ownership
do not appear to apply to REIT taxation. REIT taxation should
discourage irresponsible borrowing because tax law treats REIT
debt the same way it treats REIT equity, allowing a deduction for
both interest and dividends. 483 The median debt ratio of REITs in
the S&P 500 index is more than twice as high as the median debt
479.
See § 121(a).
480.
See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgagingthe American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotionof Home Equity Financing, 69 TULANE
L. REv. 373, 414-16 (1994) (suggesting that the home mortgage interest deduction
encourages home equity borrowing for consumption); Roberta Mann, The (Not So) Little
House on the Prairie:The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1347, 1359, 1368 (2000) (arguing that the home mortgage interest deduction only
benefits certain types of buyers and that it contributes to urban sprawl); Rebecca N.
Morrow, Billions of Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage
InterestDeduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751 (2012) (arguing that the home
mortgage interest deduction inflates home prices and encourages borrowing against home
equity); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction:A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 236, 240-43 (2010)
(revealing that no reason was presented for the home interest deduction when enacted as
part of the 1913 income tax, and that all policy justifications were presented after the
enactment, suggesting that the provision was not enacted to advance policy purposes).
481.
See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction 39-40 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9284.pdf. The extent to which the tax benefits affect value is
uncertain, but has been estimated to be as much as 7%. See James Poterba & Todd Sinai,
Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing: Deductions for Property Taxes and
Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed Rental Income (Jan. 5, 2008),
http://economics.mit.edulfiles/2525.
482.
See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Misinformed and Misled About the Benefits of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 16 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. & RES., no. 1, 2014, at 219, 22021 (summarizing and challenging arguments for the home mortgage interest deduction);
Dennis J. Ventry, The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform, 135 TAX NOTES 181, 182-83, 193-96
(Apr. 9, 2012) (pointing out the inadequacies of the mortgage interest deduction and
suggesting reform alternatives).
483.
See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012) (allowing a deduction for interest); § 857(b)(2)(B)
(granting REITs a deduction for dividends paid).
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ratio of non-financial members of the S&P 500,484 which suggests
that REITs are more prone to borrowing than other types of
publicly traded regular corporations. The explanation for this
practice may be that the REIT dividend payout requirement
makes debt less expensive than equity for REITs, so they take on
more debt than regular corporations. 485 A more relevant barometer
of whether REITs borrow responsibly may be a comparison of
REITs to other owners of real estate. REIT real estate leverage is
much lower than non-REIT real estate leverage. 486 Thus, REITs,
with their lower leverage, can help stabilize real estate markets.
Finally, partial or complete repeal of REIT taxation could also
affect investors. Because Congress enacted REIT taxation to help
more investors have an opportunity to invest in real estate
portfolios, 487 the analysis should consider whether REIT taxation
is accomplishing this purpose. The study of mutual fund
ownership is comprehensive, so information about mutual fund
ownership may shed some light on what part of the population is
likely to hold REIT stock. Approximately 46% of the population
holds mutual funds. 488 Most of those investors are in the
wealthiest half of the population, but ownership of mutual funds,
as a percentage of income cohort, is greatest among households
that have between $100,000 and $199,999 of income. 489 This
suggests that a similar cross section of the population could or does
own REIT stock directly or through a REIT mutual fund.
Furthermore, a significant portion of the population holds REIT
stock indirectly through their retirement fund holdings with
484.

See MIKE KIRBY, GREEN STREET ADVISORS, CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN THE REIT

https://www.greenstreetadvisors.comlpdf/insights/capitalstructure
SECTOR 4 (2009),
0709.pdf (reporting that the median leverage ratio (net liabilities - total market
capitalization) for non-financial companies was 21% and was 54% for REITs); see also Feng,
Gosh & Sirmans, supranote 245, at 90 (reporting that on average REITs maintain a debt
ratio of above 50% while non-REIT firms have maintained a ratio below 50%, and a REIT's
debt ratio grows and stabilizes around 65% ten years after an IPO).
See Feng, Gosh & Sirmans, supra note 245, at 90-91.
485.
Ponda Interview, supra note 214. Bank lending standards typically hold banks to
486.
prudent underwriting standards that include loan-to-value limits. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 365.2(b)(2)(ii) (2015). The FDIC generally requires that loan-to-value limits should not
exceed the following amounts: 65% for raw land, 75% for land development, 80% for
construction of commercial, multifamily, and nonresidential property, 85% for 1- to 4-family
residential, and 85% for improved property. 12 C.F.R. pt. 365, subpt. A, app. A (2015).
Undoubtedly, many property owners and lenders lend up those limits, which would mean
that private real estate could be leveraged to levels that significantly differ from the REIT
debt ratios.
See supra note 67.
487.
488.
See supra note 60.
See INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 106 (54th ed.),
489.
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf.
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institutional investors. 490 Even though Congress probably did not
anticipate the scope of mutual funds and retirement plans that
exist today, REIT taxation provides the opportunity for a broad
cross section of the population to participate in a portfolio of real
estate through retirement plans or mutual funds. Although that is
not the explicitly stated purpose of REIT taxation, perhaps it is a
desirable unintended consequence that REIT reform would
eliminate.
Although there are calls for REIT reform, the proposals do not
withstand careful tax-policy analysis. Consequently, repealing or
scaling back REIT taxation does not enjoy tax-policy support and
appears to be the product of misinformed perception of REIT
taxation.
2. Alter Retirement-Savings and Foreign-Investment Tax
Policy. Instead of reforming REIT taxation, the government could
curtail the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation by changing the
rules that govern the taxation of REIT investors. A significant
portion of lost tax revenue attributed to REIT taxation actually
comes as a result of tax-exempt and foreign investors holding
REIT stock. 491 Modifying the rules governing the taxation of
retirement plans, other tax-exempt entities, and foreign investors
could therefore raise tax revenue. Of course, any effort to alter the
overall tax exemption for retirement-savings funds would face
almost impossible odds. Other institutional investors, such as
university endowments, may be more vulnerable to attack, 492 but
even changing the tax treatment of that type of entity would
appear to be a longshot. 493 The only hope for reform in this area

490.
See supra note 444.
491.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 579-83, 592-613; see also
Alan I. Appel et al., FIRPTA, Section 892 and REITS, 2015 A.B.A. TAx SEC.: REAL EST.
COMM., May 8, 2015, at 35-40, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?file
name=/TX334800/newsletterpubs/15may-re-firptasection892andreits.pdf (describing REIT
tax advantages available to foreign sovereigns).
492.
See, e.g., Annie Lowry, Take Away Harvard'sNonprofit Status, N.Y. MAG. (Sept.
9, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/take-away-harvards-nonprofit-sta
tus.html (arguing that Harvard's endowment should not be exempt from tax); Peter
Schworm & Matt Viser, Lawmakers Target $1B Endowments, BOSTON (May 9, 2009),
http://www.boston.com/news/locallarticles/2008/05/08/lawmakers-targetlb_endowments/
?page=full (reporting that Massachusetts lawmakers asked finance officials to study a plan
that would impose a 2.5% annual assessment on colleges with endowments over $1 billion).
493.
Despite the calls for taxation of large university endowments, apparently no
legislative action has occurred to tax them. See Jeffrey J. Selingo, Are Harvard, Yale, and
Stanford Really Public Universities?, WASH. POST: GRADE POINT (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.cominews/grade-point/wp/2015/04/06/are-harvard-yale-and-st
anford-really-public-universities.
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would therefore be some type of carve-out that would subject some
portion of REIT distributions to such entities to taxation. For
example, the law could require REITs to pay corporate tax on
amounts distributed to tax-exempt and foreign investors. Such a
change could reduce the negative tax-revenue effect of REIT
taxation, but it would not eliminate inequity, inefficiency, or bad
optics.
Subjecting REIT income received by retirement plans to
income tax would not eliminate inequity because REITs would still
be taxed differently from corporations. Also, subjecting REIT
income to tax would treat REIT income differently from income
received from direct ownership in real estate. Taxing REIT income
at the retirement fund level would not change the inefficiency
described above 494 because REITs would still have to separate
operations from ownership to receive preferential treatment for
income not distributed to tax-exempts and would need one of the
inefficient structures to do so. The bad optics would continue
because REITs would still appear to erode the corporate tax base.
Subjecting tax-exempt and foreign investors' REIT income to
tax could, however, significantly affect small investors' ability to
benefit from investments in real estate portfolios. Such a change
could seriously impede the flow of capital to real estate markets,
which would reduce or eliminate the monitoring role that
institutional investors play in REITs. Consequently, small
investors would lose the benefits obtained directly and indirectly
through such investment. 495 If institutional investors lost the tax
benefit of investing in REITs, they would undoubtedly reduce their
REIT investments, the flow of capital to real estate markets would
decrease, and the stability of commercial real estate could suffer.
Consequently, in addition to being politically infeasible, the gains
to be had from changing rules governing institutional investment
in REITs would not outweigh the costs of changing the current
rules.
3. Eliminate Double Tax Altogether. Another way to
eliminate the disparity between the taxation of REIT income and
the income of regular corporations is to simply eliminate the
double tax on corporate income. Congress could eliminate the
double tax by either eliminating the entity tax altogether or by

494.
See supra text accompanying notes 394-411.
495.
See supra text accompanying notes 421-24, 446-51 (discussing the benefits that
derive from institutional investment in REITs, which inure to others who also invest in
REITs).
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adopting a method for integrating corporate and individual tax
rates. The validity of the corporate tax has been debated for
decades from various perspectives. 4 96 This Article does not attempt
to enter that discussion or weigh in on it from a general
perspective. Instead, the Article considers elimination of the
double tax that results from the current U.S. corporate tax regime
merely as a point of reference for correcting the inequity that
results from taxing REIT and corporate income differently. If tax
law eliminated the double tax, the incentive to avoid the double
tax would also disappear, and without such incentive, parties
would be less likely to form flow-through and conduit entities such
as REITs. 4 97 Nonetheless, eliminating the entity-level tax would

eliminate all corporate tax revenue. An integration system would
eliminate the double tax on income distributed to taxable
shareholders. Either of those changes could have a negative,
although perhaps not significant, effect on tax revenues. 498
To the extent that eliminating the double tax on corporate
income would negatively affect tax revenue, Congress could
change other parts of the law to offset the lost tax revenues.
Congress could, for instance, increase the tax on income from
flow-through and conduit entities or subject greater portions of the
income of tax-exempt entities to tax. 4 9 9 Parties who are allocated
income from flow-through and conduit entities could, therefore,
see an increase in tax rates, and they would most likely oppose the
elimination of the entity- and shareholder-level tax on corporate

496.
See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income
Tax Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 592-98 (2008) (summarizing some of the
arguments in favor of the entity-level corporate tax).
497.
See Bradley T. Borden, Tax Aspects of Partnerships,LLCs, and Alternative Forms
&

of Business Organizations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 147, 160-61 (Robert W. Hillman

Mark J. Lowenstein eds., 2015) (providing that Canadian tax practitioners believe that the
Canadian integrated corporate tax system disincentivizes the use of flow-through tax
entities, so Canada flow-through tax regimes have not developed to the extent of U.S.
flow-through tax regimes). Nonetheless, Canada and other countries that have integrated
individual and corporate tax systems often have a REIT regime. See Canada Income Tax
Act § 122.1(1) (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)); Andrew H. Kingissepp, Canada:New Tax on
Income Trusts; Economic Update, J. INT'L TAX'N, Mar. 2007, at 22, 25-27 Daly, supra note
27, at 840, 843, 847-49, 855-58 (discussing REIT regimes in the United Kingdom and
Germany). The existence of REITs in such regimes may suggest that REITs provide non-tax
advantages that attract investors.
498.
See Borden, Rethinking the Effect, supra note 27, at 612-13 (demonstrating that
the tax revenue generated from REIT income is not much less than the tax revenue that
the same income would generate if it were earned by regular corporations).
499.
See Karen C. Burke, PassthroughEntities: The Missing Element in Business Tax
Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1335-36 (2013) (recognizing that revenue lost from
repealing the corporate tax would have to be offset by increases elsewhere).
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income.5 00 If Congress were to eliminate the double tax on
corporate income, corporate income that flows through to
shareholders might become subject to the same tax to which REITs
are currently subject. That may result in investments shifting
away from REITs, and other flow-through entities, to corporations.
Thus, REITs, REIT investors, members of partnerships, and their
advisors would most likely oppose eliminating the double tax.
Eliminating the double tax on corporate income would satisfy
other tax policy objectives related to REIT taxation. Eliminating
the corporate double tax would promote equity because the owners
of entities would not be subject to the double tax, regardless of
form, so REIT income, income of regular corporations, and income
from partnerships would be taxed the same, not taking into
account the taxation of investors. Elimination of the corporate tax
would also promote efficiency because property owners would not
have to use cumbersome ownership structures to divide operations
from real estate ownership. Instead, all income would be subject
to a single level of tax. The problem of bad optics should also
disappear with the elimination of the double tax on corporate
income. The downside of such reform is that single-entity
ownership of operations and real estate eliminates transparency
that results from having multiple publicly traded entities serving
different functions,5 0 1 so elimination of the double tax on corporate
income would not enhance efficiency perfectly.
Eliminating the double tax should not affect small investors'
ability to invest in REITs or other arrangements that hold real
estate. If Congress were to eliminate the double tax, small
investors could invest in real estate through corporations or
REITs, both of which could hold diversified real estate portfolios
and be subject to the same tax. The single level of tax would also
put REITs on a footing similar to that of partnerships, so small
investors could have opportunities through REITs that are
available to wealthy partnership investors. The elimination of
double tax could, however, negatively affect the flow of capital to
real estate markets. Without the comparative advantage that
REITs currently enjoy, REITs may be unable to attract the same
level of investment because the investment choice will become tax

See, e.g., Richard Rubin, Bid to Lower Corporate Tax Rate Stirs Backlash from
500.
Business, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-13/bid-to
-lower-corporate-tax-rate-stirs-backlash-from-businesses.html (discussing opposition from
owners of flow-through businesses to legislation that would reduce the corporate tax rate
and curb other business tax breaks to pay for the rate reduction).
See supratext accompanying notes 421-24.
501.
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neutral. 502 Thus, the elimination of the double tax satisfies most of
the REIT policy criteria, but it may negatively affect the flow of
capital to real estate markets, which would most likely negatively
affect the stability of the real estate markets.
4. Expand Entity-Level Taxation. Another way to enhance
equity between corporations, REITs, and partnerships is to
expand entity-level taxation to cover REITs and partnerships. 5 0 3 A
broader entity-level tax regime could increase tax revenue,
depending upon how the law would affect owner-level taxation.
The broader entity-level tax would enhance equity because all
forms of business entities would be subject to the tax, and it would
improve efficiency because property owners would not be able to
avoid the entity-level tax with complex ownership structures. The
elimination of such structures would also cure the bad optics in
the current system, because corporations would not spin off real
estate to erode the corporate tax base. If the entity-level tax
applied to direct ownership in real estate, small investors who
owned property through a corporation would be treated the same
as investors who could invest directly in real estate. If the
comprehensive entity-level tax did not have a distribution
requirement for corporations that own real estate, it would most
likely disrupt the flow of capital to real estate markets, which
benefit under the current REIT rules because investors appear to
prefer investments that make regular distributions. 5 04
This discussion suggests that Congress could enhance equity,
efficiency, and optics by creating a tax system that treated all
entities the same. Such a system would not deprive small investors
from the investment opportunities afforded to wealthy investors.
It would, however, most likely divert capital away from real estate
markets. However, perhaps the unique attributes of real estate
502.
Notice, however, that following the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003, which lowered the corporate dividend rate to 15% making the corporate double
tax less onerous, see P.L. 108-27, § 302(e)(5), (6), REIT market capitalization of REITs
continued to grow significantly. See supra Figure 1. This suggests that anything less than
complete repeal of the double tax and the REIT distribution requirement may not stem the
flow of capital to REITs, but the complete repeal of the corporate tax would tax the income
of regular corporations and REITs identically.
See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Rethinking Taxation of Privately Held
503.
Businesses (July 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=2500476 (proposing an entity-level tax on all business entities,
which presumably could include REITs).
504.
See Michael Santoli, Changing Their Stripes, BARRON'S (May 19, 2012),
http://online.barrons.comlarticles/SB50001424053111904571704577406161684395748
(attributing REIT growth and improved REIT market value to "investors' rabid appetite for
income-producing investments").
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warrant treating entities that own real estate differently from
other ownerships structures.5 0 5 If changing the law to advance
principles of equity and efficiency has a significantly negative
effect on the economy, the traditional tax policy objectives should
perhaps yield to the economic benefits conferred by the current
system.
C. Bifurcate Income
All of the reform alternatives discussed to this point suffer
from some policy or other defect, and the prospect of significantly
changing REIT taxation or repealing or expanding entity-level tax
is probably remote. Instead of focusing on entity structures,
perhaps the law should embrace a system that exempts
passive-type income from entity-level tax and eliminate inequity
and inefficiency with a system that bifurcates income (i.e.,
separates passive-type income from other income) within single
entities.5 0 6 To separate real-estate income from operating income
under the current system, operating corporations spin off their
real estate assets or convert to REITs with taxable REIT
subsidiaries.5 0 7 Under the current system, REITs form taxable
REIT subsidiaries to provide noncustomary tenant services to the
users of their property.508 These structures often separate
operations from ownership in form only, with control of both
operations and ownership residing in common owners.5 09
The Windstream spinoff provides a framework for considering
how a bifurcation approach would differ from the current system.
To separate the passive real estate income from its operations and
ensure that two types of income were taxed differently,
Windstream had to transfer the real estate to a separate publicly
traded entity.5 10 Following the spinoff, Windstream will continue
to exert control over the use of the property held by the REIT
through the long-term lease agreement between the two public
companies.5 11 The structure requires: a separate public offering;
multiple entities, which will not be under common ownership
505.
See supra text accompanying notes 472-90.
506.
Commentators have proposed bifurcation in other contexts. See, e.g., Borden,
Brown & Wagner, supra note 142, 312-14 (proposing an elective regime for bifurcation of
investment income from ordinary income in the real estate development context).
507.
See supra text accompanying notes 402-11.
508.
See supraPart II.C.6.
509.
See supratext accompanying notes 398-411.
510.
See Windstream News Release, supra note 332.
511.
See id. (providing that the operating corporation will enter into a long-term
triple-net lease with the REIT).
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following the spinoff; and complex financing arrangements. Tax
law explicitly blesses this type of income bifurcation, 51 2 which
effectively exempts passive real estate income from the corporate
tax. Because tax law explicitly allows income bifurcation through
the use of a complex structure, perhaps it should consider allowing
corporations to bifurcate income without the structure.
To bifurcate income within a single corporate structure, tax
law would have to draw the line between income exempt from
corporate tax and income subject to it. The current REIT regime
provides a framework for bifurcating passive income from
operating income. REITs that have taxable REIT subsidiaries
must determine whether any tenant revenues include payment for
the subsidiary services; the REIT must pay tax on any services
revenue that it does not pay to the taxable REIT subsidiary, and
the subsidiary must pay regular corporate tax on its income. 513 A
bifurcation regime could use rules that are similar to the current
regime's rules for identifying income attributable to the use of
property and income attributable to services. For example, the law
could provide that absent evidence to the contrary, income from
noncustomary tenant services or management and operation of
the property would equal no less than 150% of the cost of providing
the services. 514 All income determined to be from services would be
subject to an entity-level tax, all rental distributed rental income
would be taxed at the investor level.
The Windstream structure includes a long-term lease
between the operating company and REIT.5 15 That agreement
includes rental terms and establishes the amount of income that
the REIT will recognize from renting the property to the
corporation. Even with such an agreement, the parties may
struggle to establish the appropriate amount of market rent,5 16 but
the separation of operations and ownership provides a greater
likelihood that the rent will be arm's length. The bifurcation
approach would require a separate determination of arm's length
rental income, so lawmakers would have to devise a method for
computing the appropriate amount of deemed rental income.
512.
See supra Part II.C.7.
513.
See supra text accompanying notes 289-93.
514. The law currently applies this 150% test to operating and management services,
and to the amount of redetermined rents for services provided by a taxable REIT subsidiary.
See I.R.C. § 857(b)(7)(B)(v), (D) (2012); supra text accompanying notes 291-93.
515.
See Windstream News Release, supra note 332.
516.
See Lee A. Sheppard, Gambling on REIT Status, 143 TAX NOTES 1463, 1465-67
(June 30, 2014) (discussing issues related to valuation of the lease between a REITs and an
operating company).
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If tax law can adequately separate real estate income from
other income, it could exempt the real estate income from the
entity-level corporate tax. To maintain consistency with the
current REIT rules, such a bifurcation regime would have to
5 17
require corporations to distribute at least 90% of such income.
The distribution requirement could help ensure that the
transparency of the current system would not be lost. Nonetheless,
the system could dampen investment in real estate because
investors who acquire stock in a corporation that adopts the
bifurcation approach may not be able to direct the use of their
investment proceeds. Consequently, the bifurcation regime would
impair the ability to manage the diversification of an investment
portfolio because investors would have to buy stock in corporations
that had both operations and real estate. The regime could inhibit
small investors' ability to invest in real estate because their
options would be curtailed if both operations and real estate
resided within a single entity.
The effect that bifurcation would have on the flow of capital
to real estate markets is less clear, but it could be negative. The
REIT regime provides investors the opportunity to monitor
management of real estate specifically.5 18 Investors have less
monitoring ability and less influence over the management of real
estate if a single entity owns real estate as part of an operating
business. Consequently, the effectiveness of real estate monitoring
would be diminished under a bifurcation regime, and the efficiency
gains that bifurcation may provide with simpler structures may be
offset by such losses.
The bifurcation may not measurably advance equity. Under
the bifurcation approach, the law would continue to treat different
types of income differently. It would also treat corporate income
differently from partnership income. Consequently, bifurcation
does not measurably advance equity. This suggests that although
bifurcation would eliminate complex structures, it would not
provide a significant improvement over the current system.
D.

Scorecardof Reform Alternatives

The discussion of the reform alternatives reveals that each
alternative presents policy challenges. No alternative appears
capable of achieving all policy objectives, but some may achieve
more objectives than others. Assessment of the various
alternatives is a largely qualitative endeavor, but Table 1 presents

517.
518.

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 421-24.
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a scorecard that summarize and provides some clarity to the
analysis of the various reform alternatives. The scorecard is not
without its limits. For instance, it does not attempt to prioritize
objectives. Instead it assigns equal weight to each policy objective
and to optics. It also includes a category for political feasibility of
an alternative. It then scores the extent to which an alternative
achieves or fails to advance a particular policy objective. If a
reform alternative clearly achieves a policy objective, the
alternative receives a plus (+) for that policy objective. If an
alternative clearly fails to achieve a policy objective, it receives a
minus (-) for the objective. If the alternative's effect on a policy
objective is unclear or negligible, then it receives a zero for that
objective. The scorecard assigns a value of one to pluses and a
value of negative one to minuses to create a score for each
alternative.

Table 1: Scorecard of Reform Alternatives
Alternatives

Objectives
Total
Stem Promote Promote Improve Support Channel Politically
TaxEquity Efficiency Optics
Small
Capital Feasible
Base
Investors to Real
Erosion
Estate

Maintain

Prohibit
REIT
Spinoffs
Narrow
Definition of
Real Property
Restrict
Services
REITs
Perform
Repeal REIT
Taxation
Alter
RetirementSavings
Policy
Eliminate
Double Tax
Expand
Entity-Level
Tax
Accommodate
Bifurcation

-

0

0

0

+

+

+

2

0

0

0

+

-

-

-

-2

+

0

0

+

-

-

-

-1

0

-

-

0

-

-

-

-5

+

0

0

+

+

+

0

0

0

-

+

+

+

+

-

-

1

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

1

0
0

0

+

Stts~o
Status
Quo

-1

0
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Maintaining status quo scores the highest under this system.
This is not surprising because even though REITs may have a
nominal negative effect on tax revenue, they provide other non-tax
benefits to society and the economy. 519 The qualitative analysis
above also concludes that while REIT taxation is part of a tax
system that treats different types of income and entities
differently, the manner in which the law treats REITs is not
inherently inequitable. 520 Property owners use complex structures
to obtain preferential tax treatment, which causes inefficiencies, 5 2 1
but those structures provide non-tax benefits such as providing
greater opportunities to diversify and greater access to monitor
real estate management. 522 Consequently, REIT taxation does not
seriously violate any tax-policy objective. On the positive side,
REIT taxation provides greater investment opportunities for a
broad cross section of the population, it helps channel capital to
the real estate markets, and it appears to help stabilize real estate
markets. 523
The only other reform alternatives that have positive scores
are eliminating double tax and expanding entity-level tax. Those
alternatives have positive scores because they could reduce the
negative tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation, and they could also
help improve equity and efficiency. Nonetheless, they would
negatively affect the investment opportunities provided by REIT
taxation, and they would likely stem the flow of capital to real
estate markets. As a result, they do not score as well as
maintaining the status quo.
V.

CONCLUSION

The findings in this Article lead to the conclusion that the
current discussion of REIT reform is much ado about nothing, and
results from bad optics caused by misinformed understandings of
the effects of REIT taxation. REIT taxation does not have a
significant negative effect on government tax revenues, and it does
not appear to offend any particular tax policies. REIT taxation is
thus a benign component of the tax system from a traditional
tax-policy standpoint. On a positive note, REIT taxation provides
significant non-tax benefits to investors, the real estate market,
and the broader economy. Consequently, Congress should not take
action to significantly curtail the scope of REIT taxation. Instead,
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part III.A.
supra Part III.B.
supraPart III.C.1.
supra Part III.C.2.
supra Part W.A.
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it and Treasury may be well served to further study REIT taxation
and consider whether less intrusive methods exist to improve
REIT taxation in ways that benefit investors and the economy.
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APPENDIX A: REIT MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND
All REITs
End

Equity REITs

Mortgage REITs

GDP DATA

Hybrid REITs

Market

Of #of Market Avg. Cap as #of Market %
# of Market %of #of Market %of GDP
Year
Market
a
ElTs Cap Total
Total
REITs Cap
Cap
%of REMT
Ca
Toal E~
a
a RESTS CapCa
GDPCaCaCp
$571 38%
$592 40% $1,168
34 $1,494
$44
0.13% 12
$332
22%
$775 41%
$729
39% $1,282
20%
$377
46 $1,881
$41
0.15% 17
$517 37%
53 $1,394
$26
0.10% 20
$336
24%
$540
39% $1,429
$239 34%
$242
34%
$232 33% $1,549
53
$712
$13
0.05% 19
$312 35%
$276
31%
$312
$20
0.05% 12
$900
35% $1,689
46
$416 32%
0.07% 27
$410
31%
$21
62 $1,308
37% $1,878
$483
$398 26%
$592
69 $1,528
$22
0.07% 32
$538
35%
39% $2,086
$340 24%
71 $1,412
$20
0.06% 33
$496
41%
$576
35% $2,357
0.07% 32
$377 21%
$25
71 $1,754
$744
42%
$633
36% $2,632
$510 22%
75 $2,229
$31
0.08% 35
41%
$942
$847
37% $2,863
0.08% 36
$541 22%
$32
76 $2,439
$978
40%
$920
38% $3,211
$1,094 33% $3,345
66 $3,299
$1,133 34%
$50
0.10% 30 $1,071 32%
$1,406 34%
0.12% 26 $1,469 34%
$72
59 $4,257
$1,329 31% $3,638
0.13% 25 $1,795 35%
$1,801 35%
$86
59 $5,085
$1,489 29% $4,041
$3,162 41%
82 $7,674
$94
0.18% 37 $3,270 43%
$1,241
16% $4,347
$3,626 37%
96 $9,924 $103 0.22% 45 $4,336 44%
$1,962 20% $4,590
0.20% 53 $4,759 49%
$3,161 33%
$88
110 $9,702
$1,782 18% $4,870
$3,621 32%
$98
0.22% 56 $6,142 54%
117 $11,435
$1,673 15% $5,253
120 $11,662
$97
0.21% 56 $6,770 58%
$3,536 30%
$1,356 12% $5,658
$2,549 29%
119 $8,737
$73
0.15% 58 $5,552 64%
$636
7% $5,980
138 $12,968
$94
0.21% 86 $8,786 68%
$2,586 20%
$1,596 12% $6,174
$2,773 17%
142 $15,912 $112 0.24% 89 $11,171 70%
$1,968 12% $6,539
189 $32,159 $170 0.47% 135 $26,082 81%
$3,339 11%
$2,678 8% $6,879
226 $44,306 $196 0.61% 175 $38,812 88%
$2,503 6%
$2,991 7% $7,309
$3,395 6%
219 $57,541 $263 0.75% 178 $49,913 87%
$4,233 7% $7,664
199 $88,776 $446 1.10% 166 $78,302 88%
$4,779 5%
$5,696 6% $8,100
211 $140,534 $666 1.63% 176 $127,825 91%
$7,370 5%
$5,338 4% $8,609
$6,481 5%
210 $138,301 $659 1.52% 173 $126,905 92%
$4,916 4% $9,089
203 $124,262 $612 1.29% 167 $118,233 95%
$4,442 4%
$1,588 1% $9,661
189 $138,715 $734 1.35% 158 $134,431 97%
$1,632 1%
$2,652 2% $10,285
$3,991 3%
182 $154,899 $851 1.46% 151 $147,092 95%
$3,816 2% $10,622
176 $161,937 $920 1.48% 149 $151,272 93%
$7,146 4%
$3,519
2% $10,978
171 $224,212 $1,311 1.95% 144 $204,800 91%
$14,187 6%
$5,225
2% $11,511
$25,964 8%
$6,639 2% $12,275
193 $307,895 $1,595 2.51% 153 $275,291 89%
197 $330,691 $1,679 2.53% 152 $301,491 91%
$23,394 7%
$5,807
2% $13,094
183 $438,071 $2,394 3.16% 138 $400,741 91%
$29,195 7%
$8,134 2% $13,856
152 $312,009 $2,053 2.16% 118 $288,695 93%
$19,054 6%
$4,260
1% $14,478
136 $191,651 $1,409 1.30% 113 $176,238 92%
$14,281 7%
$1,133
1% $14,719
142 $271,199 $1,910 1.88% 115 $248,355 92%
$22,103 8%
$741
0% $14,419
153 $389,295 $2,544 2.60% 126 $358,908 92%
$30,387 8%
$14,964
160 $450,501 $2,816 2.90% 130 $407,529 90%
$43,972 10%
$15,518
172 $603,415 $3,508 3.73% 139 $544,415 90%
$59,000 10%
$16,163
$62,057 9%
202 $670,334 $3,318 4.00% 161 $608,277 91%
$16,768
216 $907,426 $4,201 5.21% 177 $846,410 93%
$61,017 7%
$17,419
* All REIT dollar amounts in millions. GDP dollar amounts in billions.
Source: National Income and ProductAccounts Tables, Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product, BuREAu OF EcoN.
ANALYSIS (last updated on Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqlD=9&step=3&isuri
=1&904=1971&903=5&906=a&905=2015&910=x&911=0 U.S.; REIT Industry Equity Market CapHistorical REIT Industry Market Capitalization: 1972-2014, REIT.coM, https://www.reit.com/dataresearch/datalus-reit-industry-equity-market-cap (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).

